Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

63. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 23, 1964, 4 p.m.

1267. I called on Kosygin at 1130 this morning and had 35 minute talk with him. I was accompanied by Toon. Kosygin was attended by an unidentified aide and Vinogradov as interpreter. (Troyanovsky met us in outer office, thus presumably putting end to speculation as to his downfall with Khrushchev.)

I told Kosygin I deeply appreciated opportunity he had accorded me to pay my respects and again convey my personal congratulations to him on his designation as Premier since I recognized that at this time he must have a very busy schedule. As he was aware the President had been pleased that Dobrynin had called on him² promptly after change in Soviet Government and was glad to receive the message through Dobrynin that the new government intended to follow previous policies especially those affecting bilateral relations between US and Soviet Union. I felt sure Dobrynin had reported in detail on his meeting with the President and if Kosygin now had anything further to say with regard to govt change and to policies of Soviet Government, I should be glad to convey any message he might have to Washington.

Kosygin said he would ask me to transmit his personal deep gratitude for the congratulatory message from the President³ and to reassure him as Dobrynin had indicated in his first meeting with the President and as has been expressed in public statements in Moscow the Soviet Government contemplates no changes in its internal and international policies. The government would remain the same except for the fact that the former Chairman of the Council of Ministers had retired.

I commented that we had noted with satisfaction the public statements by the new Soviet Government to which Kosygin had referred particularly the speeches by Mr. Kosygin himself as well as Brezhnev.

Continuing, Kosygin said that the basic line which the new government intended to follow was the line laid down at the 20th, 21st and 22nd Party Congresses. All in Central Committee and government staunchly support the principles of peaceful coexistence with states of different social systems and do not contemplate any change in this policy. Furthermore, new government hopes to preserve all existing channels of communications with President Johnson and would like to continue friendly and confidential conversations if this is also the wish of the President. Kosygin felt that in current world context system of our relations is not a bad one and he hoped it would be continued.

I said I was sure that President shared Kosygin’s view on need and desirability maintaining existing channels of communications and as President had already indicated to Dobrynin, was gratified that new government intended continue previous policies, especially those affecting our two countries which we had found mutually useful. I personally considered it my duty as well as a privilege to report accurately and sympathetically on Soviet Government’s attitudes with a view toward improvement our mutual relations. I was devoted to the concept, I had worked assiduously toward this aim and would continue to do so.

Kosygin said he was glad to hear this and he would welcome any continued efforts in this direction. He felt we were engaged in a number of useful pursuits in the mutual interests of our two countries and he hoped that we would continue our efforts and contacts toward this end.

Recognizing that he was preoccupied with a number of pressing problems at present time I said that I did not wish to discuss any substantive problems in detail at this meeting. I felt he should know, however, that the President and Secretary of State wished me to return to the United States for consultation after the elections and I hoped before then to have a substantive talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko and perhaps with Kosygin himself on specific issues. Meanwhile, I would like briefly to refer to a major and topical problem which had been discussed by the President with Dobrynin and subsequently by the Secretary of State and Stevenson with the Soviet Ambassador. This problem related to the question of UN arrearages.⁴ I wished to reaffirm to Kosygin that while there are differences between us on this question my government does not regard the question as a Cold War issue between our two countries and hopes sincerely that the Soviet Government will re-examine the problem in the light of their stated intention to strengthen the United Nations. It was our sincere desire to help resolve the problem before the GA meets in order to avoid a sharpening of our conflicting views in the early days of our two new administrations.

Kosygin said that the Soviet Government’s point of view on this issue remains unchanged. With regard to expenses of the Congo operation, he wished emphasize that Soviets did not participate “in this war” and they would not pay any assessments in connection with it. Kosygin hoped we would give serious thought to possible ways out of impasse. Meanwhile, he wished point out that whatever our motivation might have been, it was we who raised the matter in such “acute and active” way. Soviet Government did not understand, saw no logic in and were puzzled as to purpose of our actions. What did we intend to accomplish by posing problem in this way? Is purpose to force USSR out of UN? Kosygin personally doubted this. In any case, he wished to make crystal clear that Soviet Government attitude on this is matter of deep principle which they intended to defend to end.

I said I did not wish to enter into a detailed discussion of issue but I felt I should clarify one point. We had not taken any initiative to raise this question; the question arises automatically in accordance with Articles 17 and 19 of UN Charter. Kosygin would recall that the General Assembly had endorsed Congo operation through five resolutions four of which the Soviet Union had voted for. We felt strongly—also on grounds of principle—that the UN would be finished, would no longer be a viable institution if members should be permitted to choose assessments which they were prepared to pay. The initiative we did take was to enter into discussions with Soviet representatives in order to attempt to find way to prevent problem from coming to a head. I reiterated that our purpose was simply to preserve the UN Charter and in no sense was our action directed deliberately against the Soviet Union or any other country. Our position thus was a pro-UN position, not an anti-Soviet position. I felt strongly that we and the Soviets had a shared interest in maintaining the strength of the UN through preserving the Charter as well as UN financial stability. In no sense did we seek to embarrass the Soviet Government by our position on the Article 19 issue and if the Soviet Government could find some way to strengthen the financial stability of the UN while at same time maintaining their political position, we would, of course, be glad to cooperate in their efforts.

Kosygin said he too did not wish to be drawn into a detailed discussion of this issue at this meeting, but he felt I should understand clearly that Soviet Government maintains unchanged its previous position. The war waged in the Congo was not the Soviet Government’s idea, it was not popular with the Soviet people and the Soviet Government is not going to pay for any expenses in connection with Congo operations. With regard to the UN itself, Kosygin could assure me that the Soviets were prepared to spare no efforts and use all possible means to preserve the institution and to facilitate cooperation among states within the framework of the UN Charter. He must emphasize again that the Soviet Government’s position on the Article 19 issue is shared by “all here” and represents the interests of other states as well.

I apologized for raising the question at this meeting but explained that both the President and Secretary of State felt deeply that our position should not be misunderstood by the Soviet Government. Specifically, I wished Kosygin to understand that we did not regard the problem as a Cold War issue, our position was not anti-Soviet. I felt it important to clarify this point in view of Kosygin’s remarks which could be interpreted as questioning our motivation.

Kosygin assumed that we would each draw our own conclusions from the conversation. He felt I would agree that the question tended to aggravate our relations and he personally failed to understand why we had raised the problem in such a “sharp” way. For this he felt we must assume full responsibility.

I said I could not accept this charge.

Kosygin said that while perhaps I could not agree we were at fault, I would recognize that each side regards the issue from its own point of view. I would perhaps also agree that if we changed positions with the Soviet Union we would take the same attitude as they.

I said I would simply restate my hope that we could resolve problem before it came to a head. Meanwhile, leaving this problem aside, I would hope to do everything possible to advance good relations between our two countries and toward this end I would always be at disposal Kosygin in order convey his wishes and receive his advice. In concluding conversation Kosygin noted that President at present time is deeply preoccupied with electoral campaign. He and all his colleagues wished him every success in the hard and arduous task which lies ahead of him; this was not simply Kosygin’s personal view but the view of the entire collective leadership of the Soviet Union—the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. He hoped that the Soviet’s Nov 7 holiday would also be cause for celebration of the President’s victory and the President’s personal holiday would coincide with the Soviet national day.⁵

I said I would be pleased to transmit Kosygin’s wishes to the President and I was sure he would be glad to receive them.⁶

Kohler

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential; Flash; Limdis. A summary of this conversation was sent to Paris for the Embassy and USRO, London, Bonn, and Tokyo and was pouched to all other U.S. diplomatic posts in circular telegram 746, October 27. (Ibid.)
2. See Document 55.
3. Transmitted in telegram 1139, October 17, it reads: “I extend greetings to you on your designation as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Our countries bear heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of world peace. It is my hope that our governments will work constructively in attempting to resolve the urgent international problems facing us and the world.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VI)
4. See footnote 2, Document 42.
5. With his Presidential campaign in mind, the President proposed in a telephone conversation with McGeorge Bundy on October 27 that Bundy “blow up” Kohler’s October 23 visit with Kosygin by saying that Kosygin called in the U.S. Ambassador and notified the President that there would be no change in policy and that Kosygin was “communicating with us” and “courting us”—“it puts us on a little different level from Barry [Goldwater].” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Bundy, 1:59 p.m., Tape 6410.13, PNO 24) In a campaign speech in Salt Lake City on October 29, the President noted that Kosygin had informed him “this week” that the Soviet Union “would maintain its present policies” and would “continue its communication with the United States.” For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book II, p. 1516.
6. In telegram 1268, October 23, Kohler commented that Kosygin “habitually looks worn and morose” and that he did at their meeting, although he was affable and friendly throughout it. In commenting further the Ambassador said there would be no “freewheeling by the new Soviet leaders, and they would avoid in both public and private statements any remarks that did not accord precisely with the view of the new collective leadership.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 USSR)