Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

127. Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council¹

Washington, August 10, 1965.

SUBJECT

• The Division of Germany and of Europe

I. Introduction and Purpose

For a variety of reasons, the problem of divided Germany has not been at the center of diplomatic activity for some time. Critical situations outside of Europe have held major attention. The Soviets have been preoccupied by the tensions and uncertainties of a change in leadership and by the spreading disarray in the Communist world. The West has been distracted by discords of its own over the organization of Europe and the structure of the alliance.

It may be that problems like these will continue for some time longer to take precedence; the new approach to the USSR which had been contemplated for the period after the West German elections in September does not now seem likely to be timely. We can be sure, however, that Germany as the most central of all the issues between the West and the USSR will sooner or later return to the active agenda. This paper appraises, against the background of our two decades of experience and the changing scene in Eastern Europe, various approaches which have been suggested for Western policy. It states some views about the probable long-term development of the German problem, and draws some implications for American policy, especially in relations with the Federal Republic.

II. Some Suggested Approaches to the German Problem

A. Formal Initiatives for Negotiation

The three Western powers will continue from time to time to be under pressure from the West Germans to undertake formal diplomatic approaches to the USSR in quest of a return to Four-Power negotiations. This is a natural by-product of German internal politics, as well as of a need for reassurance that the allies remain actually committed to Germany’s reunification.

We know that such “initiatives” will be barren of any result. The Soviets are committed to maintain the division of Germany indefinitely if they can. They consider that the survival of Communist power in East Germany is inseparable from their hegemony in Eastern Europe as a whole; they are unwilling to hazard that power position, the prize of victory in World War II, by permitting a reunited Germany to revive the historic struggle of Germans and Russians in that area. Any leadership under the present regime which allowed a reunited Germany to emerge and, as the Soviets would expect, to challenge their dominant influence in Eastern Europe, would suffer the most severe ideological and political consequences. Considerations of this kind, more than a concern for military security in the specific sense, or even for the great economic value which East Germany has for the USSR, almost certainly determine the unyielding nature of the Soviet attitude.

The USSR’s intention to maintain the status quo in Central Europe would probably hold firm whatever guarantees the West might offer against wayward conduct by a reunited Germany. The Soviets would agree to the dismantling of Communist power in East Germany only if developments there took such a turn that it seemed likely to become more costly or dangerous to remain than to withdraw. Short of a contingency like revolt or other serious difficulties for the East German regime, the Soviets mean to stay.

This Soviet attitude is based in the last analysis on a view of Russian national interest and might not change even if there should be a considerable dilution of the ideological elements which presently condition the Soviet outlook. At the very least, it is necessary to posit an end to the cold war and the power alignments associated with it in order to make such a change seem plausible at all.

Since proposals for negotiations which aim at the removal of Communist control from East Germany will not gain a favorable response in the foreseeable future, the only relevant question concerning them is what advantages or costs they may have. Clearly they do serve the purpose of cementing relations with the West Germans. Beyond this, they are of use in reminding the Soviets, and the world, that we continue to regard German reunification as essential to a general settlement, should they ever be disposed to seek one.

There may be circumstances, however, in which relations with the Soviets are unduly burdened by proposals for negotiations on Germany. When the main focus of Soviet-American dealings is elsewhere, as at present during the Viet Nam crisis, or perhaps at some moment when a desirable arms control measure becomes possible of agreement, would be such occasions.

On the whole, we should probably continue to be sparing of formal approaches to the Soviets for negotiations and calculate carefully the suitable occasions. We should try to satisfy the Germans as much as possible with unilateral declarations in lieu of formal initiatives. These might also give primary stress to the theme of self-determination as the ground on which a German settlement remains a pressing issue, rather than to the theme of the Soviets’ legal obligations under the Four-Power arrangements. Periodic enunciation of self-determination for Germany as the key to security in Central Europe should serve to underline our position adequately. Such statements are also more effective as political warfare in Germany and Eastern Europe than yet another curt Soviet rejection of a formal invitation to negotiate.

B. Arms Control and Security Measures

This approach proceeds from the view that certain arms control and security agreements could reduce the danger of conflict in Central Europe and consequently over time create an atmosphere which would favor a general political settlement. Standard proposals of this sort include observation and inspection of military dispositions on both sides, prohibition of nuclear weapons in an agreed zone, partial troop withdrawals and non-aggression pacts.

The error in this approach lies in the false assumption from which it proceeds, namely that the Soviets insist upon remaining in Germany primarily because they fear for their military security. In fact, as argued above, there is more at stake than that. But even if the Soviets were primarily concerned with military security, they would almost certainly continue to believe that the division of Germany itself was for them essential in any combination of security-arms control measures. The Soviet and in particular Polish interest in negotiating about undertakings of this kind, therefore, is precisely that these would have the effect of consolidating and guaranteeing the status quo. And because this is so, they would have the further effect of bringing discord into our relations with Bonn, as indeed even negotiations in this field tend to do.

These undesirable consequences are not balanced by any meaningful gain for peace and security. The risk of conflict in Central Europe is in fact slight; the East-West frontier drawn by the 20-year-old military confrontation in the center of Germany is probably as stable as any in the world.

The one respect in which stability could be improved would be by obtaining firmer guarantees for the security of West Berlin and its access routes. The measures referred to above have little bearing on this problem, and the Soviets and East Germans have shown little interest in providing such guarantees.

As a general rule, our policy should be governed by the proposition that limited arms control and security measures in Central Europe have little interest for us when they are unrelated to political developments which advance a general settlement in Germany. Measures of this kind serve Communist political objectives and not our own, and by so doing burden our relations with West Germany to no purpose. On the other hand, of course, we cannot do what the Germans sometimes seem to want us to do, that is, to make all arms control agreements conditional on progress toward their national goal.

C. Bridges to Eastern Europe

Recognition that the division of Germany and of Europe cannot be ended by negotiating devices designed to have effect in the short term has focused attention on possible efforts to prepare a settlement by furthering a long-term process of fundamental change in Eastern Europe. Broadly stated, this view argues that the development of East-West economic and cultural relations can gradually erode the ideological commitment of the East to maintain the present reach of Communist power into the heart of Germany. In its more elaborate forms, this thesis speaks of all-European economic development schemes under which Western assistance would become the persuader which would diminish ideological tensions and convince the East that the division of Germany was no longer essential to its interests.

It is evident that the retreat from monolithic ideology and the assertion of national independence in Eastern Europe are real. These trends result from a variety of factors—the disappearance and the subsequent denigration of the semi-divinity who embodied Moscow’s authority in the period when Moscow’s power was first thrust into Eastern Europe, the later recognition by the Communist regimes thus artificially created that they needed local sources of authority to be viable, and finally the Yugoslav and Chinese challenges to the idea that there should be any central fount of authority for the Communist world at all. What is emerging from the former satellite empire in Eastern Europe is a system of states whose ruling groups still regard their ideological, security, and economic ties to the USSR as essential, but who wish to define the latter’s overlordship in terms of maximum advantage to themselves.

What would Western programs of aid, contact, and even inclusion in Western multilateral arrangements offer to such ruling groups? The Communist leaders would, of course, welcome easier access to Western markets, and probably also generous aid if this could be dressed in business garb and seem to be without ideological implications. These would advance economic development and buttress national independence. But any inference that such an elaboration of East-West relations should lead on to a broader structure of European unity, presumably bringing with it free cultural and political intercourse, would be fatal to the present ruling groups. Their survival rests on the preservation of Communist theological myths, however changed or attenuated, on national exclusiveness, and ultimately on Soviet guarantees. Contact and intercourse with the West can probably contribute only marginally to a change in the political character and external orientation of the Eastern European regimes.

If the political order in Eastern Europe for some considerable period ahead consists of a system of national states in hegemonial relationship to the USSR, what contribution can these states make to a settlement of the German problem? The answer for Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary must be virtually none; even if they come to favor German reunification, which is not inconceivable though more likely they will be simply indifferent, they would not promote or advocate it against the will of the USSR. Even if Czechoslovakia liberalizes its regime and becomes more accessible to Western influences, as seems increasingly likely, it would have no real interest in supporting a German settlement, and could not significantly affect the chances for one in any case.

Poland is and seems likely to remain unalterably opposed to the reunification of Germany. The special feverishness with which this attitude is held is due in some part to the weakness in the country of the Communist regime, which finds in anti-German sentiments its main political resource. But the attitude would be the same in essence even if the Polish Communists held power more securely. The Poles have no desire to serve once again as the shuttlecock in a Russian-German power contest. They evidently believe that the present arrangement, with a Communist buffer state carved out of Germany, gives them greater security and freedom of action than they could enjoy under any other arrangement.

These Polish attitudes are an additional strong factor in determining the USSR’s insistence upon preserving the division of Germany. Should the Soviets for other reasons entertain the idea of consenting to Germany’s reunification, they would have to face the possibility that such a development could place the existence of the Polish Communist regime in jeopardy.

It seems likely, therefore, that however much the elaboration of economic and cultural ties with Eastern Europe may help to reduce tensions and improve East-West atmospherics, the hard sense of an overriding interest in Germany’s present division will remain unaffected. And this is especially the case where it matters most, in the USSR and Poland.

The same general prognosis must apply to West Germany’s growing interest in developing economic, cultural, and eventually, by a change in the Hallstein doctrine, formal diplomatic ties with Eastern Europe. These steps are also unlikely to stimulate real incentives in Eastern Europe to support a German settlement. Economic leverage and cultural influence can seldom override what is conceived as a serious national interest.

The approach by way of enlarging economic-cultural contacts somehow vaguely implies that the German problem will not be settled but dissolved—in a process which will see the Communist states lose their ideological coloration, a “unity” of all Europe created, and national interests cease to have effect. Even if one does not think this entirely utopian, he must at least concede that it will take a very long time, and in the interval offer the Germans no very sure promise. In short, this approach is not a policy aimed at foreseeable consequences; it is a way of living hopefully with the problem.

D. Interim Conclusion on Alternative Approaches

The conclusion implied in the foregoing review of suggested approaches to a German and European settlement is that none of them offers any real promise. They all suffer from the defect that they give the East no incentive for altering its view that the status quo serves its interests better than would any settlement embracing a reunited Germany. That is why Communist policy is directed to buttressing, legalizing, and normalizing the status quo in every possible way.

The premise of this latter policy is that Communist power in East Germany can be made viable for the long pull. Only if this should not prove true, only if the effort to sustain the Communist regime seemed likely to become more costly and dangerous than a settlement reunifying Germany, would the Soviets and Poles have any real incentive for consenting to such a settlement.

III. The Key Question: Possible Developments in East Germany

A. The Viability of the East German Regime

The key questions bearing on the future of the German problem are therefore the following: Will the East German regime in fact prove viable indefinitely? What political changes are likely to take place within it over the long term? What can the Federal Republic and the West do to promote changes which would favor an all-German settlement?

The vulnerabilities of the East German regime are manifest—its lack of national appeal and of legitimacy based on popular mandate as compared with West Germany, its Wall as graphic demonstration of these facts, its ultimate dependence on Soviet military power. Though now apparently improbable, it can never be ruled out that this brittle pretense of a state might one day be faced with popular resistance. Soviet military power could, of course, cope with this contingency, but it would confront the Soviets in acute form with the question of whether the costs and risks of the effort to maintain this regime were worth its value to them. Probably they would still think it was, but it is also conceivable that the Soviet attitude toward Germany could change in consequence of such an episode. A flexible Western policy at such a moment might induce the Soviets to take serious steps toward a final German settlement.

A more fruitful area of speculation relates to what changes may occur within the East German regime over a prolonged period. Will its leadership group continue to believe in and have the will to maintain a separate state existence? Or will the Soviets be increasingly hard put to find a leadership even as capable as the present one?

It is a fact that East Germany has a more vigorous and promising appearance today than it did, say five years ago. Doctrinaire inanities in economic planning and administration have been done away with and a respectable if not sensational trend of economic advance attained. It is even reported, though one must remain skeptical of this, that the East German population manifests an increasing degree of identification with East Germany as a separate state entity.

Probably it is true that over a long period the discontents of the population will be less a threat to this regime than the quality and commitment of its leadership. It was created by men, with Ulbricht as their archetype, who thought of themselves as Soviet apparatchiks first and Germans second. The successor generation of leaders may be men of a different cut, in which case the internal political life of this regime could become very complicated, perhaps even quite unstable. In any case, if the trend towards national autonomy and internal liberalization continues elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the regime in East Germany will tend to have an increasingly anomalous character.

It might, but would not necessarily, nor even probably, collapse from this defect, though it might become a growing embarrassment to the Soviets. They, however, do not embarrass easily, and probably would still find men long after Ulbricht who were able and willing to govern such a state. On the whole, it seems wiser to assume the continuing viability of the East German regime rather than to count on its internal evolution in ways which would make German reunification easier to achieve.

B. The Policy of “Isolating” East Germany

Advocates of the approaches to the German problem discussed above generally say that it is a necessary concomitant of those policies that the Federal Republic and the West must work for the “isolation” of East Germany. The inference is that this means something more than merely continuing the present policy of diplomatic non-recognition. How realistic is “isolation” and how effective is it likely to be in changing Soviet attitudes or in acting on political conditions within East Germany so as to reduce the viability of the regime?

The real tendency of West German attitudes in fact now runs opposite to any effort to enforce greater isolation on East Germany. Bonn is, of course, not moving toward conceding legitimacy to the regime. But West German politicians are responding to what appears to be an increasingly impatient desire on the part of the West Germans, especially younger people, for more human contacts. For their part, the East German leaders deem it prudent to respond at least cautiously to similar pressures in their population, and they may be willing to go further if economic advance is sustained. The prospect probably is that, as Germans confront more frankly the fact that unity through action of the Four Powers remains remote, such pressure will increase rather than diminish. Greater contacts may or may not have any significant political consequences in East Germany, but they are in any case incompatible with a policy of stricter isolation.

With economic advance in East Germany, the volume of interzonal trade will probably increase and the interests associated with it in West Germany are likely to favor more normal relations. As East Germany becomes able to develop significant trade with other Western states, the West Germans may feel obliged to handle interzonal trade more generously and in a more formal framework, even at the cost of some implied “recognition” for East Germany. Altogether, the trends now operating seem likely, over a prolonged period, to favor a gradual movement toward normalization of relations rather than an increased effort by West Germany to isolate the Communist regime.

Such a change would not necessarily mean that the West Germans were phasing over into acceptance both of the Pankow regime and of the indefinite division of Germany. They could describe it to themselves as a policy of engagement which had become necessary due to changed conditions but which still sought the same aims. They could continue to refrain from formal recognition on the ground that the East German regime, never having obtained a genuine popular mandate, has no real claim to legitimacy. Contact and presence in East Germany could nevertheless be pressed as a step toward the goal of unity to which even the East Germans pay lip service. Such a policy would no doubt soon find the East German leaders back-pedaling furiously from their pretense that they were the ones who sought contact and normalization. At the very least, their internal political position would be weakened and complicated.

Such a change in Bonn’s policy would not affect the Soviets’ attitude or their basic interest in maintaining the Pankow regime. They would advise Pankow to advance cautiously on the road of normal relations, seeking to construe these in accordance with standard Soviet theses on the future of Germany. One by-product, however, might be an easing of Berlin problems.

Should the West Germans eventually move toward such a course of normalization and engagement, we would not need to be alarmed and it probably would not be prudent to attempt to discourage them. We cannot honestly say that the present policy of halfhearted, legalistically defined “isolation” will have greater effect in moving the German problem toward settlement.

On the other hand, it is not a course which we can urge either, since in the present state of German opinion we would only sow confusion and misunderstanding, and perhaps become embroiled in party politics. We ought to be prepared, however, to see German attitudes change as the long stalemate drags on, and perhaps especially after Ulbricht leaves the scene.

IV. Implications for US Policy Toward West Germany

If it is true that the problem of divided Germany will not in the foreseeable future yield to settlement by any policies open to the West to pursue, then our vitally important relations with the Federal Republic must be handled with all priority, care, and delicacy. There is no great danger that the West Germans will move to come to terms with the Soviets or undertake some act of desperation. But there is some possibility eventually of political demoralization and internal divisions which could make the Federal Republic a burden and a problem for the West rather than the asset it is today. American relations with Bonn are basically sound at present, but some suggestions can be made which may help to insure that those relations withstand the dangers and challenges of the long period ahead during which the “German problem” is likely still to be with us.

A. The Quality of the Relationship

Although contacts between West Germans and Americans have been numerous enough, one senses that they have not been marked by any special intimacy. All too frequently, comprehension and communication break down and lead to flurries of misunderstanding and even mistrust in the German press.

There are obvious historical, cultural, and psychological reasons for the somewhat distant quality that seems to characterize the relationship. Certainly the Germans ought not to be as sensitive and mistrustful as they are. Their leaders ought to cultivate a more courageous and “democratic” style in dealing with public opinion and the press. But for our part, we ought not to burden the relationship psychologically by bringing to it the unspoken but not unnoticed assumption that the Germans may once again become the sick children of Europe, and that their care and feeding is a matter of nervous concern to us.

On the level of official and political contact we ought at least to aim for the kind of candor that has obtained in the Anglo-American relationship. The German leaders know, and know that we know, that their national problem cannot be solved now, nor probably for a very long time. Acknowledgment of this reality in private dialogue does not mean that we are any the less committed to their interest; it might help to undergird genuine trust if the common tasks could be frankly addressed from this starting point. One wholesome by-product might be that the German leaders would be emboldened to communicate more candidly with their own people and thus help to steady German opinion for the long pull.

The suggestion here is not that our present relations with West Germany are seriously unsatisfactory. It is that, in view of the prospect ahead, a steady and deliberate effort to improve the quality of the relationship at all levels will be in our interest. It would also be helpful if other allies did the same, especially the British.

B. West Germany’s Role in the West

It scarcely needs reiteration that the Germans must have a responsible role in the common undertakings of the West. They will take a more wholesome view of their national situation if their part in the affairs of the Western community is the significant one which their power and resources warrant. If a settlement of the German problem can in the end only come about through a long process of change in Eastern Europe, their intimate association with the West will be a help to this process and not a hindrance. And if it does come about in this way, the stability of a Europe made whole again will be all the more sure.

The precise institutional forms of West Germany’s association with the West are less important than that she be part of a West which is as politically united as possible. Divisions within the West which force the Germans to take sides carry the risk of persuading them that the Western association will not after all serve their national interest, and carry also the danger of stimulating the sort of political demoralization referred to above.

Various projects for Western European and Atlantic “integration” may be desirable, but they are probably not urgent enough to justify such risks, assuming that they can be consummated by a forcing process at all. Integration has one other risk of which we should be wary. It may lead some Germans to say that this is a device for binding down a permanently partitioned Germany, a manifestation of continued Western mistrust of the Germans.

C. West Germany’s Eastern Policy

It was argued earlier in this paper that the more active policy in Eastern Europe which Bonn is increasingly disposed to pursue is unlikely to have any decisive effect in advancing a German settlement. Nevertheless, we ought to encourage it.

We should do so in part because of the effects on the West Germans themselves. The sense of being active in their own interest will assuage their chronic distemper over being merely the “object” of the policies of others. They will have a more concrete appreciation of the obstacles to a German settlement, and perhaps be less inclined to suspect inadequacies in the American effort.

Moreover, it is possible that in certain unanticipated circumstances a larger West German presence and influence in Eastern Europe could have some beneficial effect in advancing a German settlement. If Western policy cannot do much positively at present to bring about a settlement, it can at least be alert to exploit any break in Eastern Europe which might open up possibilities not now evident. Some issues in international politics are not solved by gradualism but by a sudden crystallization of new factors. Political deterioration in East Germany or some form of internal crisis in the USSR might be such factors; there may be others we cannot now imagine. The fact that the West Germans were on the scene and known in Eastern Europe rather than seen as a distant bogey might some day prove helpful.

What particular steps the Germans should take in developing their policy toward Eastern Europe is a difficult question and any advice we provide should be delivered with tact and careful timing. The “policy of movement” appears still hazy in the minds of its advocates. It is subject to partisan controversy in which we would not wish to become involved.

The primary target of the German effort should be Poland, since, apart from the Soviets, the Poles would have most to say about any change in Eastern attitudes on the German problem. For reasons given earlier, it will be difficult to initiate a meaningful dialogue at all. In order to do so, the Germans will probably at some point have to make a clean-cut statement recognizing Poland’s present Western frontier. They should do this if they are at all serious about an active policy in Eastern Europe. It is fantasy to pretend that this “concession” can be held out as a bargaining counter in some eventual negotiation of a final settlement.

There are other things the Germans could do to enlarge their access to Eastern Europe. They could forthrightly renounce national acquisition of nuclear weapons. Schroeder’s recent attempt to toy with this by making it conditional on reunification can do nothing but harm to the Eastern policy he proposes; put this way, nobody in Eastern Europe will be reassured. The Germans could also give up the ambiguous but ominous references to Heimatrecht for purposes of domestic politicking. It would improve the face the Germans present to the East if the Socialists gained access to the government, though this obviously rests on other considerations and could not be devised for purposes of foreign policy alone.

The Germans do not normally speak of embracing the USSR in a “policy of movement” toward the East. But they must hope that one of its results would be an opportunity to talk more meaningfully with the Soviets. We would not need to take alarm at this if it actually happened. There cannot be a ground of common interest between the Soviets and Germans who seek the unity and freedom of their country. Only if the political complexion of the Federal Republic underwent a profound change and the country came to be governed by Germans willing to accept Soviet tutelage, at the cost incidentally of all the ties and interests which now bind it to the West, is it possible to imagine a development of Soviet-German relations prejudicial to Western interests. This is an extremely remote danger and will remain so if the West stays close to the Germans and provides them a worthy place in its councils.

V. Conclusions and Summary

The view of the German problem and of the indicated American policies set forth in this paper has the following principal elements:

1. A settlement based on the reunification of Germany in freedom cannot in the foreseeable future be obtained by any policy approach the West can now pursue. This applies to new initiatives for negotiation, to regional arms control and security measures, and to the development of economic and other contacts in Eastern Europe.

2. The Soviet and Polish attitudes, the only ones that really matter, rest on a belief that the status quo is essential to their national interests. Their views will not change unless the costs and risks of the present situation seem likely to become greater than those of a general settlement, or unless they themselves undergo a profound internal political change and the cold war is in effect terminated.

3. Present Communist policy rests on a calculation that the East German regime will remain viable indefinitely. This is probably correct, but there is some chance that it is not, owing to that regime’s unique vulnerabilities and to possible change in the character of its leadership. In any event, such policies of “isolation” as the West Germans are likely to pursue would have little effect. Bonn may in fact turn eventually to normalization of relations, while still withholding formal recognition and still pressing for reunification.

4. It would not be in our interest to oppose such a change in West German tactics. However, American policy should continue to declare that German reunification on the basis of self-determination is an essential ingredient of the East-West settlement we seek. There is declining advantage in doing this by way of formal appeals to the Soviets to resume Four-Power negotiations, and such initiatives, or at least their timing, should take account of other aspects of our dealings with the Soviets.

5. Because we can do little to move the German problem toward settlement, the cultivation of a sound and intimate relationship with the Federal Republic must have the highest priority. This means in particular working for an adequate role for West Germany in the affairs of the West, and playing a tactful part in relation to Bonn’s attempt to develop a more active Eastern policy.

The German problem offers no promising outlook. For the present, it appears to be one of those issues in international politics which has mainly to be lived with until the political forces surrounding it change in some profound way which cannot now be foreseen. If American policy in the world as a whole meets with reasonable success, presumably it will help to promote such change.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 71 D 273, Division of Europe and Germany. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Huizinga. An August 11 memorandum by Huizinga attached to the source text notes that the paper was initially prepared for discussion at the August 20 meeting of the Policy Planning Council. A subsequent memorandum of September 10 by Rostow indicates that the discussion took place on September 16. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 32–4 GER) No record of either meeting was found.