Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

93. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 11, 1965, 8 p.m.

2324. While I continue to believe that Sovs are anxious to avoid escalation of hostilities in Vietnam and this morning’s joint statement on the Hanoi visit supports this view, I think we must recognize that if Viet Cong attacks and our retaliatory moves multiply, pressures on Sovs to “put up or shut up” mount accordingly. I would think it likely that the Sovs themselves are now seriously examining possible countermeasures which in their view would promise some prospect of compelling us to temper our reaction to Vietnam developments without running real risk of US-Soviet confrontation. Obviously one of principal reasons for such soul searching exercise on part of Sovs must be recognition that in context their obvious interest in demonstrating their reliability as socialist ally in face of goading commentary by ChiComs, they must at some point be prepared to do more than make statements, attack this already battered Embassy and offer defensive military equipment to North Vietnam.

In this connection, I would call attention to development reported Embtel 2320,² when Embassy officers who planned visit Kiev, Minsk and Lvov on book buying trip were told trip could not be registered for temporary reasons. We have asked British Embassy to make application for similar trip to ascertain if temporary ban applies to them as well. If it does, we should consider the possibility that Sovs are trying to give us the impression that they may be up to some military move in Eastern Europe (e.g. a move against access to West Berlin backed by troop reinforcements) responsive to increased tension in Southeast Asia and in Soviet-US relations. Alternatively, they may be starting some military moves which they wish to conceal at this juncture. Our military attachés inform me that this is not the normal time for winter maneuvers and if troop movements are reason for temporary closing of normally open areas, then they must be of an extraordinary nature.

If Sovs are in fact thinking on these lines they may be making a bad miscalculation. The effect may well be just the opposite of what they hope. On other hand, Sovs may be intrigued with possibilities inherent somewhat less than enthusiastic support of our policy in Southeast Asia by majority Western European countries and may think that by presenting them with possible choice between facing nasty flareup in Central Europe and exerting pressure on us to temper actions in Vietnam, they have real opportunity of causing serious intra-alliance friction.

Other possible pressure points are, of course, Laos and Korea. In latter connection the announcement this morning of Kosygin’s trip to Pyong Yang bears close inspection. While we assume for the moment that the principal reason for Kosygin’s change in plans is related to the March 1 meeting (and could even be reaction to ChiCom pressure on North Koreans to move South in a diversionary effort), we cannot exclude the possibility of Sovs themselves being intrigued with Korean theater as a vulnerable pressure point. Moves in Laos, of course, would be easier logistically and might be regarded as safer from Sov point of view and perhaps more difficult from US point of view.

As I indicated at outset, I still think Sovs are anxious to avoid any dangerous increase in tension and do not want to be alarmist. However, Sovs do face a real problem in present circumstances and probably feel selves under increasing pressure not to appear weak and ineffective. Their assessment of what they can do with minimal risk and how this may affect Western public opinion is obviously a very tricky exercise. We should be considering what we might do to influence their thinking in a healthy direction.³

Kohler

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. Dated February 10. (Ibid., POL 17–2 US–USSR)
3. On February 14 Kohler reported that additional indications supported the idea of extraordinary military movements into East Germany. (Telegram 2362 from Moscow; ibid.)