Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

195. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, January 16, 1967, 2005Z.

8224. NATUS. Subj: Talk with Chancellor Kiesinger. Chancellor Kiesinger asked me to call on him today so that he could report to our govt the results of his meeting with General de Gaulle on Jan 13–14. It is perhaps significant from the standpoint of his attitude toward the US that we were the first country he had chosen to report to and that he did so on his first day back in office.

1. German and French relations with US

Kiesinger said that his objective in meeting with de Gaulle was to revive the German-French treaty without, however, creating any “twilight” areas of uncertainty. He had a “very clear” discussion with de Gaulle with respect to the relations of both countries with the US. de Gaulle said that he had respect for the US, but that the US was so powerful that it could not help “dominating.” To this France will not submit, even though it is a “friendly” domination. France wishes to retain its ties and alliance with the US but to carry out an independent policy. On the other hand, he considered that Germany had been too “obedient” to the US, “even Adenauer.” In response, Kiesinger agreed that the US naturally had its own interests and would be “stupid” not to act accordingly. The problem is to determine the extent to which US interests can be brought to coincide with those of Europe as a whole, and of individual European countries. At the peak of the cold war there had been a very close correspondence of interests. Perhaps there is a difference now. We should talk about it. Kiesinger said that he had made clear to de Gaulle, however, that Germany’s position was different from that of France. Germany will continue to support NATO on an integrated basis, and Germany wished US troops to remain in Europe. To these ends Germany will cooperate with the US. He agreed, however, with de Gaulle that Europe must make an increasing contribution toward the “molding of its fate.” According to Kiesinger, there was little dispute or extended discussions in the foregoing exchange. de Gaulle admitted that he recognized Germany’s position and attitude to be different. (Kiesinger interpolated this to me to mean “for the time being” and that de Gaulle fully expects that Germany will eventually come around to the French viewpoint.) According to Kiesinger, both he and de Gaulle agreed that the cooperation of France and Germany under its treaty need not be handicapped by their respective attitudes toward the US.

2. Viet Nam

Regarding Viet Nam, de Gaulle only said that the US position was “not good,” that we would find that we “can’t conquer a swamp.” To this Kiesinger replied that Germany cannot say the same thing, if for no other reason than that “we are a divided country.”

3. UK membership in the Common Market

With respect to the further development of the Common Market and the question of UK membership, de Gaulle raised his old objection. Kies-inger in turn proposed that the “door should be left open.” He told de Gaulle that Germany had a strong desire for the success of the Kennedy Round in order to bring down the tariff walls separating it and EFTA, with which it had important trading interests. He told de Gaulle that the question of the entry of the UK into the Common Market is one for decision by the Six. A decision should be postponed until Wilson has had an opportunity to talk with the French Govt in Paris.

4. European détente

de Gaulle emphasized the importance of a policy of détente in Europe. The present confrontation in Europe must be reduced “step by step.” This was a thorny problem, however, it will be less difficult now than in the future to get the Soviets to a détente—including increased economic and cultural exchanges. France needs a period of peace in order to develop its country. Kiesinger replied that Germany also seeks détente in Europe. They agree that this is the only way to preserve peace. Germany hopes, however, that throughout the process her allies will keep German reunification in mind. He realizes that the solution cannot be “figured out now,” however, it should not be left entirely to the future. He told de Gaulle that he could not accept his interpretation that German reunification must wait until the end when complete détente has occurred and it will therefore come automatically. The Germans are not willing “to pursue détente just for détente’s sake.” He believes that every peaceful opportunity should be seized to further reunification.

According to Kiesinger, de Gaulle agreed with his formulation. Kiesinger observed to me that he was not in the end able to envisage precisely what de Gaulle had in mind in his concepts of détente, entente and cooperation. According to him de Gaulle, however, does believe that the Soviets are so preoccupied in dealing with their own problems, including Red China, that they will be willing to avoid a confrontation in Europe.

5. Other matters discussed with Kiesinger, including a non-proliferation treaty, and comments will follow.²

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow. Passed to the White House and USIA. In a January 16 memorandum to President Johnson transmitting this telegram, Walt Rostow commented: “Herewith Chancellor Kiesinger’s report on his talks with de Gaulle. In short, Bonn’s heart still belongs to Daddy.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 12) McGhee summarized this telegram and commented on the new Chancellor’s views in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 204–205.
2. Telegram 8250 from Bonn, January 17. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18)