Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

193. Memorandum Prepared by John W. McCloy¹

Bonn, December 17, 1966, 7 p.m.

Memorandum of meeting with Brandt and Wehner on the evening of Saturday, December 17th, 1966, at Brandt’s Berlin office in Bonn. Was with them for about 3 hours (7 to 10 P.M.) An S.P.D. member of the Bundestag, Seydak (who may only have been a party official) was also present.

I told Brandt I was anxious to get from him his conception of the direction of the new government in foreign affairs. I have talked with the new Chancellor and with the new Finance Minister and I was particularly interested in the views of the new Foreign Minister.

I told him that I had been asked to talk to them about the new direction of the government and also to learn their views of the correct direction of United States policy in respect to Germany.

Brandt was expecting me to talk about balance of payments. I told him this was an important but incidental matter, important but far less so than the direction of Europe and the relation of the United States to it.

The talk of “change” was in the air and it was necessary to know what really was changing and what the implications were for the security of the Free World.

He started out by saying that in the past German emphasis had been on reunification. That had been the inspiration of German policy. The main orientation now is, what can Germany do for peace of the world. Everything must be put in relation to this without giving up Germany’s ultimate legitimate aims, i.e., reunification. Soviets must lose their fear of Germany if reunification is ever to come about. We must find the formula by which peace is preserved—peace on a permanent basis.

Germany had been concerned too much with its own worries and preoccupations and had not been as conscious or as sympathetic as it should have been over the concerns and troubles of others, particularly the United States. Reunification is not in the foreseeable future. NATO has been the security framework but within this framework now Europe had to be brought together. It was a slow process but a necessary one—contradictional in many of its aspects but it had to be accomplished. Young people needed confidence in future and they had to have new direction. As nothing can be done with Europe without France, one has to deal with France and de Gaulle is France at the moment. We cannot give France a new government and so we have to deal with him. We shall never have the Europe which is ultimately desirable while he is head of France because his concept is leadership of France in Europe with a secondary position for everybody else. People are disillusioned regarding reunification and the lack of progress of integration of Europe economically and politically but we must make progress in what direction we can; and so Germany has determined to see what can be done on a bilateral basis. He saw De Gaulle day before yesterday—cordial—talked for an hour. Brandt had felt it possible to work out common policies with France, technological problems, common market, common policies for Europe, etc. Found de Gaulle not so much interested in this any more. Now it was the East-West issue which absorbed him. Whereas before this, de Gaulle had always expressed anti-American sentiments to him, this time there was “almost no such references.” Quite evidently, de Gaulle thought that the major development was now to be the entente with the Soviet Union, deep significance of Kosygin visit and those to come after. de Gaulle had met with Rusk and Brandt had impression meeting was not unpleasant.

de Gaulle believed no threat from Soviet Union for time being—possibilities of renewed threat not excluded for the future. de Gaulle had referred to United States troops on Germany’s territory. Had no objection to this—indeed, was quite satisfied with their presence there. He simply did not want them on French soil and they served the purpose where they were. Soviet Union much preoccupied with China and internal problems and way is now open to discuss things with Soviet Union—trade, culture—can’t really discuss reunification now. Brandt was contemplating and de Gaulle was urging entering into an agreement renouncing all use of force in connection with solution of the German problem. Formal document. Make it appear as a significant document or treaty of far-reaching importance. This might help “normalize” relations which they had in mind. They wished to have diplomatic relations with satellites. Poland would prove difficult. All this is in line with President Johnson’s October 7th speech as Couve de Murville was careful to point out. It was not possible to mention “Oder Neisse” line at this time but they had gone as far as possible in the Chancellor’s statement. de Gaulle had said to Kosygin that reunification of Germany was a historical necessity though nothing to be done about it now. Maybe the issue of Sudetens could be included in the agreement but this was already so clearly renounced that it no longer had any significance. de Gaulle surprised him by referring to the need for a renunciation of an Anschluss with Austria Of course, no one was interested in this but it might be useful vis-à-vis Soviet Union. There are limited moves one can make and we intend to study what these moves can be. de Gaulle had said no longer interested in military matters or strategy. French troops in Germany on the proper basis—experts can take care of trade, military technological matters. “We can deal with the fundamentals”, i.e., East-West.

Brandt and Wehner were impressed by the proclamation Monnet was now working on in regard to Europe. S.P.D. would support it. British would certainly be blocked unless de Gaulle could be convinced that Britain’s financial problems solved and honestly accepted full obligations of Rome. Had to deal with France. Brandt said that he had made it clear that Germans adhered to concept of integrated defense. “de Gaulle did not object”. Brandt said the Germans were going to do what they could to improve military planning but did not know how far de Gaulle would be prepared to go. Mainly interested in the Moscow-Paris axis.

Germans were in a confused position. “We are the only one all of whose forces are in NATO.” Till recently all wanted Germany to do more in military field. Now suggestion is we should do less; still fear of German rearmament. Must restore confidence. This is the value of the renunciation agreement.

As for United States force levels—most dangerous if important changes took place now—must not relate such action to money. This had created a very bad impression—the package approach was a major mistake—created doubts about the Alliance. Hastened the fall of the Erhard Government. No steps regarding forces should be taken which do not come about as a result of community decisions—must be a rational evolution subscribed to by all—not unilateral. Alliance has suffered a set back. Must be reinvigorated. United States should not gain the impression that there was a basic change in German policies. Geography and experience dictate the need for accommodation with France. He found a recent statement given him by McGhee helpful in that it made clear State Department’s desire for good Franco-German relations. Germany’s economic situation probably improving this fall but growth rate of 4% impossible. Need to bring order into finance. Should no longer make the defense budget a savings account for social legislation as it had been. Whatever was needed for defense should be voted and spent. (cf. Strauss)

Belgians had made an interesting suggestion in Paris—all say things have changed—appoint a committee to examine into just what has changed and what is the value of the change.

When I asked Willy whether he had the impression that the United States had attempted to dominate or bring too much influence to bear on German policy, he said definitely not, except in some aspects of the military field. If anything, he felt United States had not been as closely interested in German policy matters as might have been wished. At one time there had been a common discussion of problems—example of old days in Berlin, etc. Now the impression was one of some aloofness and oversensitivity in regard to undue influence. What was needed was close frank collaboration on all matters which affected Germany. He said he was pleased that Rusk had referred to the non-proliferation treaty language when he had been in Paris.² His view was that Germany did not want to create any difficulties over non-proliferation. People had come to believe it was a step toward peace and momentum of opinion is in favor of it. No place therefore for Germany to stand in way, although its significance may be considerably less than claimed for it. Where Germany raised questions it would be on basis of interest of all non-nuclear powers not particularly Germany alone. On the European option he was not so concerned. Impossible to bind a new European community any way—simply not bound by treaty’s terms. Of course, if such a European political entity was favored it would have to have nuclear power. Important thing is what goes on within Alliance as it is; McNamara committee, disarmament questions. When I raised the question of the confederation with France which Strauss spoke of, he said he did not agree with Strauss on this point. He said his concern was to save De Gaulle and France from the German Gaullists. They were dangerous and most reactionary in their thinking. No accident that many rightist elements in Germany are Gaullists.

Wehner added some remarks. Important for everyone to realize with all the talk of French rapprochement Europe is only possible within the concept of American partnership. We should try to find the small “auslege” with the French but never lose sight of the fact that these were interior matters and are not part of the larger waters. Germany needs a little “spielraum” within which to operate with France and the East but it must all be within the basic commitments. Wehner said he had learned to become pro-American out of discipline—simply because there was no other way. Had not been exactly seduced by the Americans over the years but he was a pro-American. Kiesinger had done well to speak of France as America’s oldest ally.

Erhard was not able to establish good relations with either France, Britain or United States—too bad because he had made real contribution to the country. Now the new government was going to do this. It had authority which Erhard lacked. The S.P.D. had supported Schroeder and the M.L.F. and the Kennedy test ban. Impression created that United States interest in these things had disappeared after Germany had been committed. Too easy an acceptance of United States point of view. New government will be more satisfactory to deal with than the obsequious Hassel. Can operate on a broader basis.

Wehner said United States should emphasize closer collaboration. He complained that American Ambassador had not seen him since the Ambassador’s arrival until just the other day when he was made a Minister.³ (This remark together with the one about the United States not having seduced him made me feel he is very sensitive in regard to his position. He has been operating in the shadows for so long due to his old communist record and the brilliance of Erler that he is now enjoying the sun. He seeks and expects recognition and one should be aware of this if he visits the United States.)

Both of them thought a visit by the President to Germany would be helpful if not too long postponed. However, it should be carefully thought out and some concrete results should accompany the conclusion of the visit. Perhaps some things in regard to space or technology. He rather thought Kiesinger should visit the United States first. Visit should be not for show but for business—serious attempt should be made to re-create confidence in United States leadership.

I had seen Brandt on the T.V. when he addressed the Bundestag after his return from Paris. It was too effusive and too obviously directed toward a make-up with France and a tactful detachment from the United States. I said that I wanted to say a few things: the strong emphasis on the overthrow of the old government because it had been too much under the influence of the United States, the rush to Paris, the tone of his talk was not the attitude of a foreign minister sure of himself as an equal partner in an Alliance. I said I was fearful of the result of all this Lili Marlene love affair. He should recall that it was only a few days before his “embracio” of de Gaulle that Kosygin, de Gaulle’s red carpet guest, had used French soil from which to deliver vicious attacks on his country and my country—two allies of France. de Gaulle must have been apprized of these attacks beforehand.

When I recently saw Senator Mansfield he had talked to me about the Europeans not wanting United States troops and that we had better get out if this was their attitude. I complained that he was mistakenly relating French attitudes to the rest of Europe. I was now fearful that all this rather ostentatious display toward France on the part of Germany when France had hardly acted as a loyal ally of the United States either in respect of Viet Nam or in the manner it had left NATO, would tend to justify the Senator’s appraisal and that a large body of United States opinion would be saying “a plague on both your houses”, with the result that both de Gaulle and Moscow would suddenly find they had with Germany’s assistance accomplished their respective wishes for the detachment of the United States and its interests from Europe. I am sure this sobered him up. I believe it was well to say it if only to moderate the emotional transports which Bonn and Brandt are now undergoing in the way of “off with the old, on with the new.”

I said that he must always keep in mind that it was not the United States which was demanding a choice between Washington and Paris. It was France only that demanded Paris. Germany did not have to decide between de Gaulle and Johnson or France and the United States. What Germany did have to decide was between a collective approach to security with all that it meant and an individual independent approach based on axes and all the other paraphanalia of the pre-war era which de Gaulle had re-introduced. This was fundamental for there was no place for the United States in Europe on any basis except a collective basis. We could not put our troops in Germany on the same basis that France now demanded hers. It was going to require high statesmanship for Germany to play these two roles—embracement of France and adherence to collective policies hostile to de Gaulle. It would prove to be a difficult role to play in Europe and an even more difficult one to play in front of United States public opinion.

I asked Brandt what role the offset problem and the failure of Erhard’s visit to the United States had played in his downfall. He said it had undoubtedly accelerated it but it would probably have occurred later on without this development. There is no doubt now in my mind that this is a correct appraisal. At least all Germans with whom I spoke said the visit and the way the offset was handled triggered things and was a factor both in the fall of Erhard and the new accent on overtures to the French.

He seemed to harbor no grudges over the Berlin voting problem.

John J. McCloy ⁴

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, vol. 17. No classification marking. McCloy prepared the memorandum on December 22. A memorandum of McCloy’s December 16 conversation with Chancellor Kiesinger is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 230.
2. December 12. Reported in telegram Secto 16 from Paris, December 13. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453, CF 248)
3. McGhee reported on this meeting in telegram 7161 from Bonn, December 15. (Ibid., Central Files, POL GER W–US)
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.