Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

213. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Bonn, April 24, 1967.

Mr. President:

The memorandum that follows may be important for your talk with Chancellor Kiesinger on Wednesday.

Here is the story.

At his request I called on Rainer Barzel at 11:00 a.m. this morning. As you know, he is the Majority Floor Leader in the German Parliament. We are good friends. Therefore, I gave him your position as outlined yesterday with the bark off, explaining that you cannot deal with the Mansfield problem unless they stop behaving like children and start behaving like serious partners in the task of preserving the unity of the West.

We then went on to the four specific issues. In his judgment, the withdrawal of aircraft is the most difficult for politicians in Germany to accept.

As we were leaving he said he was going to report immediately to the Chancellor.

I received a message this afternoon that he wished to see me again. I saw him at 6:00 p.m. at the American Embassy. He asked that I report the conversation only to you and that the interpreter destroy his notes.

This is what he said:

I. Chancellor Kiesinger was greatly impressed with you and your personality this morning.²

II. He wishes on Wednesday to talk to you “extensively and, if possible, alone.”

III. He wishes to discuss the large outlines of your policy rather than the details. This is particularly important after your conversation this morning and after Barzel’s report to the Chancellor of what I said to him. (He meant, it turned out, that the Chancellor is pretty clear about what you wish him to do about the four specific issues.)

I then began to probe what he meant by the “large outlines of policy” rather than specifics. I said President Johnson was a man of large ideas and ideals; but he would rather discuss the next step in achieving them rather than to discuss them in abstract, rhetorical terms. (At that point he smiled and said President Johnson is like Adenauer: His last words to his children were not: “Keep the family together”; but “make sure you meet every Christmas.”)

He then began to explain as follows: There are some people telling the Chancellor that if Germany signs the non-proliferation treaty, Germany is giving in on one of the three things the Soviet Union demands: the other two are the Oder-Neisse line and formal recognition of the East German Government.

They then go on to say that troop levels will be reduced by us but not by the Soviet Union. After that they ask: Will we have any possibility of raising the question of German unity in the future?

The critical question for Kiesinger in the face of this pressure is to be able to tell his cabinet that President Johnson has a concept of policy in which there is a place for German unity.

For example, Barzel said, President Johnson might say: “I am doing everything I can to ease tensions between East and West because the world needs peace. German unity cannot be my first consideration; but out in the process of bringing peace and arms control, German unity will have a place. Non-proliferation will contribute to the process of arms control. That is the kind of world in which German unity has the greatest chance of coming about.”

Barzel went on to say that there is no chance for German unity if the world is divided into two big blocs. “We cannot achieve German unity by nuclear war; but if relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union improve as we achieve progress in a limited way on East/West issues, then we create an environment in which German unity becomes more possible in the future.”

He then shifted to a specific, practical point. Chancellor Kiesinger in the Parliament made a Declaration of the Federal Government on Amelioration of Living Conditions in All of Germany.³ He urged that Germans in East and West Germany be permitted to travel more: that doctors—specialists—be permitted to cross from East to West. Kiesinger has spoken movingly in human terms about Germans being allowed to get closer in these matters. Still, the Soviet Union denounced Kiesinger’s speech and has flatly refused to move in this direction.

Barzel then said: “Would it not be possible for President Johnson to tell Kiesinger that he will instruct Ambassador Thompson in Moscow to make representations to the Soviet Government that they should respond to this simple human appeal?” He said that nothing would affect Kiesinger and German opinion more than to know that President Johnson—with his great humanitarian heart—has considered seriously, among the human problems on this earth, the problem of human relations among Germans and German families divided one from the other.

I explained to Barzel that, while you worked for every reasonable approach to the Soviet Union, you were skeptical of Soviet motives and how fast they would move.

And I came back to my central point in the morning, which was: If we had any chance of making progress in the East, it was on the basis of a strong and united West; and it was not useful for the German Government to have these hopes to the East while it was cutting the ground from under your feet in maintaining the unity of the West. Barzel said that he understood this fully; and he believed Chancellor Kiesinger understood it also.

Before I make my recommendations, I wish to tell you now strongly I was impressed in this conversation that the Germans understand in their hearts—if not in their pocketbooks or their press relations—that they depend absolutely on you.

You should also know that: The German cabinet has been meeting in the wake of your talk with Kiesinger; Strauss has asked that I see him, which I shall do tomorrow morning; I have received an invitation to talk with Guttenberg this evening—the other extreme nationalist in opposition to Kiesinger.

My assessment and recommendations:

I. Your interview this morning with Kiesinger has had one hell of an effect.

II. You should agree to talk at length with Kiesinger alone on Wednesday.

III. Your talking points should be these:

• —Although we have 500,000 men fighting in Southeast Asia, I have not pulled out one fighting man from NATO through this difficult period;
• —I have kept my commitment in Europe because we have a vital security interest in Europe, but also because I am fully aware of the hope for peace in Europe;
• —Working together in unity we have demonstrated in these 20 years since the end of the World War that we can defend ourselves against the Communists, that we can make more economic and social progress than the Communists;
• —And that we can produce in the West societies that are so attractive and successful that Communism is failing as an ideology in the East;
• —The Chancellor should remember that it was only after the Cuba missile crisis that people began to talk of détente and that very small steps—the atmospheric test ban—were possible; you have been working for small agreements with the West because you believe that as Communism becomes weaker, nationalism in the East becomes stronger in each country and more normal relations can fully be developed; so far as the non-proliferation treaty is concerned, you believe: it makes sense for the human race; it makes sense for the free world; and if we stay together it could contribute to arms control—for example, the avoidance of a major race in ABM and ICBM’s;
• —This is the environment in which you believe that movement towards German unity may gradually become possible; of all the American Presidents in this century, you have the closest ties to the German people; you understand the pain felt by every German that the division of their country cuts across families and language and cultures and memory;
• —It is a simple fact that of all the nations in the West, the United States is the only one that honestly wishes to see German unity brought about: neither the British nor the French honestly wish this to happen no matter what they say;
• —The reason the American people want German unity is because they want an end to the Cold War and that requires the drawing together of Germany and all of Europe under conditions of security for everyone. If, however, the West cannot remain united and if we cannot settle sensibly issues of trade and money and troops, then we shall not have détente and movement towards German unity, we shall have danger and crisis again. Therefore, the Chancellor should work with the President to maintain the unity of the West and count on the President—and on the United States—to be the strongest supporter he has in taking steps towards German unity.
• —You might then say that we are prepared to take small steps or large, whatever is realistic and possible. For example, you have been informed of the Chancellor’s interest in improving the simple human contacts between the people in East and in West Germany. Your men have spoken often to Soviet representatives and told them how unwise it is for them to attack democratic Germany. You have asked Secretary Rusk to arrange that we talk to the Russians about the wisdom of encouraging these human contacts between East and West.
• —I suggest that you should close by saying once again that it is our experience together—Germans and Americans—that we have gotten nothing from the Russians through weakness and disunity. It is only if German policy and European policy is rooted in unity and strength in the West, that we have any chance of bringing peace to Europe and unity to the German people.

W. W. R. ⁴

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Adenauer Funeral. Secret.
2. See Document 212.
3. For text of the April 12 declaration, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 955–957.
4. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.