Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

201. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, February 25, 1967, 1430Z.

9959. Subj: Improvement of FRG-US relations. For the Secretary.

1. As is evident from our recent reporting, we are currently in a difficult stage in our relations with the FedRep. The fears and accusations of American disinterest and abandonment, voiced by men of much influence in Germany, have reached disturbing proportions. In large part, they have an emotional rather than a factual basis, however, there is small comfort in this circumstance for us. I believe it to be essential at this point to try to understand what lies beneath this emotion, and to consider what steps we can take to reverse the trend.

2. I believe that the German Govt and people are troubled because they do not see clearly for Germany the future role they feel that they—as one of the three leading economic and military powers of the free world—are entitled. They have during the past year witnessed a weakening of NATO, to them the keystone of the established order which provides the basis for their security. They see a number of mutual interests emerging between the US and the Soviet Union, which they feel could bring about a realignment in the post-war security pattern. In such an atmosphere it is perhaps only natural that there has developed an urge for Germany to pursue its own national interest in establishing a more favorable position for itself in the world community. German authorities are so far unable, however, to define just what this position should be. Meanwhile they are suddenly fearful that before they can reach this definition the two great powers will decide Germany’s destiny between them. They feel “boxed in.” They are frustrated by the limited freedom of action that they feel is permitted them in their international relations.

3. We began our relations with the grand coalition under a number of handicaps. First and foremost, there was the fall of the Erhard government which, because of its close ties to the US and our alleged association with its demise, constituted a blow to our position here. The offset issue, which was so central to Erhard’s problems, seemed itself to raise the question of how closely the US continued to identify European security with its own. Although the new government says little about it, they must deeply resent having to pay the current offset in the light of the serious budgetary problems they have inherited. In addition, there is the increasing conviction here that the US has lost interest in Germany and Europe because of its preoccupation with Asia.

4. Nonetheless, we have made considerable progress in establishing good relations with the new government. Kiesinger and Brandt are well known quantities to us—and sympathetic to us. They have made it very clear that despite their bow to the French they wish to improve understanding with Washington. Their efforts in this direction, however, have until now been largely thwarted by the highly negative German reaction to the NPT, a reaction which shows signs of the psychological considerations mentioned above. There is in particular a feeling of frustration that we have, without adequate consultation, presented Germany with a fait accompli in the NPT with which it has no choice but to comply—despite possible adverse effects on German and European interests. Despite our best efforts the almost universal impression persists in Germany that the NPT is a sign of a new pattern of world organization being worked out secretly together—and imposed—by the two superpowers.

There is widespread fear as to where this will leave Germany. In many cases this fear has nothing to do with German access to nuclear weapons. Rather it is a fear that the US has lost faith in NATO and hope for a united Europe, leaving Germany to find its own future, possibly in the company of such neutrals as India and Sweden.

5. As the Chancellor told Senator Robert Kennedy and subsequently me (Embtel 9817),² he hopes that German discussion with the US can go beyond specific points of disagreement—to broader and more positive aspects of common policy as well. I believe he has in mind that the US should try to inform the German Govt, and Kiesinger in particular, what our plans are for the longer range future—when the NPT will have become a reality and the offset solved in one way or another. To do this a good bit of preparatory thinking will obviously be required on our part—as well as by the Germans.

6. It is with this background that I make the following recommendations:

A. Kiesinger visit. A principal element of uncertainty in our relations with Chancellor Kiesinger is the unclear status of the initial meeting between Kiesinger and the President. Kiesinger is a man of high intellectual qualities—who seeks an overall conceptual frame within which to place the particular aspects of policy, such as NPT, with which he must deal. It is evident that Kiesinger strongly desires, at first hand, an exposure to the President’s personal thinking for the future. There is ample evidence that the postponement of discussions for a meeting with the President is being used as evidence of a negative attitude in our government toward the Chancellor and his Cabinet. I would propose, therefore, that I be permitted to tell Kiesinger that although the President wishes to come to Germany he has not yet been able to make a firm decision and that this should not interfere with a Kiesinger visit to the United States. If the Chancellor will tell us when in his view he considers such a visit to be propitious, and mutually convenient date can be found, the President will be delighted to extend an invitation. I would assure him that he will be warmly welcomed.

B. NPT consultations. For the immediate future we should do everything possible to provide answers to the seemingly unending series of questions raised by the Germans—public and private—on the NPT. I have, as reported in Embtel 9817, proposed to the Chancellor that Amb Foster come to Germany to discuss the NPT with him personally. The Chancellor’s reaction was positive. I have been in contact with Foster who will be glad to come once the ENDC gets underway—perhaps after another week. I have also urged that Dr. Kratzer of the AEC return for a second visit to talk with the German scientific community, as well as with FonOff officials, and that he be accompanied by other technical experts. This has been arranged starting Feb 27. I am continuing my detailed private discussions on NPT which so far have included Kiesinger, Science Min Stoltenberg and Kurt Birrenbach.

C. East-West relations. I believe that we should make a concerted effort to bring home to the Germans that we offer them full support in the achievement of their own Eastern policies, and that we stand ready to coordinate with them our activities in this field where this proves desirable. (Although this seems obvious to us there is evidence that it is not so to the Germans.) This could also be a central theme of any eventual meeting between the President and the Chancellor. Speeches by leading Department officials should include approving references to Germany’s new Eastern policy. We should make clear to the Germans that we are always prepared, where this is appropriate, to plead their case in Moscow and other East European capitals. Finally, as concrete proposal, I recommend that a group of three or four ranking Department officials come to Germany to discuss with their counterparts here in a systematic way our mutual assessments of the situation in Eastern Europe, our mutual policies and the means for better coordinating these policies. Perhaps this group could be headed up by Under Sec Rostow or Counselor Bowie, and include Lisle, Director for Eastern Europe, and Brzezinski of Policy Planning. The agenda might include the following: closer prior consultations concerning impeding unilateral move in Eastern Europe; greater German access to the end products of the US intelligence community, whose resources are greater than those of the FedGovt; a more systematic effort to pass on to the FonOff reports received from Prague and Belgrade, where the FRG has no regular missions and instructions to our missions in other Eastern European capitals to maintain the closest liaison with one another.

D. Western security. I would suggest that State Secretaries Schuetz (FonOff) and Carstens (Defense) be invited to Washington for a few days of off-the-record discussion, to include at least in part, the Under Secretaries of State and Defense. Every effort would be made to encourage an atmosphere of confidence and informality. Since both Carstens and Schuetz speak English, communication would be easy. The talks would center on the future of NATO and how we see Western security ensured for the future. We would attempt to give the Germans the feeling that they have some insight into our long-range thinking. This kind of conversation would be of immediate benefit in increasing confidence between us, and would be an excellent preparation for an eventual meeting between the President and the Chancellor.

7. I would appreciate your personal attention and comment on the foregoing at the earliest opportunity.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Secret; Limdis. This telegram is summarized in McGhee, At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 216–217.
2. Document 200.