Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

203. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, March 3, 1967, 1219Z.

10199. Subject: Kiesinger visit. For the Secretary and Under Secretary.

1. In accordance with the instructions given me late yesterday over the telephone by the Under Secretary, I sounded out Chancellor Kiesinger last evening on the question of a possible visit to the States.² Knowing the sensitivity of the subject, I was, as I have always been in the past, extremely cautious. As instructed, I did not purport to speak either for the President or the government, but assumed personal responsibility for my remarks. Our discussion took place alone after a small informal dinner in honor of retiring Con Gen Paul Sweet, an old friend of the Kiesin-gers, which was the first private social function the Kiesingers have attended since he assumed office. Since I have known Kiesinger well for almost four years our conversation was on a very easy and confidential basis.

2. I began by advising the Chancellor that I wanted to discuss frankly with him the question of his possible visit to the States, in light of the speculation on this question which had emerged on the preceding day in the German press. Naturally, as the head of a country which is such a close friend and ally he would always be welcome in the States. We have not as yet raised the question of a visit with him officially because we have not wished to appear to be “rushing” him so soon after his coming into office. We have wanted to give him ample opportunity to carry out his planned visit to France, to establish his regime and to evolve his own policies—without apparent pressure from us. We had, moreover, observed certain statements attributed to him to the effect that he wished to delay his visit to America until after he had achieved his main legislative objectives. When he reaches the conclusion that he is ready for a visit, and there is something important that he wishes to discuss with the President, I would appreciate it if he would advise me. I was confident that, once a time suitable for both him and the President could be found, there would be no difficulty in arranging the visit.

3. Kiesinger responded by saying that he had never intended to give the impression that he wished to delay his visit to America for any reason connected with his attitude toward the US. He recounted his long background of good relationships with Americans in Bonn and Stuttgart and his frequent visits to the US to see his daughter who is married to an American citizen. When he came to power he had felt a strong necessity for overcoming the results of the “neglect” in German French policy, which he considered had resulted from Schroeder’s curiously negative attitude toward the French. He had to this end visited Gen de Gaulle and they had had a very frank discussion. He had pointed out to de Gaulle the limitations on French and German cooperation, and had advised de Gaulle that Germany would continue to cooperate with the US. de Gaulle had responded to this in a rather cynical way, i.e. that the Germans would ultimately come to the French view with respect to the US; however, he would not seek to influence them in this respect. Kiesinger said that he really didn’t know whether anything important would come of Germany’s relations with France; however, he considered it important for all that he make an effort to continue friendly relations. I assured him that we fully agreed.

4. Kiesinger then said that, assuming we thought it desirable, he wanted to go to the US. When should he go? I replied that I believed this to be a decision for him. When did he feel that he would be ready, in terms of the evolution of the policies and actions of his regime? He replied that he thought it best to go before his next meeting with de Gaulle, which is now scheduled for June. He has, up to now, been consolidating his leadership over the coalition government. I gathered that he felt this had just about, but perhaps not quite yet, been accomplished.

There were certain high priority pieces of legislation that he wished to see well launched toward passage. When I asked him if he referred to the emergency legislation, the stabilization law and a new electoral law, he nodded. He hoped that all this could be accomplished by May. In short, he thought May was the right time.

5. Kiesinger said that the principal purpose of a meeting with the President and other US leaders should, in his view, be to provide the opportunity for a broad discussion on long-range problems and policies of the West vis-à-vis the Communist bloc. He referred, as an example, to the discussions held in the Bilderberg Group, which he on one occasion attended. He did not wish to negotiate specific issues, such as the offset or the NPT. Indeed he hoped that by then the NPT would be signed on conditions which would be considered to be honorable for Germany. (I thought it interesting that he apparently revealed his expectation that the NPT would be signed.)

6. I advised the Chancellor that I would inform my government fully on our conversation, portraying it as not being an initiative on his part but as a result of a frank discussion which I had myself raised.

Comment:

I believe that Kiesinger has now gone as far as we can expect him to go in suggesting that he visit the US. In view of the uncertainties which have been discussed privately and in the press as to whether he would be welcome, I do not believe that we should expect him to be the first to make the suggestion publicly. To do so would, from his viewpoint, possibly result in an embarrassing rebuff or delay. We would, in almost any normal similar circumstances, welcome a visit from a new German Chancellor—in connection with his calls on other heads of allied states. Our only hesitancy in the past has, as I understand it, arisen out of the unusual circumstances surrounding our relationship to the previous Erhard govt and Kiesinger’s relationship to de Gaulle. Since Kiesinger has, I believe, in his conversation with me, removed any barriers arising out of these associations from his standpoint, I believe that we should do the same and should proceed to extend a normal invitation for him to visit the President, and attempt to work out a suitable date in May. It is obvious, in any event, that the visit must ultimately take place. As soon as a decision has been made to explore the time, I would hope that an announcement could be made both in Bonn and Washington to this effect. This would, I believe, have the effect of “pricking the bubble” of speculation which has grown to sizeable proportions here, and would enable us to resume a more normal relationship as preparations for the visit get underway.³

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 7 GER W. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Eyes Only.
2. McGhee discussed the meeting in At the Creation of a New Germany, p. 215.
3. In a March 3 memorandum to President Johnson, attached to a White House copy of this telegram, Rostow wrote: “Herewith George delicately explores with Kiesinger and comes up tentatively with May. Is that agreeable in principle? It sounds right to me: the prospect will help us with McCloy and other negotiations in the next several months and we should have things in pretty good shape by May.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, vol. 22)