Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

92. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 9, 1965, 11 p.m.

2311. Immediately after demonstration I asked for appointment with Gromyko soonest but since unavailable I saw Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin at 1730 to lodge strong protest.²

I told Zorin I wished most strongly to protest fact of demonstration and extensive resultant damage to Embassy premises because of inadequacy of police protection. I indicated that the demonstration obviously had been staged with foreknowledge of Soviet authorities since public announcement of demonstration had been posted on Moscow University bulletin board this morning and it was because Embassy had been informed of this that we had requested Ministry for adequate protection and informed Ministry that Embassy would hold Soviet authorities responsible for any damages incurred. Demonstration had resulted in breakage of about 200 windows, serious defacing of Embassy facade and bombardment of hundreds of missiles—some of such type as to be of danger to life and limb. I had with me samples of such missiles including iron bolts, steel pellets and rocks which I left with Zorin. I also told Zorin that a French correspondent had been seriously injured in demonstration (Ullmann of AFP)³ and an American correspondent turned up missing (Clymer, Baltimore Sun). I told Zorin that I expected Sov Govt to compensate Embassy for damages incurred and to make arrangements for immediate repairs to Embassy premises in order to permit carrying out of normal Embassy functions. I also asked him to ascertain whereabouts of missing American correspondent and inform Embassy soonest of results Ministry’s inquiry.

Zorin pointed out that the demonstration was direct reflection of strong feelings held by Soviet people and foreign students resident in Moscow toward aggressive action by American forces against DRV, an independent state and friend of Soviet Union. In Zorin’s view there was more justification for protest of US actions in Vietnam by those genuinely interested in preservation of peace and normal international relations than for protest against demonstration by people genuinely and deeply disturbed by recent events. With regard my remarks concerning damage to Embassy premises Zorin said that Soviet administrative authorities at request of Ministry had taken ample measures for protection of Embassy including significant reinforcement of militia. He regretted damage to Embassy but insisted that Soviet authorities had made maximum effort to guard against such damage. With regard my remarks re correspondents Zorin failed understand why I should make representations with regard to a French national but he undertook to ascertain whereabouts of missing American correspondent and inform Embassy of results of inquiry. Meanwhile, he was happy to learn that no Embassy personnel had been injured in demonstration and promised to take immediate measures to ensure adequate repairs to Embassy property. In fact, Zorin said UPDK had already been given the necessary instructions and he was sure that they would actively and completely cooperate with Embassy to effect immediate repairs. My additional requests (presumably referring to request for compensation) he said would be promptly examined by appropriate authorities.

I told Zorin I saw no need to debate with him question as to who was real aggressor in Vietnam since I was sure he was familiar with statements issued by White House, Stevenson letter, and statement to Dobrynin.⁴ I then said it was perfectly clear from damage caused Embassy that protection accorded by Soviet authorities had been grossly inadequate; while it was true that the militia had been reinforced, no efforts had been made to keep demonstrators away from Embassy and to prevent them from damaging property as well as hurling—in some cases by sling—deadly missiles capable of causing serious injury, into Embassy offices and living quarters. In connection his remarks re French correspondent, I told Zorin that certainly Ullmann had right to be in vicinity American Embassy, that Embassy personnel had interceded in order to rescue him from crowd and had given emergency medical care to obviously seriously injured man; I felt that in this case Ullmann’s condition was more important consideration than his nationality. In stressing seriousness with which we regard such demonstrations, I reminded Zorin of statement made by Secretary after November incident⁵ and also remarks by President in State of Union message with regard to need for respect and protection of American property and personnel abroad, handing him a typewritten excerpt of this passage.⁶ I said Zorin, of course, aware that in the United States we effectively protect Soviet installations against damage and demonstrators and in fact our regulations preclude demonstrators from approaching diplomatic missions closer than 500 feet. I felt compelled to seek assurances from Ministry that similar adequate measures would be adopted in Moscow and, failing such assurances, I would have to recommend a reexamination of our own procedures.

Zorin said he also did not wish to enter into detailed discussion of question of guilt in Vietnam and in this respect would rest on assessment of situation set forth in Soviet Govt statement published in Pravda today. He insisted that protective measures had been adequate and he could assure me that Soviet administrative authorities would continue to apply necessary measures in order protect Embassy property since Soviet Govt considers this solemn obligation. While he would, of course, report my remarks to Gromyko, he wished stress need for removal causes for international misunderstanding and he urged US in particular to bear this in mind. We should recognize that actions incompatible with preservation of peace and normal international relations are bound to give rise to such incidents and demonstration. He felt first task both our governments was to seek avoid cause for such unpleasantness. He hoped US Govt would correctly interpret Soviet Govt’s statement published today as well as additional remarks which Dobrynin will be making in Washington on subject.

I again took issue with Zorin’s insistence that protective measures had been adequate, stressing that damage to Embassy and behavior of crowd which imperiled life and limb Embassy personnel belied Zorin’s assertions. With regard to his remarks on causes on misunderstanding I could agree that it should be mutual responsibility of our two governments to work toward their removal and I hoped that at this very moment Kosygin was using his influence to prevent the kind of aggression that led to the incident today.

Zorin said he could not agree with my assessment of situation and wished point out simply that it was US planes and US personnel and not Soviet planes and personnel that had attacked Vietnamese. He felt we should understand that continued actions of this sort could not but lead to serious consequences.⁷

Kohler

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 USSR. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to London, Paris, Saigon, and Hong Kong.
2. At 7 p.m. Kohler reported that the Embassy was “attacked this afternoon by a mob of at least 1500 persons” including some Soviet students but mainly Asians, despite assurances earlier in the day from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs that protection would be provided. The demonstrators carried placards bearing slogans protesting U.S. action in Vietnam. (Telegram 2308 from Moscow; ibid.)
3. Bernard Ullmann, Chief of the Moscow Bureau of Agence France Presse.
4. For text of Stevenson’s letter, February 7, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 240–241; for the statement to Dobrynin on the same day, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. II, Document 82.
5. See footnote 1, Document 75.
6. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 1–9.
7. On February 11 the Embassy in Moscow again protested the attack on February 9. On this occasion Smirnovsky stated that he had nothing to add to what Zorin had already said. (Telegram 2323 from Moscow; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 USSR)