Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

35. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, May 8, 1964, 9 p.m.

4100. Dept also pass White House. Subject: FRG reunification proposal. Embtel 3953 and 4099.² Chancellor Erhard, during my meeting with him today, raised with me a question which he said was of great importance. He hoped that I would convey his views to the President before Secretary Rusk departed for the NATO Ministerial Meeting in The Hague.³ It concerned the German reunification proposal now before the Ambassadorial Group.

As a result of rumors to the effect that the FRG proposal had not been well received by the other three and that they had suggested that the proposal be presented by the FRG on its own, he had experienced increasing pressures from within his party which he found difficult to hold down. If there is no agreement on the basis of the FRG proposal, or if it is not put forward jointly but the FRG is forced to present it alone, it would appear to all that ground had been lost in the solution of the German question. This posed not only a general problem but an acute internal German political problem. If it should be suspected that it was the US which had blocked agreement on a proposal which France would have accepted, he would find it extremely difficult to control the pro-French group, which was small but very powerful.

The Chancellor expressed his firm conviction that the presentation to the Soviets of a suitable agreed proposal by the three powers in conjunction with the FRG would not bring about a deterioration of US or Western relations with the Soviets. He pointed out that the Russians continued to put forward their proposals on all German and Berlin matters and that there was no reason why the West should not do the same. He favored the policy of seeking limited understandings with the USSR as he and the President had agreed in Texas. Indeed, the FRG had just made it possible for the Bolshoi Ballet to appear in the FRG and West Berlin and it would probably accept an exchange of West and East German newspapers. However, the German people would not understand it if efforts to seek agreement were limited to peripheral issues, since they would conclude that the reunification issue had been forgotten.

The Chancellor understood there was little likelihood that anything put forward at this time would be negotiable with the Soviets. It was necessary, however, from both a psychological and political point of view, to put forward something concrete. The Chancellor urged strongly that the President discuss this matter with the Secretary before the latter’s departure for The Hague. He urged further that every effort be made to reach Quadripartite agreement on a proposal which could be presented to the USSR by the three powers in association with the FRG.

I replied that at the last Ministerial Meeting we had readily agreed to consider an FRG proposal. Since that time the German draft had been discussed, and in some instances modified, in the Ambassadorial Group. Other differences in view were still under discussion. We understood the German preference for a plan which the three powers could sponsor in association with the FRG. The question of whether the three powers should make the proposal to the Soviets or whether the FRG should put it forward alone depended principally on whether a quadripartitely agreed proposal could be achieved. It was not a question of whether we all support reunification. I recounted efforts to this end made by the Kennedy administration shortly after it first came into office when a crisis arose over Berlin.

The main problem about the FRG proposal as it now stood and as it might be modified, was not whether it was negotiable with the Soviets but whether it constituted a credible Western position. It would be counter-productive if a position were put forward which represented a retrogression from previous positions or was so patently unrealistic as to have the appearance of a purely propaganda exercise. We were earnestly seeking a reasonable proposal in the Ambassadorial Group. If such a proposal could be formulated, I was sure we would be willing to associate ourselves with it. I would, however, convey the Chancellor’s concern to the President immediately so that it could be taken into account by Secretary Rusk in his discussions with FonMin Schroeder and his British and French colleagues in The Hague.

Comment: The fact that the Chancellor has raised this question as a matter of urgency, with the suggestion that his comments be passed directly to the President, indicates the importance he attaches to it. He has apparently come under increasing pressure from the Adenauer-Krone-Strauss-Guttenberg group on this issue. It may well be that the French, who we understand are really more lukewarm on the FRG proposal than we, are hinting to this group that it is the US which is blocking the FRG plan. I am not sure that Erhard, or even Schroeder, fully appreciate the repercussions their proposal might have. They do, however, feel strongly that the present situation calls for some new Western initiative on reunification for which they would like, because of internal political considerations, to obtain credit. The Germans have clearly gained the impression from the Ambassadorial meetings and from other information which has reached them that the Americans are not enthusiastic about a new initiative. They seem to feel that our approach is overly influenced by the possible effect which such an initiative might have on our relations with the Soviets, including our ability to negotiate additional bilateral agreements. The Chancellor emphasized twice that what he proposed would not, in his judgment, exacerbate our relations with Moscow.

This is not a critical issue from the standpoint of the Chancellor’s overall position, which, following the Baden-Wuerttemberg election, is now stronger than ever. It could, however, determine whether Schroeder can in the future merely survive as Foreign Minister—and possibly only until the 1965 elections—or whether he can play an important role, commensurate with his ability, in the making of German foreign policy.

I recommend strongly that this matter be discussed by the Secretary and the President prior to the Secretary’s departure and that insofar as possible we take a positive position in discussions on this question at The Hague. As the Dept is aware, the Embassy in Embtel 3953 submitted a suggestion for an alternative approach in the event agreement along the lines proposed by the FRG is not feasible. This would have the effect of deflecting the FRG proposal into the creation of a four-power standing committee on the German problem. I am submitting by separate telegram a summary of views expressed recently by Kuhlmann-Stumm and Majonica, foreign policy leaders in the FDP and CDU respectively, which would indicate the acceptability of such an approach in FRG political circles (see Embtel 4099).

I believe there is a temporary malaise in our relationship with the FRG, some of the aspects of which are being dealt with in a subsequent telegram. While I do not believe this is serious, I feel it justifies a little greater effort now than we might otherwise make along the lines proposed by the Chancellor in order to provide convincing evidence that we have not lost sight of the German reunification objective in our efforts to achieve more limited agreements with the USSR.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 32–4 GER. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and Berlin and passed to the White House.
2. Telegram 3953 from Bonn, April 25, reported that Schroeder expected to discuss reunification issues at the Quadripartite meeting and outlined possible U.S. responses. (Ibid.) Telegram 4099 from Bonn, May 8, reported on discussions with influential Germans regarding the Federal Republic’s reunification initiative. (Ibid.)
3. May 10–14.