Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, December 21, 1966, 7:51 p.m.

106794. Pass to White House. From Ambassador McGhee.

1. This message should be considered as being a reporting telegram from Amembassy Bonn.²

2. I called late yesterday on Chancellor Kiesinger at my request. I was with him for an hour. Only his aide, Fonoff Rep Osterheld, was present. This was my first opportunity to call on the Chancellor, who was inducted on December 1. He had only the previous day given his initial reception for foreign ambassadors—thus putting himself in business.

3. I congratulated the Chancellor on his elevation to his high office. Recalling our long association when he was Minister-President of Baden Wuerttemberg I expressed my pleasure and that of our government in working with him. We know him well and had full confidence in him and in his friendship for the US.

4. I thereupon gave him the letter to himself from the President dated December 19,³ together with Christmas card from the President. Kiesinger read the letter carefully, expressed appreciation for the warmth of the President’s greeting and said he would reply shortly.

5. I also gave the Chancellor for later reading the US policy statement (see Embtel 6525 and State 98003)⁴ approved by the Dept for transmission to FonMin Brandt, and a copy of the very favorable NY Times editorial of that day which commented on his Policy Statement to the Bundestag. I attempted to clarify for the Chancellor the conflicting rumors concerning the possibility of a visit of the President to Europe in the spring, by reading to him the most recent official US statement (made December 12)⁵ on this question.

6. Kiesinger then commented that German and American interests were to a very wide extent the same. He proposed to develop and expand our traditional good relations—to bring our nations into a close understanding. He refused to accept an “either-or” in Germany’s relations with France and the US. Although he hoped to establish good relations with France, this need not be at the expense of relations with us. There are many issues, NATO organization for example, on which he differs sharply from France.

7. I assured Kiesinger that we had no doubts as to his impartiality. We were not engaged in a running popularity contest with the French. We hoped he would be able to develop close and fruitful relations with France, which we considered to be vital for the peace of Europe.

8. I thereupon raised with the Chancellor the partial draft non-proliferation treaty which I had been instructed to take up with the FonMin earlier that day (reported separately).

I emphasized that in our judgment the draft did not foreclose any important German nuclear objectives, including the eventual creation of a European nuclear force, to which the Chancellor had made reference in his television appearance on December 18. It would enhance Germany’s image—particularly in Eastern Europe. If, on the other hand, Germany were the only important “holdout” to a non-proliferation treaty, her reputation would suffer enormously.

9. Kiesinger replied that although the matter had been discussed briefly in the cabinet meeting that morning, there had been no opportunity for detailed study of the draft itself. The German policy, as given in his Policy Statement, was quite clear. They were against German possession or control of nuclear weapons. He is aware of the strong reaction there would be against Germany if they would oppose a treaty. Their only concern is one of “keeping the door open”—for options for the future, and to assure Germany’s nuclear protection after the treaty is signed. He queried me as to our impression of timing. When would Germany be faced with a decision? The next cabinet meeting was scheduled for January 11. I undertook to inform the Fonoff on this point.

10. I then raised with Kiesinger the question of Eastern Policy. There was much in his Policy Statement which corresponded closely to portions of the President’s speech of October 7. FonMin Brandt had yesterday before the WEU spoken, as had the President, of the possibility of phased withdrawal of forces from Central Europe.

11. Kiesinger replied that he did not expect spectacular results from his policy, however, “something new would happen.” He wished to avoid the old nomenclature—“Must détente precede reunification or vice versa.” The supreme German policy was not reunification but peace. Although this is nothing new, there was relief on the part of the Germans that he had stated it. The new point that he sought to inject was “that we should all together try to achieve détente”—at the same time being sure that nothing was left undone in the military field. Indeed, has not the ratio of forces turned in recent years in favor of the Soviets? We must not lose the military confrontation, however détente must be pursued and reunification must be “infused” into it.

12. I assured the Chancellor of our sincere desire to see reunification accomplished. We would not be content merely to await its coming about automatically through the historical welding together of East and West Europe, if it could be accomplished earlier in any other peaceful way.

13. Kiesinger then commented on the fact that, although there was some anti-American feeling in Europe, this was least true of all in Germany—despite efforts by the NPD to stir it up. The only real problem was a fear on the part of some that the US would seek détente at the expense of reunification. Germany should not put itself in the position of a girl who constantly seeks reassurance from an old lover “that he still loves her”. This is not dignified. Great good could be accomplished, however, if the President could come to Germany and explain his policies. He would be well received.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. confidential; exdis. Drafted by McGhee, cleared by Thompson, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris and London.
2. McGhee was in Washington for consultations. Rusk’s Appointment Book indicates taht he met with McGhee at 5 p.m. that day. (Johnson Library)
3. See footnote 2, Document 192.
4. See footnote 2, Document 188.
5. Not found.