Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

212. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bonn, April 24, 1967, 11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• President Johnson
• Chancellor Kiesinger
• Secretary Rusk
• Ambassador McGhee
• State Secretary Guttenberg
• Ambassador Knappstein
• Mr. Heinz Weber (interpreter)
• Mr. Harry Obst (interpreter)

Opening Remarks

Kiesinger stated that it was a great honor for his government and for the German people that the President of the United States, together with so many of his most distinguished assistants, had come to attend the State funeral of former Chancellor Adenauer.

Though this was a very sad occasion that had brought the President to Germany, he was nevertheless happy that the President could be here and meet with him for the first time. He hoped they would find an opportunity to exchange views on their common problems.

President Johnson expressed his appreciation for the Chancellor’s kind reception this morning. He was aware that the Chancellor had an extremely busy schedule for the next two or three days. He did not want to add to his burdens more than was necessary.

He equally regretted to have to come on such a sad mission, and equally welcomed the opportunity to be able to meet with Mr. Kiesinger to talk about his problems (Johnson’s) and learn about those of the Chancellor.

Upon learning of Adenauer’s death he had immediately determined to make the trip and had so stated. The purpose of his coming here was to underscore the great respect that he and the entire American people felt for the contribution to the world made by the late Chancellor. They also felt the same respect and admiration for the German people as a whole, and would continue to uphold the relationship of friendship and alliance with the Federal Republic.

He appreciated the courtesy that Mr. Kiesinger had shown the Vice President during their recent meeting in Bonn. The Vice President had conveyed a clear picture of the substance of their talks to the American people. He had been extremely pleased with the warm reception he had been given in Germany. The President was gratified that Mr. Humphrey had had an opportunity to review mutual problems with Vice Chancellor Brandt, a very good and old friend.

Efforts to divide U.S. and FRG

There were many people in the world who would like to divide Germany and the United States, and many attempts had been made particularly during the terms of office of Chancellors Adenauer and Erhard. None of those attempts, however, had been successful. He was positive that the same excellent relationship we had enjoyed during this period would continue in the future. He hoped that no enemy would ever be able to divide us or cause us to doubt each other.

Future meeting with Chancellor

The President hoped that he and the Chancellor would be able to discuss certain subjects of mutual interest when they meet on Wednesday. He only wanted at this time to express the sincere grief and deep sorrow of the American people over the passing of Konrad Adenauer. Apart from meeting with the Chancellor on Wednesday, he was looking forward to a meeting with the Chancellor in the future, maybe in a few months time. He hoped that such an encounter would be possible.

He had just told Mr. Humphrey over dinner before his departure to Bonn, when Mr. Humphrey was telling him about his visit to Germany, that during the three years that he had been President he had spent two of the three Christmases with German Chancellors. He had, during this period, met with them about a dozen times or so.

US–FRG Consultation

He had read several editorials a few days ago which stressed that there were no consultations between the U.S. and German Governments. While these editorials were being published, Ambassador Foster was in Bonn to talk to the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor Brandt was leaving the White House, Defense Minister Schroeder was entering his Cabinet room, Secretary Rusk was in Europe for consultations and the Vice President arrived a day or so later. Notwithstanding all this activity, the press maintained no exchanges of views were taking place.

FRG high on U.S. priority list

He welcomed the opportunity of the forthcoming meeting with the Chancellor, and would always look forward to further future discussions of joint problems and interests. His (the President’s) election had not come out as well as Mr. Kiesinger’s and he had to deal with a very recalcitrant Congress.² He was facing complex problems in other parts of the world. Some of these had already existed before he took office about three years ago. The United States had to live and deal with these problems, but it would never disregard the interests of the Chancellor and the German nation. He (Mr. Kiesinger) and the German people were right at the top of the list of American attention. The United States was willing to discuss all mutual problems with Germany and try to find solutions to them. Even if the Chancellor was not willing to sacrifice his Christmas celebration, a meeting with him would be welcome at any time.

Praise for Knappstein and McGhee

The President emphasized his high regard for Ambassador Knappstein, who had visited his home many times. Mr. Knappstein could be sure that he could call on the President with any message at any time and be welcomed with open arms.

The President also expressed appreciation for the very many courtesies and great cooperation shown by the Chancellor and the German Government to Ambassador McGhee. Mr. McGhee was doing an excellent job in representing the United States in Bonn. He was not only from the President’s home state of Texas but also a long-time neighbor and good friend.

Vital that US–FRG stand together

Despite the fact that so much time and sacrifice had to be given for the support of the U.S. fighting men in Viet-Nam, and despite the difficulties with Congress that was trying to tie him down much more than he would like, there was hardly any question that he was giving more time and attention to—to the relationship of the United States with Germany and the other European nations. In the future, as in the past, there would be those who would by rumor, gossip and doubt try to divide them. He had no doubt, however, that the peace of the world could be assured in the future, as long as the German and American leaders would fully trust each other and stand shoulder to shoulder. That was what he and his government intended to do.

The President then explained that he was descended from German stock and lived in a German community in Texas. If he did not have the deep respect and love for the German people that he possessed, he would have moved long ago.

He was aware that there were many difficult problems and many danger signals in the 20th century. There would be times of uncertainty on certain subjects. If, however, the Chancellor and he would, with equal friendship and determination, continue to stand side by side, the period of their cooperation would turn out to be a very good one.

In closing the President said that President Eisenhower had very much wanted to be present at the funeral, but he was 76, ill and had a heart condition. His doctor had vetoed the trip.

FRG wants US friendship

Mr. Kiesinger, in response, said that the President had spoken of the burden of the Chancellor’s office. He was almost embarrassed to compare it with the gigantic burden of concerns and responsibility that the President had to bear. He assured the President that his government was not only thinking of their own worries and problems, but were very much concerned about those faced by the United States. He had so stated in his initial Statement of Policy to the Bundestag. His government wanted the same firm relationship of determination and friendship that the President had spoken of, and would try to consolidate that friendship and make the alliance even stronger.

If the President had heard certain complaints made on the German side, and even by the Chancellor himself, these complaints were not meant to be unilateral accusations against the United States. Rather they were expressing what the Germans themselves had so often failed to do.

Quality of consultation

As far as consultations between the two governments were concerned, he was not worried so much about the lack of frequency, which indeed did not exist. His concern was one of quality rather than of quantity. Some subjects should be explored in greater depth. Candor should always prevail in their discussions, even on complex and troublesome questions.

Today, maybe more than at any time since the peak of the cold war, there was in Germany a feeling of deep sympathy for the United States, maybe more so than in any other European country. He appreciated the President’s willingness to discuss mutual problems in depth and with candor.

Need to adjust to changes

It was true, of course, that great changes had taken place. Nowadays, the world was changing as much in a decade as it had once changed during a century. It was necessary to follow and adjust to these changes.

Kiesinger would like to visit President

He assured the President that he would be available whenever he would deem it advisable to have talks with him, be it Christmas, Easter or Whitsuntide (This would be an especially appropriate time, since the Holy Spirit descended during this period). He was as much concerned as the President that they work closely together in the future, to help secure peace and freedom and justice. And he did not just want to utter those big words.

Hope for even firmer friendship

He was aware of the fact that the United States was extremely powerful. It was indeed the first nation of the world. The President, as leader of this nation, was carrying a tremendous responsibility. He hoped that it would not be considered arrogant on his part (or whatever one might want to call it) if he stated that the Federal Republic would endeavor to make the friendship between the two countries even firmer and their alliance stronger.

However, in the joint discussion both sides should endeavor to reach the degree of “quality” which was commensurate with this particular hour of history.

By the way, he did not think the President would hear many more complaints coming from Germany. He had conducted many discussions in the previous weeks, first of all with Ambassador McGhee—and he appreciated greatly the great job the Ambassador had done in making clear to him the problems and position of the United States Government—then with Special Representative John McCloy whom the President had sent twice to Germany in recent weeks. He had, indeed, made a wise choice to dispatch such an old and highly esteemed friend of the German people. He was equally grateful for the visit of Vice President Humphrey, who had proved to be an eloquent and convincing representative for the American people, and for the call by Ambassador Foster, whom he had known since his early days as a member of the Bundestag Defense Committee. He was also glad to see again Secretary of State Dean Rusk for whose ability he had great respect, and whom he had visited on several occasions.

Need for candor

He was convinced that on most of the very important political issues, the interests of the two countries coincided to a large extent. Since the height of the cold war, great changes had taken place. Still many interests were similar; however, one should review their nature as well as those areas where possible friction could arise. The best method to secure a firmer alliance was through complete and candid exchange of views in an atmosphere of trust. He could assure the President that this was the will of the German Government.

The President had spoken of growing up in a German community in the United States and of hailing from German stock. Many of the Chancellor’s family had emigrated to the United States, at one time or another, for reasons of material want or political persecution. Once, during the term of office of Chancellor Adenauer, the latter had asked him to be the German Ambassador in Washington. He had asked Jean Monnet his opinion on the matter. Monnet had advised him to go, but had warned him at the same time that if he had any children to be prepared to have one or all of them take up residence in the United States. He had not become Ambassador, yet this had not prevented his daughter from taking up residence in the United States. Having a daughter, son-in-law and grandchild there in itself tied him closer to the United States.

He appreciated very much the Vice President’s kindness to have visited with his daughter before departing the United States. He also was grateful that the President has seen fit to bring his daughter and son-in-law along on this trip. By this he had made him and his wife extremely happy.

President Johnson said that it had been a great pleasure to have Mr. Kiesinger’s daughter and son-in-law on the plane. He had enjoyed their company very much.

Topics for Wednesday’s discussion

As for their discussion on Wednesday, if he had to try and outline the main subjects on which the two might have fruitful exchange of views, he would name the nonproliferation treaty, the question of troop levels, the Kennedy Round and the international liquidity negotiations.

High quality of U.S. personalities

If it was “quality” that the Chancellor was interested in, he could not expect to find better quality people than those handling the nonproliferation treaty and disarmament negotiations for the United States. Among them was the Vice President who had handled these matters already as a senator, and Ambassador Foster. Secretary Fowler himself had kept in close touch with the Munich Conference on currency matters. He had told the President that he was quite dissatisfied with the state of affairs at that meeting.

Troop levels

The troop level question had been discussed in Congress extensively in the past months, and he had been subjected to considerable pressure from that side. A hearing on foreign troop levels was coming up in Congress next week. He had invited leading congressmen to the White House for talks in anticipation of this hearing.

Speaking of “quality”, he had discussed the question of troop levels two or three times with Secretary McNamara before coming here. He had reviewed with him the commitments that both countries had made to each other. He had asked Mr. McNamara, at that time, if he himself and top experts could make themselves available for Mr. Kiesinger if he so desired. The Secretary had agreed. Also, Defense Minister Schroeder had been in Washington just a week ago and had had extensive talks with Mr. McNamara. He had also called on the President.

One of the two biggest problems existing between the two countries—and this had been present ever since the end of the war—was this problem of troop levels in Europe. In the past, any expected changes or doubts in this regard had always been reviewed and straightened out in a sort of “family talk” between the two governments. Now, however, these matters were spread all over the New York Times and other papers. The American people had started to think and talk about them and some had gotten very upset. He thought it wise that the two governments keep such questions “in the family”. As was once said in Hollywood, in a different context, “include the newspapers out.” This would be in the interest of the German Government as well. Added to this publicity was some heavy resistance in congressional circles.

Mr. McNamara, or his experts, would be available to discuss details on this matter and to give the United States reasoning on any of these questions. He wanted to assure the Chancellor that Mr. McNamara would speak on his behalf. He had been given complete authority by him to make any agreement he considered necessary. He trusted the Secretary completely.

Secretary McNamara had spent some 80 hours before Congression-al Committees on questions of troop levels. The Chancellor was certainly aware of gentlemen like Senator Fulbright and Senator Mansfield, whose thinking was not exactly the same as that of Mr. McNamara. They believed, just as the Chancellor had expressed to him before, that great changes had taken place and that these changes were very material ones.

The President stated that he had urged Mr. McNamara to stay in frequent touch with the German military and the Defense Minister. He believed that cooperation on that level was closer than ever before.

Speaking of men of “quality”, Secretary Rusk had just returned from a Washington meeting of the SEATO countries. The United States had serious problems in SE Asia. The Secretary would return to Europe for the NATO meeting in June.

So then “quality” seemed well represented in his Government with such people as Secretaries Rusk, McNamara and Fowler. And these men could be put at the disposal of the Chancellor for consultations at almost any time. Should, in addition, the Chancellor need the direct advice of the President, he would be glad to find a way to accommodate him. To summarize, the main issues between us included the NPT, the troop level issue and the liquidity question. There seemed to be some new matter to deal with every year. There was now in Germany a new Government, a new Chancellor and there was in Washington a new assertion of power by Congress, in particular in the Senate. For instance, the foreign policy committee of the Democratic Party, before which Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara had been pleading the President’s case, favors substantial troop reductions in Europe. People like Mr. Mansfield do not think about a reduction of maybe a few thousand, but about many scores of thousands—indeed, entire divisions. Out of his own party members, 13 voted against him and none for him on the troop issue. In view of such developments, he had to stop, look and listen carefully on these matters.

He was happy to see the Vice Chancellor again for whom he had warm feelings of friendship. He (as Vice President) had been the first to go to Berlin when the Wall was built.³ He wanted to be the first to go there when it would be torn down. Discussions on troop levels should better be conducted in such a manner as not to supply ammunition to Congressional critics.

He assured the Chancellor that there was no “complicity”, that he was in favor of extensive discussions. The President of the United States had not changed. He was still the same. He had always had good and friendly feelings towards the German nation and the German people.

Keep vital discussions within “the family”

Mr. Kiesinger stated that he understood the problems the President had with his Congress. He often had similar problems with the Bundestag despite his great majority. There would be a discussion of the NPT coming up in the German Parliament in about a week, on which the Bundestag had insisted on its own initiative.

He agreed with the President’s suggestion that discussions on troop levels should be kept in the family circle as much as possible, though it could not always be kept out of the press. He would try to steer a course that would not involve him in American domestic frictions and polemics.

He was convinced that the President had men of outstanding quality around him, and he always preferred to talk to the political leaders rather than to experts. There was much agreement on major trends in their thinking (President’s and Kiesinger’s). He was hopeful that the talk on Wednesday would produce some common results. Regarding the problems with Congress on the NPT, the Chancellor would be very careful to avoid giving the press an opportunity to again sow any seeds of friction between the two countries.

FRG problems with Bundestag

The new coalition government commanded a greater majority which gave it a better opportunity to come to solutions on some problems. However, he also often encountered dissension within his own party. Sometimes he had to walk a very narrow path to make his policies prevail. Also, he did not have the strong power with which the United States Constitution endows the President. In general, however, his Parliament was showing a great amount of good will.

Mr. Johnson stated that despite the 30 years he had dealt closely with Congress as Senator, Vice President and President, he sometimes did not have much control over its decision.

International liquidity

One item which he intended to discuss in detail in the Wednesday meeting was the “new-money problem”. The talks on this matter had not produced good results. He was seriously concerned about this matter.

Press briefing

Secretary Rusk suggested one should think about what to say to the press before adjourning. He suggested that they say that the President had called on the Chancellor to pay his respects with regard to the passing of former Chancellor Adenauer. The President and the Chancellor had also taken note of the issues that they wanted to discuss in their meeting on Wednesday.

It might be acceptable to the President and the Chancellor to say no more than this.

The President and the Chancellor agreed, and the meeting adjourned having lasted about one hour and twenty minutes.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 163. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Obst and approved in S on April 24 and in the White House on June 28. The meeting was held in Kiesinger’s office.
2. In November 1966 Congressional elections, the Democratic Party lost 47 House and 3 Senate seats.
3. Johnson’s report on his visit to Germany August 19–20, 1961, is in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, pp. 354–358.