Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

199. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 8, 1967, 11:30 a.m.–1 p.m.

SUBJECT

• East-West Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Americans
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • ACDA Director Foster
  • Under Secretary Rostow
  • Deputy Under Secretary Kohler
  • Assistant Secretary Leddy
  • Counselor Bowie
  • Ambassador McGhee
  • Ambassador Cleveland
  • Mr. Puhan
• Germans
  • Vice Chancellor Brandt
  • Egon Bahr, FRG Foreign Office
  • Ambassador Knappstein, FRG Embassy
  • Minister Von Lilienfeld, FRG Embassy
  • Counselor Von Staden, FRG Embassy
  • Dr. Hans Arnold, FRG Foreign Office
  • Mr. Weber, Foreign Office
  • Mr. Soenksen, Foreign Office

The Secretary asked how East-West relations were developing.

Brandt replied with a smile that this was an area where the issues could be discussed both in Paris and in Washington without differences. He added, however, that relations with the Soviet Union remain difficult. He mentioned a Note received from the USSR this morning returning the FRG’s Note informing the Soviet Government of the establishment of relations with Romania.² The FRG Note was returned because of mention that the FRG was the legitimate spokesman for the German people. However the Soviet Note was not in itself as tendentious as that which the FRG had received in January.³ Nevertheless, Brandt thought this might be part of the Soviet effort to convince the other Eastern European states to take a harder line with the FRG than Romania had. In this the Soviets may have achieved some success. The Czechs were again asking that the Munich Agreement be null and void ab initio (a more acceptable formulation appears to have been under consideration by the Czechs before). Nevertheless Brandt retained the impression that the Hungarians and Czechs still had a strong tendency to develop better relations with the FRG, i.e., to follow the Romanian example. He mentioned Manescu had told him in Bonn to do what they liked with the Hungarians and that the FRG might say Romania had only done what the Soviet Union had done earlier with Germany, i.e., included West Berlin in trade with the FRG. (Brandt said the Romanians would permit the FRG to take care of West Berliners “a titre humanitaire”.)

Poland was admittedly more difficult. Danish Foreign Minister Krag in Warsaw found no particular change, thought Gomulka difficult, Cyrankiewicz relaxed and Rapacki colder now than during the Cold War. Still the FRG had hopes, in part because they thought French contacts on their behalf might be successful and because they were hopeful that Krupp manager Beitz, who had good connections with the Poles from wartime days, might be able to achieve something. The FRG will keep us informed through Ambassador Knappstein on what transpires. Brandt hoped Poland will come around, but said it will take time.

Yugoslavia was difficult largely for juridical reasons. The FRG broke relations with Yugoslavia⁴ and the problem of course concerns how third-world countries will regard FRG resumption of relations with a state that still recognizes the Soviet Zone after the FRG broke relations with them for that very reason. In this connection, Brandt mentioned German gratitude for our efforts to prevent recognition of the GDR by third countries. He added the FRG was still looking for a legal formulation that would make Yugoslavia a case distinct from others, like declaring Yugoslavia part of Eastern Europe. He admitted making a special case of Yugoslavia is a headache. Meanwhile the first step was to get direct communications in Bonn for the German diplomat in Belgrade who is at present attached to the French Embassy.

Returning to the Soviet Union, Brandt thought that considerable progress had been made on the one hand between him and Abrasimov in Berlin and, on the other, between Carstens and Tsarapkin in Bonn. However, since then the new Government there seemed to be a wall between Tsarapkin and the Germans. Even trade talks were interrupted with Tsarapkin saying that he wanted Soviet trade to receive the same treatment as that of Common Market members. The Russians were not amused by the rejoinder asking whether the USSR would also be willing to accept the same obligations. Brandt knew that the Russians had tried the same trade approach to the French, from which he concluded that this policy was not directed exclusively at the FRG. He wondered whether Tsarapkin was really properly instructed yet.

Before the new Government, he had an impression of forward motion on the question of exchange of declarations of the non-use of force. He had heard nothing since. As for the Soviet propaganda note, he said Bonn intended to answer it against the advice of the FRG Ambassador in Moscow. As seen from Bonn the note was worth answering, if only to score a few propaganda points and place the German position clearly on record. The FRG would then try to move forward on trade, scientific and cultural exchanges.

The Secretary mentioned that our own bilateral relations with the USSR had not really been inhibited by Viet-Nam, mentioning the Civil Air Agreement concluded in May, the Consular Agreement now before the Senate and the Outer Space Treaty as examples.⁵ He said wryly that the Soviet negotiators do not appear to have the word reciprocity in their vocabulary, that somehow the greatest tragedy which could befall a Soviet negotiator was to realize that he could have gotten more.

The Secretary concluded it was important for all of us to contribute to the bettering of East-West relations.

1. Source: Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Memoranda of Conversation. Secret. Drafted by Puhan on February 9 and approved in S, M, and G on February 17. The source text is marked “Part 2 of 2.” The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Conference Room. A memorandum of conversation dealing with NATO is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 235.
2. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 946–948.
3. For extracts, see ibid., pp. 944–946.
4. West Germany broke diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia in 1957.
5. For text of the Civil Air Agreement, signed on November 4, 1966, see 17 UST 1909. For text of the Consular Agreement, signed on June 1, 1964, see 19 UST 5018. For text of the Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, signed on January 27, 1967, see 18 UST 2410.