Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

128. Memorandum of Conversation Between Vice President Humphrey and the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee)¹

Washington, September 1, 1965.

German Election Campaign

Ambassador McGhee predicted that Chancellor Erhard and the GDU would win the September 19 elections, and continue to govern. The envisioned “Grand Coalition” (between CDU and SPD) would not materialize. Willy Brandt has been unable to seize any issues or offer a real choice in the campaign.

Ambassador McGhee discounted many of the campaign statements made by former Chancellor Adenauer. Adenauer has been bitter re the United States “since the election of John Kennedy,” he said, and increasingly pro-Gaullist. (But even Adenauer has been lately critical of deGaulle and twice has publicly criticized him. Gaullism was weakening, in general, inside Germany.)

Chancellor Erhard remains staunchly pro-American and pro-Atlantic. In fact, Erhard readily admits he was “made in America” and placed in German politics by U.S. military government. His policies after the election will continue to be moderate. He was most favorably impressed by his visit to the LBJ ranch, and hopes the President will be able to reciprocate the visit.

U.S. Policy Toward Germany

The Vice President posed the question for consideration: Is our European and Atlantic policy conditioned too greatly on what Germany might or might not accept?

The Ambassador replied that he thought not. There are those in Germany, be said, who feel indeed the opposite—that Germany is a U.S. puppet and that German policy is too often formulated on a basis of pleasing the United States.

In reality, the Ambassador said, there is a great identity of interest for the U.S. and Germany and that, 90 per cent of the time, we are in agreement to begin with. Our policies coincide, he said, because they serve both our interests.

Nuclear-Sharing and MLF

The Vice President asked whether the Federal Republic really wanted the MLF. The Ambassador replied that Germany did not necessarily want the MLF per se, but that Germany did seek some arrangement of nuclear sharing for two reasons:

1. It would give Germany political equality with France and Great Britain, both of whom possess nuclear forces; and

2. It would give Germany a greater guarantee of military security.

On the second point, the Ambassador said most reponsible Germans felt that participation in a nuclear-sharing arrangement or multilateral force would insure that Germany would be left with some protection in event of a non-proliferation agreement—if a non-proliferation agreement were reached today, Germany might feel completely on the outside, looking in. Her only protection would be the U.S. guarantee.

The U.S. sold the German government on the MLF concept, the Ambassador said, and then when “the rug was pulled out from under them,” both Schroeder and Von Hassel took a beating at home.

There is no sense of urgency in Germany at present re nuclear sharing, the Ambassador said. However, the Ambassador felt we should take initiative toward further discussion of the problem. He suggested, as a starting point, the calling of a high-level meeting early next year in framework of the Paris Working Group to renew initiative toward some solution. The Ambassador frankly felt that the assignment of more Polaris missiles to the Mediterranean, under NATO, would reassure the Germans militarily—at least for the next two or three years. It was possible that the desire for nuclear sharing could, in fact, be satisfied with greater participation in nuclear command and control, targeting and planning. The U.S. should, he said, make clearly known its offer to “work something out” so that we did not appear to be the all-powerful big brothers of the Alliance, imposing our will on our partners.

Kennedy Round and Common Market

The Vice President asked whether the Ambassador thought General deGaulle meant to permanently sabotage the Kennedy Round trade negotiation. The Ambassador replied that he thought this would be too great a blow against France’s five EEC partners, who favored the Kennedy Round.

The Vice President asked whether the Ambassador felt deGaulle would demand the removal of EEC President Hallstein and Vice President Mansholt as his price for remaining in the EEC. The Ambassador said that this, too, would press France’s partners too far. The Germans, particularly, could not accept such a demand re Hallstein.

If France continues its policies of threat and ultimatum within the EEC, she will ultimately alienate the rest of Europe, the Ambassador said.

Eastern Europe

The Ambassador felt Germany was increasingly liberalizing her attitude toward relations with Eastern Europe. He pointed to the large amount of German-East European trade. He pointed out that Germany was highly upset concerning long-term commercial arrangements concluded with the East by the U.K. The Vice President replied that he was upset, too. Common Western policies were badly needed in this regard.

Visits to Europe (Private Discussion)

The Ambassador said he felt Western Europe badly needed some important signs of U.S. interest and commitment. He had hoped for some time that President Johnson could make an official visit to Western Europe.

The Vice President asked for the Ambassador’s candid opinion regarding the usefulness of a visit by himself to Western Europe. The Ambassador said he thought it would be useful, but that it might create circumstances which would cause a delay in a Presidential visit—and the Presidential visit was badly needed.

The Vice President said that this was his opinion, too. He disclosed, privately, that there had been discussion regarding possible foreign travel by himself. He felt, personally, that visits to Africa and Asia might be most useful to the national interest. He thought the President should visit Latin America and Europe as soon as possible—perhaps a European trip in early December.

Both the Vice President and Ambassador agreed to work toward stimulation of such a European visit by the President.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Erhard Visit, December 1965. Confidential. Drafted by Ted Van Dyke of the Vice President’s staff.