Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

204. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State¹

Berlin, March 18, 1967, 1400Z.

1214. NATUS info. Subject: Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov—European matters. From Ambassador McGhee.

1. I attended a two-hour luncheon March 17 at the Embassy residence of Soviet Ambassador to the GDR Abrasimov. He was accompanied by Embassy Counselor Komarov, Protocol Officer Khrustalev, and a translator named Michurina. Minister Morris and Polansky of USBER accompanied me. The atmosphere was relaxed and straightforward. Abrasimov was quite forthcoming and in good humor.

2. Our conversation touched on relations between the FRG on the one hand, and East Germany, Eastern Europe and the USSR on the other, Berlin matters, and US-Soviet relations. The Berlin and US-Soviet topics are subjects of separate telegrams.²

3. FRG relations with Eastern Europe and USSR. After an initial exchange of pleasantries, I noted that the USSR and the GDR appear to have reacted negatively to the new Eastern European policy of the Kiesinger government. I said that the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Eastern European countries could hardly be construed as a threat to the USSR or East Germany and invited Abrasimov’s comments.

4. In a lengthy response, Abrasimov made the following points: the USSR was not opposed to the FRG establishing diplomatic relations with socialist countries. However, Bonn would have to give up its claim to represent all of Germany, and efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Bonn makes pleasant noises about improving relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but does not follow this up with practical deeds. In fact, Bonn’s policies are similar to those of Adenauer and Erhard. As Governing Mayor Brandt, in his conversations with Abrasimov, made many intelligent comments about improving relations with EE and the USSR, but said he (Brandt) was not in power in Bonn and therefore could not do anything. Now Brandt is in power and still is not doing anything constructive. The US welcomes Bonn’s new Eastern European policy; we should, however, advise Bonn to take new, realistic steps in its Eastern European policy which would be acceptable to the USSR and East Germany.

5. With respect to Berlin, the US and the Soviet Union say that they are for the status quo. However, the US apparently makes no efforts to prevent the Kiesinger government from taking provocative actions, such as high-level talks and Bundestag meetings in Berlin. These are provocations against the USSR, when they occur in Berlin.

6. In reply, I pointed out that the US and the USSR appraise Bonn’s policies differently. One can hardly call the Bonn government revanchist just because it wants to reunite the German people. Bonn has done nothing aggressive in this regard, and has gone so far as to renounce unilaterally the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It makes no claims for any specific areas beyond the Oder-Neisse Line, and asserts only that the final determination of German borders must await the signing of a peace treaty. I pointed out that I knew the present leaders of the FRG government very well personally and that Abrasimov knew Brandt. One could hardly call these leaders aggressive.

7. I said it seemed to me that the USSR and the East Germans had adopted a harder attitude toward the Kiesinger government than they had toward Erhard or Adenauer. The Bundestag Committee meetings in Berlin were normal and could hardly be called provocative. Furthermore, the GDR appears to have adopted a much harder line on such issues as passes for holiday visits and hardship cases. I saw no reason for the USSR to fear the FRG, which is a relatively small country. Moreover, the FRG has only a small army, much smaller than Soviet forces in the GDR, which remains under NATO control.

8. In response, Abrasimov stressed several times that the USSR is not afraid of the FRG. If the FRG starts something, however, there will be not much left of it.

9. Troop withdrawals from Europe. In response to a question about rumored Soviet troop withdrawals from the GDR, Abrasimov said that there was no truth to it. The USSR favors a continuation of the status quo in this connection. Abrasimov said that, as regards reciprocal withdrawals, the USSR would wait for deeds, not words. After the US, the UK and France withdrew from Germany (it was not clear whether he meant all or part), then the Soviet Union would withdraw from East Germany. He added in a jocular vein that since the US had the farthest to go, it should start first. I said nothing committal on this question.

10. Abrasimov said he had read that the cost of maintaining US troops in Europe amounted to approximately two billion dollars. He observed that the FRG pays for US forces stationed in West Germany, whereas the USSR pays for Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. I replied that there was widespread misunderstanding on the issue of troop costs. The FRG does not pay for US troops. We ask only that Bonn balance its foreign accounts with us either through the purchase of weapons or of bonds. We do not insist they purchase weapons they do not need.

11. German reunification. Abrasimov said that we should be realists and not expect German reunification during our lifetime. Moscow will not give up the GDR and Washington will not give up the FRG. Two separate German states exist, with different social-economic systems. I noted we had no illusions about when reunification would occur. However, we were certain that Germany would ultimately be reunited, and that until this comes about the division of Germany would continue to represent a serious source of tension in Central Europe.

Morris

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 17–8 US. Confidential. Repeated to UNNMR SHAPE, Moscow, Bonn, Paris, CINCUSAREUR, and CINCEUR.
2. McGhee reported on the discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations in telegram 1215 from Bonn, March 18. (Ibid.) He reported on their discussions on Berlin in telegram 1216 from Bonn, March 18. (Ibid.)