Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

91. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 9, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador ANATOLIY DOBRYNIN, USSR
• Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

The Ambassador referred to the conversation which I had had with him on Sunday, February seventh at the direction of the President² and said he had been instructed to make the following oral reply:

“The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state that it cannot recognize as well-founded the attempts to justify the bombing by American aircraft on February seventh and eighth of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It expressed its appraisal of these actions and necessary warnings in the February ninth statement of which the United States Government is aware.³

“If one takes seriously the repeated statement of the United States Government to the effect that it is striving for a strengthening of peace, for an improvement in American-Soviet relations, then the motives for the actions undertaken by the USA do not lend themselves to rational explanation.

“References were contained in the February seventh White House statement⁴ that these bombings were undertaken in connection with the fact that some sort of plans for actions against American military installations were being hatched by Hanoi. However, to use this type of argument for armed actions in international affairs would mean only an attempt to assume for oneself the right, at one’s own discretion, to resort to arbitrary acts which, even expressing it mildly, it is impossible to characterize other than as provocative. It is clear that there can be no justification for such actions which do not conform to elementary norms of international laws.

“We are told such thoughts were also conveyed from you personally, Mr. President-that the American bombings were undertaken in reply to an attack by guerrilla forces on a camp near the South Vietnamese town of Pleiku, where many American military personnel are located. Consequently, if such an attack took place, it was undertaken on the territory of South Viet-Nam. But can this be a basis for an armed attack on another state? After all, if we are guided by such logic, then it is possible to justify any aggressive actions, to subject any country to bombing. If, for example, affairs are going badly for the USA in South Viet-Nam, then it is somehow permissible for it today to bomb the DRV, tomorrow Laos, Cambodia or other countries. Such a course in international affairs could create very dangerous consequences for peace (the world). [The Russian word can mean either peace or world.]⁵

“We should like to say directly that it is impossible to solve the problem of South Viet-Nam by such a course. And the Soviet Government would like to hope that greater realism will prevail in the policy of the United States. If the matter stands differently, if in the future also the policy of the United States is made without regard to reality, then it could lead to unfortunate results.

“In a conversation with our Ambassador on February seventh, the question of visits was raised.

“When you, Mr. President, raised in your recent message to Congress the question of exchanging visits between the leading figures of the USSR and USA, we were inclined to regard this as evidence of the intention of the Government of the USA to seek ways to improve Soviet-American relations. Now there has been brought to our attention your words to the effect that the recent developments do not signify changes in your policy, that you are not seeking and do not wish a widening of the conflict. We were informed that in advancing the proposal for the exchange of visits you proceeded and are proceeding from really serious intentions. We are taking these communications into account.

“Unfortunately, there exists an obvious contradiction between the statements of the American side regarding the desirability of meetings for the purpose of seeking possibilities for improving relations and actions like those being undertaken in Viet-Nam; and the Soviet Government in all frankness calls this to your attention.

“We should like to hope that an end would be put to the actions which were undertaken by the United States with regard to the DRV. This would be to the advantage of all and would contribute to the establishment of peace in Southeast Asia. This would also facilitate the development of better Soviet-American relations, toward which the Government of the Soviet Union is, as previously, striving.

“On the USA, on you, Mr. President, depends what turn events will take.”⁶

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret; Exdis. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on February 9. Also initialed by Rusk. During the conversation Thompson informed Dobrynin that he had also been instructed to officially protest the demonstration against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. (Memorandum of conversation, February 9; ibid., Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 USSR)
2. For a memorandum of this conversation, during which Thompson and Dobrynin discussed the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. II, Document 82.
3. For text, see The New York Times, February 9, 1965, p. 12.
4. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 238–239.
5. Brackets in the source text.
6. A draft translation and the Russian-language text of this oral statement are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163.