Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

37. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/11

The Hague, May 11, 1964, 8 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTY-THIRDMINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

The Hague, Netherlands, May 12–14, 1964

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Mr. Tyler
  • Mr. Ausland
• France
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
  • Mr. Lucet
  • Mr. Beaumarchais
  • Mr. De la Grandville
• United Kingdom
  • Foreign Minister Butler
  • Sir Peter Garran, Ambassador to the Netherlands
  • Lord Hood
  • Mr. Barnes
• Federal Republic of Germany
  • Foreign Minister Schroeder
  • Mr. Carstens
  • Mr. Krapf
  • Mr. Lilienfeld
  • Mr. Oncken

SUBJECT

• Initiative on Germany

Following the dinner, Mr. Butler said that he considered this meeting a follow-up to the one held in Paris last December² and the work done by the Ambassadorial Group in Washington. He said he would like to hear first from Schroeder, particularly whether Schroeder thought the initiative should be a declaration or designed to bring about negotiations.

After expressing gratitude for the work of the Ambassadorial Group, Schroeder said he would like to see the three Western powers take a step vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This should contain the basis for negotiations. For the Federal Republic to take a step at this time would be too theoretical. Schroeder emphasized that he did not have in mind propaganda or merely quieting certain quarters back home. The Germans felt that the struggle with the Soviet Union would continue and that ground would be lost if the position on Germany were not made clear. He did not agree with those who said that a step at this time would lead to deterioration in relations with the Soviets. Although he was not optimistic about a positive Soviet response, he thought that the idea of a Four Power group might interest the Soviets. In any event, the step would not cause a negative Soviet reaction. He proposed, therefore, that the work of the Ambassadorial Group be condensed in form and content and presented to the Soviets by the three Western powers either jointly or in a parallel manner.

Butler asked Schroeder if when he spoke of the Four Power council he thought that it would take up the question of German unification at the outset. Schroeder noted that the German paper was rather comprehensive regarding the tasks assigned to the council. The Secretary remarked that the Four Power council would only meet if the Soviets accepted the over-all proposal.

Butler asked Schroeder what he thought were the chances for negotiations on the basis of the German plan. Schroeder replied that he thought there probably would be no full acceptance, but at least the unity of the West would have been demonstrated.

Mr. Butler asked Schroeder if he thought a tripartite initiative would have any effect on the effort of the Federal Republic to improve its relations with the satellites. Schroeder replied that he thought the two policies were quite compatible.

Butler then raised the question of European security. Schroeder emphasized that it would be a mistake to make any concessions now in view of the uncertainty regarding whether the Soviets would engage in negotiations.

Couve de Murville remarked that he understood that Schroeder wanted to keep the reunification question alive. He noted that the German proposal had been discussed in Washington at length. General agreement had been reached on the German paper. The question of how the German paper would be endorsed, however, was not really discussed. Now Mr. Schroeder had new thoughts. He wanted the three powers to take an initiative. He asked Mr. Schroeder to give his thoughts on this change in procedure.

Schroeder replied that Couve’s statement proceeded from a wrong assumption. There had not been a change in the German views. The German Government had always been flexible on procedure. What it mainly wanted was an agreement on ideas. Finally, after considering the various alternatives, the German Government had decided on a tripartite initiative. He did not preclude some changes in the German paper, provided they did not touch the substance. Couve remarked that Schroeder then wanted the Three to propose negotiations on Germany.

The Secretary then asked Schroeder why the Germans felt that unification had moved into the background. Schroeder replied that there is a feeling in Germany that as the West reaches agreements with the Soviets it may come to the conclusion that only the Germans block further agreement. This was the line taken by Gromyko last year in New York. The West, therefore, should put its position on Germany forward. He felt that if it didn’t, there would be serious consequences.

The Secretary said that we would like to meet the German needs. He felt there was no problem on substance. He noted, however, that there was no common basis at present for negotiations with the Soviets. The Secretary reminded the others that he had spent a great deal of time in the past few years trying to find a basis for negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin and Germany, but without success. Now he thought the Soviet position may have worsened, partly because of the Federal Republic’s policy toward Eastern Europe and its success in isolating East Germany. He noted that Ulbricht was complaining about liberalization in Prague and the trade treaty between the Federal Republic and the Eastern European countries. The Secretary added that he understood that Malinovsky during his recent visit to East Germany, had told Ulbricht that he should forego for now a separate peace treaty. The Secretary said that he had no difficulty with the idea of a declaration which made the position clear on Germany. He noted that he and other American officials had regularly made the attitude of the U.S. on German unification clear in speeches. The Secretary emphasized that we are under no illusions about any so-called détente with the Soviet Union. He asked Schroeder if the Germans felt that we should not talk on any subject with the Soviets unless it were linked to German unification. The Secretary also noted that if we made a proposal for negotiations or a lengthy declaration we will be asked questions about security and such problems as territorial boundaries on which at present we do not have agreed answers. He concluded by saying that he thought the present German paper contained too much to be a declaration and too little to be a basis for negotiations.

Schroeder noted that many formal offers have been made to the Soviet Union on Germany, beginning in 1954.³ He did not think that the Germans wanted to link all problems to unification. The Germans had not objected to American wheat sales to the Soviet Union⁴ but thought they should have been linked to political concessions. (The Secretary remarked that Europe had traded ten times as much as the United States with the Soviet Union without asking any concessions.) Schroeder added that the trade agreements with Eastern European countries were not linked with unification because this must come from the Soviets. Schroeder emphasized that there should be no concrete proposals on security before negotiations took place. The question of territories, on the other hand, could be discussed in the Four Power council. We should make it clear, however, that these discussions should be based on the right of self-determination. Schroeder concluded by asking: if the others were prepared to accept the German paper as a basis for a declaration why were they not prepared to submit it to the Soviets as a basis for negotiations?

The Secretary remarked that if we join in a proposal and get a “no,” he thought the American people would look upon this as a defeat at the hands of the Soviets. Schroeder said he didn’t want to question the Secretary’s estimate of the American reaction, but that he doubted that many Americans would consider a “no” a defeat, in view of the large number of “no’s” the Soviet Union had already given the United States.

Butler said that the British Government liked the idea of a Four Power council. He would like to see consideration given to making a proposal for a Four Power council privately to the Soviets. He would also like to have separate study given at the same time to a briefer declaration.

Couve said that his only worry regarding the German paper concerned security, on which the German paper is vague. He thought this should be discussed a little further. He said that he would make no secret of the French attitude on this question. If Germany were reunified, something would be needed regarding European security, and this should not be linked to the neutralization of Germany. Couve said he understood Schroeder’s situation. Couve emphasized that he wanted by all means to avoid any impression that there was disagreement following this meeting.

The Secretary then proposed that Ambassador Thompson, Lord Hood, Mr. Carstens and M. Lucet meet the following day and continue the discussion. Schroeder said he thought this was a good idea and perhaps these four could submit some proposals to the Foreign Ministers.

Schroeder said he would also like to say something tonight as well as something in the NATO communiqué.⁵ After some discussion, agreement was reached on the following guidance regarding the meeting for press officers:

• “On 11th May 1964 the Foreign Ministers of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States met at The Hague.
• “They discussed the question of Germany and reaffirmed their conviction that a just and peaceful solution to the problem of Germany will have to be found on the basis of the right of self-determination.
• “They agreed that each opportunity should be seized to bring the German people’s wish for reunification in freedom nearer to realization.
• “The Ministers wish to give further thought to the different possibilities and to consult their governments. Discussion will be resumed in the Ambassadorial Group.”
• Ambassador Thompson, Lord Hood, M. Lucet and Mr. Carstens agreed to meet at the American Embassy at 3:15 on May 12.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2397. Secret. Drafted by Ausland on May 13 and approved in S on May 24. The meeting was held at the British Ambassador’s residence.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XV, Document 245.
3. For texts of Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty, February 1, 1954, for the neutralization of Germany and for a treaty of collective security for Europe, both February 10, 1954, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 411–416.
4. For text of the announcement of the U.S.-Soviet agreement, October 9, 1963, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 525–526.
5. For text of the communiqué, released on May 15, see Department of Stare Bulletin, June 1, 1964, p. 852.
6. A memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 NETH (TH). Ambassador McGhee reported on German reactions to this meeting in telegram 4191 from Bonn, May 14. (Ibid.)