34. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chancellor Erhard1
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
In recent correspondence which I have had with Chairman Khrushchev concerning the reduction in the production of fissionable material for military purposes,2 Mr. Khrushchev raised some matters which I would like to report to you. I am most anxious that my correspondence with Mr. Khrushchev remain entirely confidential, but Mr. Khrushchev [Page 74] raised matters directly concerning your country and I want you to know in the strictest confidence what he has said and what I have said in reply.
In a letter to me in the middle of April, after a discussion of our separate decisions to cut back in the production of fissionable material, Mr. Khrushchev turned to the subject of our troops in Europe, in the following passage:
“This is not a disarmament measure. However the very fact that we have succeeded in undertaking certain practical steps as a matter of mutual example—I have in mind both the present agreement and mutual reduction of military budgets—shows that this approach can also be applied beneficially in a number of other instances.
“Why, for example, do we not attempt to agree in the same manner on the reduction of foreign troops on others’ territories? I am familiar with the declarations to the effect that the U.S.A. intends to withdraw from Western Germany 7,500 soldiers and officers transferred there additionally in 1961. We welcome this step of yours. If you would be prepared to go farther and proceed to the reduction of those American troops which are permanently stationed on the territory of the FRG, then I can say right now: we in that case will also be prepared to reduce our troops stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic with the provision, naturally, that the reduction of your troops would not be compensated by the further increase in the number of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany itself. It is no secret that recently the West German Bundeswehr is swelling quickly. Your Minister of Defense declared recently that the number of NATO troops in Europe already exceeds the number of troops of the countries of the Warsaw Pact and we understand that this on the whole is directly connected with the rapid growth of the West German Army. All this we must naturally take into consideration.
“I would be happy to know your views on this score.”
From time to time in other messages, Mr. Khrushchev had commented on similar matters in a more general way and I had made no comment in my replies, but the rather specific character of the remarks I have just quoted led me to make the following comment in my answering message:
“You refer to the problem of the reduction of troop levels, especially in Germany. I am sorry to have to tell you that I do not think this subject is one on which we can expect to make progress by private discussion between us at this time. The American forces in Germany are there for entirely defensive purposes, and their presence is a matter of great importance for the people and government of West Germany. For there to be any substantial additional reduction in the level of the U.S. forces in Germany there would have to be changes in the situation which would make it possible for the Germans and others in Western Europe to feel [Page 75] secure in other ways. In the meanwhile, I hope we can continue to cooperate in reducing the level of tension in Central Europe.
“The problem of the future of Germany is a most important one, and nothing could be better for the peace of the world than a real settlement. We on our side remain ready for such a settlement, which could serve the legitimate interests of the German people as well as the other peoples involved, including your own.”
I have had no further comment from the Chairman on this matter, and I assume that he will understand from what I have said that the United States is not interested in making arrangements about Germany that do not take full account of the interests of the German people, and of the Federal Republic in particular. It remains true, as you know from our talks in Texas,3 that I am determined to miss no opportunity for honorable agreements which truly serve the cause of peace.
In the light of the close and frank relations which you and I have with each other, I want you to know exactly what the Chairman recently suggested and how I have dealt with it.
If you have any views to express on these matters, Ambassador McGhee will report them to me most privately. Let me merely repeat in closing that the privacy of these exchanges with Chairman Khrushchev is a matter of the greatest importance to me, and that I therefore hope that this message may be treated as a matter entirely between the two of us.
Sincerely,4
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, vol. 4. No classification marking.↩
- Seven communications exchanged by President Johnson and Chairman Khrushchev between February 22 and May 1 regarding the reduction of fissionable materials are in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XI, Documents 11, 15, 18, 23, and 26.↩
- December 28–29, 1963. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XV, Documents 248–256.↩
- Printed from an unsigned copy.↩