Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

230. Memorandum of Conversation Between John J. McCloy and Chancellor Kiesinger¹

Bonn, December 16, 1966.

I saw Kiesinger and spent 2–1/4 hours with him. I told him that I had seen the President at his ranch in Texas and that I had told him I would take the first opportunity after the government had been formed, and it had had the opportunity to discuss the direction of its foreign policy, to talk with the new German leaders. It had been impossible or impractical to talk with him on the occasion of my last visit to Germany while the new government was being formed. I told him I was now in Germany for a short visit and I was glad to have this opportunity to discuss with him his intentions regarding the direction of the new German government’s policy and to get his thoughts on how he viewed United States policy.

I emphasized that though I was still engaged in the tripartite discussions, I was here now only as one who had a deep interest in the future of Germany and its good relations with my own country; I expected to report to the President my talks with him and with other German leaders but there would not be the general diplomatic reporting of my visit. He said he was most happy to have the chance to sit down and talk over the new direction of things as far as it was now possible to do so.

I told him of my general instructions from the President on the tripartite mission and I briefly outlined to him the basis on which I had been appointed referring to the threat of British withdrawal of troops and the need for a reappraisal of the NATO situation; its strategy; its force levels and the sharing of burdens. We now had a brief respite before the discussions resumed and I was taking advantage of my visit to Germany to have from him, as best he could now give it, the direction of German policy and what he hoped that the United States’ direction would be in relation to it. I added that I thought his recent statement of policy had been excellent and that it had had a good reception in the State Department and generally in the United States.

Since it had been frequently announced that the new government would endeavor to make constructive advances in regard to France. I thought it well to emphasize again that good relations between Germany and France were not only consistent with United States policy but a matter of deep concern on the part of the United States. Two world wars and tensions between Germany and France had been the result of poor relations, the effect of which had been to involve the United States in European affairs in a large way and we rebelled at the idea propounded by French propaganda that we stood in the way of good Franco-German relations. I said that the United States could only be relieved and pleased if those relations were placed on a permanently constructive basis. This had been a cardinal principle of our foreign policy since the end of World War II. It was true in Schuman’s time and it is true in De Gaulle’s as well. There was one thing we did wish to clarify however and that was the attitude of Germany toward NATO. We could only read General De Gaulle’s intention as one of distinct hostility to NATO. While we were not seeking to place ourselves between France and Germany, we did believe we were entitled to know which stood first in his mind, i.e., adherence to NATO or in the attempt to improve relations with France, less emphasis on NATO and the principles on which it was built. We had put a great deal of energy and resources into the concept of collective security in Europe through NATO. It had been successful and we believed it still had great validity; it was based on the concept of equal partnership of all the participants, including Germany. If the new German government was prepared to sacrifice the unity of NATO in favor of a new relationship with France, we ought to know as it would affect our whole position as a NATO partner. People were talking about new directions of policy, more “modern” approaches to European security; less adherence to the United States. Was there any suggestion in his own thinking which involved any new relationships affecting Germany’s position in NATO?

He said he wanted to respond to this question very emphatically. The coalition of which he was the leader representing over 2/3rds of all the Bundestag votes adhered strictly to the concept of European collective security which NATO represented—and more than 2/3rds of the country as a whole took the same view. This was a basic principle. NATO had to be developed, not retarded, in accordance with the requirements of the time. In his recent statement he had said this. He had said no more about NATO in his statement than this but this was not because of any lack of interest in NATO but only because he did not want to burden his first statement with details of military affairs and he wanted to emphasize in his first statement Germany’s great desire to get along well with all nations and not place too much emphasis on Europe alone. He wanted me to know and the President to know that the position of France in respect to NATO had not the slightest effect on Germany’s attitude to NATO. He repeated this several times. He had been one of the strongest proponents of the preamble to the French treaty which had stressed the priority of NATO and he did not withdraw from the position in the slightest degree. What concerned him was how to effect good relations with France at the same time making perfectly clear his adherence to and dependence upon NATO. It required some thought how best to proceed with these objectives in mind and he was not at this moment clear as to what he could do to insure the accomplishment of both objectives. He said he and all Germany urgently desired to keep United States troops in Germany on the basis and in the amount they were here now. If reduced he would be most unhappy and Germany would have to think of an equivalent substitute because the threat from the East had not disappeared. He had stressed in his statement that Germany had in the past been overly preoccupied with its own problems and had not acted as if it were aware of the problems of its allies. Germany was not now in a position where it had to be solely occupied with its own problems. It was a member of the Alliance and had to take into account the preoccupations of its partners as well. The United States was beset with problems of which Germany had to be aware and Germany had to be more understanding in respect of them. Germany was no longer in the position of the young girl in love for the first time who sought daily some new assurance from her lover of his undying affection. Its task was to help create a real and dignified partnership with the United States and not seek repeated assurances of United States commitments as a member of the Alliance to the security of Germany. “We take this for granted and intend to act accordingly,” was the way he put it. He deplored the French defection and was sorry for it but we had to put up with it, make the best of it and to look now for the practical adjustments required by it and not merely deplore the past. It might be presumptuous of him to hope that Germany might be of some help in trying to bring about some better understanding with France on matters of military security and between United States, NATO and France than had thus far been practical, considering the French attitude. He did not have anything specific in mind and it might only be wishful thinking on his part but he intended to give the matter thought and try to accomplish something to improve the arrangements with France in regard to defenses in case of trouble and generally between France and the United States. He hoped there was a role Germany could play along these lines. It was, at least, worth a try.

The need was now to strengthen NATO. There was no justification either for security reasons or for the inability to achieve the reunification of Germany to suggest any withdrawal or weakening of NATO. It had not been the objective of NATO, in the first place, to achieve reunification and he did not share the view of some of his compatriots that NATO had been a failure because reunification had not been achieved. NATO had been a resounding success but it needed nourishment. There were some who once thought Germany ought to withdraw from NATO in order to advance reunification; this was a thing of the past, and no one in his right mind could think the Soviets would be the more induced to grant reunification if NATO were to go or Germany were to withdraw from it. He did feel that some relaxation of tensions might help in the long struggle for reunification but he was under no illusions respecting Soviet intentions in this respect. He was not concerned over any detente with the United States and the Soviet Union. He was in favor of it but one thing must be clear; the detente must not take the form of cementing or acquiescing in the status quo. Germany did look toward eventual reunification; it would not be a self-respecting nation if it did not constantly seek to bring it about. There was no possibility of any acceptable Soviet proposal for reunification coming about in the reasonable future. There were some fears that a detente with the Soviet Union on the part of the United States would embody an acceptance of the status quo. This was not his worry as he was aware that the United States had been the first to declare for the reunification of Germany and had been the most steadfast adherent of it. He was less confident of France.

[Here follow 6 pages of discussion of unrelated topics.]

John J. McCloy

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 17. No classification marking. The meeting was held at the Palais Schaumburg.