Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, March 1, 1967, 9:53 p.m.

146957. From the Secretary.

1. I have reviewed your thoughtful analysis of the current state of our relations with the Germans,² as well as your recommendations to improve them. I agree with your assessment that, to a large degree, the German reactions to issues like the proposed non-proliferation treaty have as much of an emotional as a factual basis. I suspect much of the current uneasiness among many of the Germans stems from their efforts to adjust to changes which are occurring in Europe, particularly as a result of de Gaulle’s work and the subsequent looser cohesion in the alliance. Unquestionably, the reorientation of the Germans in their relations to France and to us has contributed to this uneasiness. Although Brandt and Kiesinger on one or two occasions have spoken out on behalf of better relations with us, I fear that most German politicians, and particularly the German press, have not helped very much in keeping our relations on a level keel. It seems to me that we will have to let the Germans spend a little time sorting out their own attitude and determine for themselves in what directions their best interests lie. At the same time, we would want to make sure that their reactions do not result in upsetting the moderate government which now runs Germany or let them drift in a direction dangerous to our national interests.

2. With this in mind, I come now to your recommendations. I believe that a meeting between the President and Kiesinger at the proper time would be in order. The problem is essentially one of finding an appropriate time. Right now, for instance, such a visit would be interpreted as a desire on our part to call him to task for his remarks in Bonn before the CDU/CSU press club.³ I understand one German press service has already taken this line. I notice Kiesinger said in his remarks that our conversations have all dealt with contentious subjects. While we have sought in the past not to have this happen, it is rather difficult to avoid discussions of subjects like the NPT, troop levels, balance of payments problems and so forth.

3. As far as the proposed non-proliferation treaty is concerned, I believe we have been forthright in giving answers to the questions posed by the Germans. I have seen to it that all questions posed are answered. We discuss the proposed NPT with any German who comes to us. Blumenfeld, the Hamburg Deputy, was here just the other day and Adrian Fisher spent considerable time with him allaying his concerns. I know you and your staff have similarly been responding to German requests. We shall be glad to have Foster or Fisher go to Bonn as soon as possible. I agree that it was a good idea to have Kratzer of the AEC return to Bonn. If the Germans wish to explore technical aspects raised by the NPT further, they would be most welcome to do so in Washington where the resources are most readily available.

4. On the subject of East-West relations, I find it a little difficult to believe that the Germans could question our support of their activities leading to an improvement of East-West relations. When Brandt was here, he opened his discussion of this subject, you may recall, with the remark that this is one subject that he could take up in Paris or in Washington and get the same positive reactions. Our own efforts to improve relations with Eastern Europe ought to serve as a fairly good indicator of our views on this. However, I am not opposed to impressing upon them that we do approve, and your suggestion that leading Department officials include in speeches approving references to Germany’s new Eastern policy can certainly be carried out. On the whole, our willingness to respond to their request that we support them in the Arab World, Finland and India is a more demonstrable indication of our support of their position. I see no problem either in giving them greater access to the end product of the U.S. intelligence community or to pass on to the Foreign Office reports received from capitals where the Germans have no diplomatic missions, subject to the usual limitations of not endangering our own intelligence gathering efforts. I am not convinced that group discussions on East-West relations of the sort you recommend in your paragraph C would, however, serve a really useful purpose at this time.

5. As for the visit by Schuetz of the Foreign Office and Carstens of Defense to Washington for off-the-record discussions of Western security, I believe such and similar discussions might well precede a meeting between the President and Kiesinger when such a meeting can be arranged. Carstens will of course be over here with Schroeder for the discussions with Secretary McNamara in April. But the suggestion you make would provide an opportunity for our as well as the German side to prepare their respective positions in some detail and perhaps reach preliminary agreement, thereby assuring that a meeting between the President and Kiesinger might have more substantial results.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Puhan and Hirschfeld; cleared by Leddy, Rostow, and ACDA; and approved by Rusk.
2. Document 201.
3. Apparent reference to a statement made at the February 11 CDU/CSU Party meeting in which Kiesinger outlined current Ostpolitik efforts and the basis of the policy. For extracts, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 188–190.