Office of the Historian

211. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson1

Washington, April 21, 1967, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Your Trip to Germany2

I understand Walt spoke to you about my staying behind on Sunday-Wednesday. On reflection, I suspect I can be of more help to you [Page 513] here than in Europe. I hate to miss the trip, but with the Kennedy Round, liquidity negotiations, trilaterals, and non-proliferation all coming to a head, I had better keep holding the ring.

One comment about your meeting with Kiesinger. I may be soft on the British, but I am not on the Germans. However, in deciding how to talk to Kiesinger, I think it is important to remember that you are three times his size—and that he knows it. He also knows that Erhard was close to you. For both reasons, as well as the Nazi business,3 he is deeply insecure about his relations with you. A congenial and collegial approach could do wonders in reassuring him, and turning him into a more reliable friend. And I don’t believe that this would mislead him into thinking that he has any hold or claim on us.

I am aware of your doubts. But I would bet that with a little Presidential warmth you can bring this man into line, in spite of the pressure on him from Strauss et al to prove that he is not an American stooge. The gain to us from making him feel that he is a friend—and therefore has to act like one—can be very great. The Germans will have a lot to do with the outcome in non-proliferation, the Kennedy Round, international liquidity, etc. And together, the above will cast a very long shadow.

It is true that deGaulle has nothing to offer the Germans, and that they will soon find that out. But by then they may have committed some great mistakes. If they stick with the French on international money, or don’t help us move the Kennedy Round forward, or balk on non-proliferation, the structure of our relations with Europe could turn very sour. I am afraid it will be of no comfort to us that the Germans too would soon find out how wrong they had been. They are not immune to some whoppers, even when they have the most to lose.

Forgive me this special pleading. But we are reaching a crucial moment on a lot of fronts and the Germans are in a key position. I agree: it would be dead wrong for the President to plead with this man or to twist his arm. But to sit down and do a little friendly reasoning together—spelling out for him what kind of pressures you face at home, anxieties you have about the future of U.S.-European relations in case Kennedy Round and non-proliferation and liquidity go down the drain—could make a great deal of difference.

Now I’ll hold my peace. Have a very good and successful trip. My thoughts will be with you.

Francis M. Bator 4
  1. Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, President’s Trip to Europe. Secret; Sensitive.↩
  2. Former Chancellor Adenauer died on April 19, and President Johnson flew from Washington to Bonn for the funeral ceremonies on April 23. He returned to Washington on April 26. Memoranda of his conversation with German and other foreign government officials are ibid. President Johnson’s statements regarding the death of Adenauer and his talks with Kiesinger are in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 454, 462–463. McGhee discussed Johnson’s visit in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 220–223.↩
  3. Chancellor Kiesinger had been a member of a Nazi youth organization.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩