Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

200. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, February 22, 1967, 1915Z.

9817. DISTO. Subject: Meeting with Kiesinger—NPT.

1. I called on Chancellor Kiesinger late today at his request. At the outset he told me, as I had previously been advised that he had arranged the meeting in order to reassure me that the report made earlier in the week by a US news agency to the effect that the German Govt was dissatisfied with its relations with the US and with the American Amb was entirely false.² As an old friend, I had certainly known this. However, he wanted to set the record straight and had asked his Press Rep Von Hase to make a statement earlier in the day to this effect, advising the press of my visit. Some anonymous informant had apparently given rise to the story. He assured me, however, that there was no such attitude on the part of him or his Cabinet.

2. Kiesinger continued that he had, during his recent meeting with Sen Robert Kennedy,³ made the observation that he hoped that discussions between us would not be limited to points of disagreement—but also deal with broader issues and with areas in which there existed a common understanding. He had not intended to say this in a critical vein, since he considered it applicable equally to the German side. In response I said that we agreed with his observation. I pointed out the many specific areas such as defense, foreign aid, information policy, anti-pollution and resource development and space, in which organized consultations had proceeded with the previous govt and which we were in the process of resuming. I referred to the recent successful visit of FonMin Brandt, the invitation to DefMin Schroeder for a visit in April and the invitation we are extending to Min Heck.

3. The Chancellor replied that this was all excellent but he was also referring to those broader policies within which particular issues fit. He used as an example the NPT issue, which had struck Germany so emotionally. He is in the process of trying to calm Germany down on this issue. He is seeking to prevent the impression that Germany is reacting emotionally, causing unusual difficulties or conspiring to obtain nuclear weapons. He regretted some of the public statements that have been made, particularly that of former Chancellor Adenauer,⁴ as he had told Adenauer. Others, however, have raised sincere and objective questions which he hopes can be answered. No one, for example, can accuse Prof Weizsaecker of wanting an atomic bomb, but even he finds problems with respect to the treaty.

4. I suggested to the Chancellor that, as a way of precipitating more definitive discussions, he might wish to have Amb Foster visit Bonn at a suitable time. I had discussed this matter with our higher officials in Washington and yesterday with Amb Foster in Geneva, and he had indicated willingness to come after the current ENDC session gets underway. Also Dr. Kratzer of the AEC, who had recently been here on a short visit, would be willing to return with others and sit down around the table with the German technicians to answer their doubts and questions. I referred in this connection to my discussion of the previous day with Science Min Stoltenberg, who had raised with me some seven technical points which we had undertaken to answer. The Chancellor said that both suggestions seemed appropriate and he would let me know when this could be arranged. Next week may be impossible since he would be spending most of the time in Berlin.

5. The Chancellor observed that an important aspect of the problem was to assure that no impression is given the German people that they are being pressured to sign the NPT. Such pressure could have bad results for the coming Landtag elections. Kosygin’s statement in London,⁵ which he said had been confirmed by the Soviet Emb in Bonn as being accurate, to the effect that “if the treaty came about the FRG would have to sign” had had a bad effect in Germany. This had caused concern as to how the Soviets would function under the NPT; would they use it as a basis for interference in German affairs.

6. I expressed appreciation to the Chancellor for the statement made by the German Govt yesterday to the effect that they were in agreement with the idea of nonproliferation in principle. We agreed with the two conditions they had posed, namely, that nuclear powers should undertake disarmament measures and that Germany should be protected in scientific research and commercial applications. Both had been included in the draft preamble we had shown the Soviets in Geneva.⁶ I presented the Chancellor a copy of the preamble, along with the statement of President Johnson read on the opening of the ENDC meeting on Feb 20.⁷ I also gave him the oral note received from the Dept in Deptel 141946,⁸ pointing out that this would be superseded by a formal note when the complete draft treaty can be tabled.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Geneva.
2. A UPI dispatch reported that German officials had attributed a worsening diplomatic climate in part to McGhee. (Telegram 9702 from Bonn, February 20; ibid., PER McGHEE)
3. February 2.
4. During a February 16 speech at the University of Madrid. For text, see Konrad Adenauer, Reden, 1917–1967 (ed., H. Schwarz) (Stuttgart, 1975), pp. 484–491.
5. For text of Kosygin’s press conference at the conclusion of his February 6–13 visit to the United Kingdom, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, March 1, 1967, pp. 3–5. Extracts of his Guildhall speech which that also treated these issues are in Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1967–1968, p. 21881.
6. The February 20 U.S. draft is summarized in The New York Times, February 21, 1967. Subsequently the United States and Soviet Union agreed to a joint draft that was presented to the Geneva Conference on August 24. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 338–341.
7. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 210–212.
8. Dated February 21. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–6)