Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

76. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State¹

New York, December 2, 1964, 8 p.m.

Secto 7. Following uncleared, Noforn, FYI and subject to revision upon review.

Following summarizes general discussion at Secy’s luncheon with Gromyko today.² Septel re Art 19 discussion full report will follow.³

At outset luncheon Secy paid tribute to Sobolev⁴ and expressed condolences. Gromyko responded appreciatively.

Gromyko referred to discussion of military budgets at previous luncheon Nov 30⁵ and his understanding U.S. military budget FY 66 would be further reduced. He stated that “taking into account” U.S. reduction USSR was prepared to reduce its own upcoming military budget by 500 million rubles. Since their budget preceded U.S. they would probably make their announcement first. Secy said he did not carry all military budget figures in head and would not wish mislead Gromyko. Referring to questions raised by Dobrynin during previous conversation Secy said he would ascertain exact figures planned as rapidly as possible and inform Soviet side more specifically. During ensuing discussion complexities military budget, Gromyko asserted military figures in Soviet budget included military research and development and denied separate research and development figures were in fact military.

Secy inquired whether Gromyko saw possibilities for further cooperation in field outer space, saying he himself believed actual cooperation in specific projects would be desirable: for example if we could have together launched Mars shot. Gromyko confirmed government interested in developing further cooperation in this field but suggested consideration would be easier if U.S. could put up concrete suggestions. Kohler mentioned subject had been discussed during recent visit President’s Science Advisor, Hornig, to Moscow and suggested some specific ideas might emerge from this.

Secy thanked Gromyko for Soviet Govt decision to approve leased line for Embassy communications which led to some jocular remarks about long beard having finally been shaved off this question. Gromyko commented no force in Soviet Union strong enough to resist U.S. Ambassador’s insistence.

Soviet aide raised question of premises for Soviet Embassy building in Wash. Secy assured them Dept was doing everything possible to move this forward and expressed hope favorable sites might be forthcoming near future. Fedorenko then registered complaint about tax problem on Soviet property (“my residence”) at Glen Cove. Yost assured him USUN doing utmost resolve problem but Fedorenko suggested that housing problems should be reciprocal. Gromyko commented on latter Fedorenko was going too far and U.S. Amb in Moscow would remain where he is.

Secy raised question of moving forward to comprehensive test ban and asked whether responsible colleagues should get together on subject. Gromyko responded “at any time” and it was agreed Tsarapkin and Foster should meet in NY. Secy emphasized U.S. does not and will not take part in any French testing program and asked if Gromyko could say same with respect to Peking? Gromyko replied Soviets have nothing to do with China program; “we have no relations” in this field. Question of Chinese participation in test ban is hypothetical one which should not interfere with Soviet-American cooperation this field. Positive advantages would outweigh other considerations. However, to prevent misunderstanding Gromyko wished to say verification should be by national means. Kohler commented U.S. had been experimenting in improving seismological methods and he had invited Soviet participation in experiments. Invitation had been proffered and he hoped USSR would still agree. Dobrynin nodded affirmatively but no commitment was made. In this connection Secy remarked Soviet side had sometimes refused invitations for example to visit Cape Kennedy. He hoped this was not out of fear that U.S. would claim reciprocity since if we issued specific invitation we had no such intention.

Gromyko raised question of reduction of foreign troops in Europe. This discussion inconclusive except both sides agreed there had already been some reduction.

Stressing that he was engaging in personal exploration, Secy expressed hope time approaching when we might find bold, broad concept for settlement of situation in Central Europe. Gromyko responded that pending bold and total solution we should not exclude partial solutions as we had done in case of reduction of military budgets and Limited Test Ban Treaty. However Soviets were also prepared for bold approach to solutions of problems including Germany. Still speaking personally Secy asked whether there might be any point in quiet undramatic four-power conversations, citing as encouraging in this connection recent pass arrangements in Berlin and in respect of trade. U.S. could not move very far without agreement its allies so problems of procedure as well as substance arose. As illustrative example said four-powers might suggest that Germans get together to consider humanitarian measures. Gromyko responded if reunification of Germany were to be considered USSR would say at once this is matter for two German states to discuss. Procedure should be subordinated to substance. He did not know what other countries involved would do. U.S. and USSR had come closer together on certain respects as regards German problem in 1961–1962 discussions. Perhaps we should start again from where we then left off. Secy replied obviously he was not speaking for France but “we can’t go very far without others.” Suggested specific small steps might include movement of people exchanges, reunion of families. In reply to Gromyko’s query as to whether U.S. really prepared make forward progress on German question, Secy agreed we had made some progress in previous bilateral talks but could not move on certain irreducible points. He expressed interest in knowing whether Gromyko thought there were perhaps more important points where progress would be possible, commenting that he would be talking with his allies in Paris in the near future.

In absence of further response from Gromyko, Secy asked if he were planning to make new proposals on disarmament in his GA speech. Gromyko replied nothing drastic planned; Soviet proposals already made were good but of course could be improved.

Following luncheon Secy reverted to subject of Germany. For twenty years this has been most difficult problem involving confrontation two powers and imposing on both great arms burden when they have unfinished business at home. It would be good to have real solution to German question perhaps with security features attached. However he saw no possibility except on basis self-determination for people involved. Seventeen million Germans should not have decisive influence on relations of nearly one billion population NATO and Warsaw Pact powers. If East Germans should freely choose remain as they are in separate state U.S. would accept. If East Germans selected to go other way, then even from Soviet point of view it seemed to him other desirable possibilities would open up and this major question could be removed from our agenda. Perhaps it was not yet time for such bold approach and still necessary deal with smaller questions. Gromyko replied either radical solution of German problem or partial steps were possible. The question was what does radical solution mean? U.S. view contemplated reunification under term “self-determination” as used by West. This was becoming less and less possible as two states developed and FRG pursued hostile line toward GDR. In Soviet view two German states existed with deep watershed between them, especially as regards social systems. FRG and Western attitude toward GDR makes watershed deeper. FRG pursuing line remilitarization and acquisition nuclear weapons which made prospects reunification or even rapprochement increasingly difficult. Reunification could only be considered on basis decision both German states. If we were realistic radical solution would be by German peace settlement and solution related questions which we had discussed previously and on which our views at end came closer together. Though it was true we had found no common language on some problems and some knots remain, especially relating to presence Western forces in West Berlin and access thereto, Soviets believe that formalization two German states would contribute toward eventual reunification. However this of course would depend on will of both states and settlement problems involved such as sovereignty, frontiers, renunciation of nuclear arms. He did not mean by this to say that humanitarian questions mentioned by Secy were not of proper significance. If he were asked how to move forward he would say we should explore and seek agreement starting from point where previous exchange of views ended. As to role of other powers specific questions arose, for example France did not want to discuss disarmament. Question was whether things would develop in peaceful fashion or militaristic discussion as in FRG. MLF question related but has independent significance of its own. MLF plans prejudiced talks on disarmament, complicate European situation and Soviet-American relations. However we could talk separately on that subject. Soviets had noted with satisfaction U.S. declaration U.S. would not allow Germany to lead it into ventures in Europe. Serious aspect was FRG access to nuclear weapons. Secy agreed further meeting needed to discuss these questions in detail while Gromyko in New York. However before turning to UN problem he wished clear up one serious misunderstanding. U.S. had no intention facilitate proliferation nuclear weapons; quite the contrary as our acts have shown for example with respect to France. Problem had become acute during past ten years because of Soviet development of nuclear weapons and targeting of hundreds of such weapons on Western Europe. Those about to be incinerated had a legitimate interest in having right to be consulted as respects nuclear weapons.⁶

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 US–USSR. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
2. Memoranda of the five parts of the conversation, SecDel/MC/7, are ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
3. Transmitted in Secto 6, December 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2452)
4. Deputy Foreign Minister Arkady A. Sobolev, who had just died.
5. See Document 75.
6. At their third meeting on December 5 Gromyko and Rusk discussed military budgets again briefly, Laos, and nuclear dissemination. A memorandum of the conversation on nuclear dissemination is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XI, Document 53; the one on Laos is ibid., vol. XXVIII, Document 147; a memorandum of the conversation on military budgets, SecDel/MC/8, is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.