Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

62. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

No. 2051/64

Washington, October 22, 1964.

KHRUSHCHEV’S FALL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The Grievances

1. The official complaints against Khrushchev’s style of leadership clearly have great substance. If this were all, however, the result would be irritation, not a coup. Given the man’s incessant initiatives, opposition must have coalesced around the need to thwart his current projects. Even so, it could only succeed because so many of Khrushchev’s policies had both injured or upset every important group in Soviet politics and produced a long record of failures.

2. One immediate cause was probably the raising of the long-contested question of economic priorities. There are indications that Khrushchev in late September made a major bid to break the stalemate on this issue. The abridged account of his speech claimed that “now when we have a powerful industry” and defense “is at its proper level,” the “main task …is the further raising of the people’s standard of living.” He may have given notice that he meant to press a decision at the November plenum. When he thereupon left for Sochi, his colleagues, who had long resisted him on this matter, apparently decided that cause and opportunity conspired.

3. Another immediate cause probably was Khrushchev’s handling of the split in the Communist movement. It seemed clear that, in pressing for the 15 December meeting which was to prepare for a world Communist conference, Khrushchev was heading for another failure: a number of demonstratively empty chairs and further concessions to those who seek a loosening of international discipline, with no palpable gains against China. His successors can hardly have a different basic attitude to Peiping, but a tactical change probably seemed necessary.

4. We know of no equally tense issues in relations with the West, but it is possible that Khrushchev’s handling of the German question contributed to his downfall. The early 1965 visit to Bonn, with its hint of a new German policy, was clearly disquieting to the East Germans (and Chinese attempts to play on Ulbricht’s fears confirm this). Reservations were reinforced by Adzhubei’s deliberate indiscretions about Ulbricht’s health.

The Opposition

5. Deposing Khrushchev must have required a heavy Presidium majority and, below that level, a broad anti-Khrushchev consensus. Khrushchev’s repeated reorganizations had given offense to both the party and state apparatuses. He kept the military constantly busy coping with his attempts to hold down defense spending and shift funds from the ground forces to the missions of strategic attack and defense. His successors’ early endorsements of military priorities suggest the way in which the marshals were enlisted, or at least neutralized. It was also necessary at least to neutralize the police.

6. Soviet succession politics is inherently unstable. In the present case, some of the specifics are:

a. The Brezhnev-Kosygin team is not merely a duumvirate of personalities, but a combination of two bureaucracies—party and state—with a history of conflict. It is possible to interpret some of the postcoup evidence as reflecting, already, the beginnings of personal competition.

b. Podgorny is a potent rival to Brezhnev in the party apparat.

c. In the filling of vacancies, the impulse to factionalism is practically irresistible. Replacements are needed now for those who may have fallen with Khrushchev (apparently a small group so far) and for the unlucky Marshal Biryuzov and General Mironov,² who were killed in an air crash in Yugoslavia. Several new appointments to the Presidium also seem due.

d. All the civilians have a group interest in keeping the military and police in their places, yet each has an individual temptation to make factional use of them.

7. The best guess is that a struggle for power, among both interest groups and personalities, cannot be avoided.

The Consequences

8. In formulating policy over the next several months, and in the years ahead, the new leaders face a wide set of policy problems which have not been eased by Khrushchev’s fall.

9. Internal Affairs: The complaints about Khrushchev’s style of rule, together with the character of his successors, suggest a return to a less impulsive, more cautious approach. Some in the new leadership, such as Kosygin, may wish to concentrate on regularizing administrative procedures; others, such as Suslov may seek to give policies a greater ideological cast; Brezhnev’s initial statements exalt the role of the party. The question of how fast and how far to pursue de-Stalinization, and now “de-Khrushchevization” as well, may not yet be resolved. But there will probably be strong pressures from within the regime for caution concerning the Stalin question (and this could spell cooler weather ahead for the intellectual dissidents), and there has already been considerable pressure from other Communist parties for caution in handling Khrushchev’s record.

10. The major question affecting the economy is the future division of resources between defense and defense-associated industries on the one hand, and agriculture and consumer goods on the other. There are some clues that Khrushchev’s programs for the chemical industry and agriculture may lose some of their “crash” nature. In the main, however, it seems likely that the present pattern of allocations will be frozen for a time. Thus the main problems of the Soviet economy will continue unsolved. A year hence, the record of economic performance may move some politician to return to something akin to Khrushchev’s initiatives.

11. Eastern Europe: It is in this area that major consequences have already registered themselves, and they are negative. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany have praised Khrushchev’s merits instead of following the Soviet line on his failings. East European leaders are simply unwilling to weaken their domestic positions by repudiating their established line at the behest of a Soviet leadership which—who knows?—may itself be short-lived. These reactions serve notice that they will resist any Soviet efforts to reverse Khrushchev’s relatively liberal policy in this area. The impulse to look to national interest has received powerful encouragement.

12. The reaction from Western Communists has been analogous but even more explicit. Several parties have ostentatiously dissociated themselves from the decision and demanded a full public explanation. Further losses in Soviet authority seem inevitable, and some of these losses will also be Chinese gains.

13. China and the Communist Movement: Whether to proceed as planned with the 15 December meeting poses an acute tactical question to the new leaders. Many important pro-Soviet parties have not favored this meeting because it seemed certain to aggravate the split. The Soviets now may modify the terms of the meeting, defer it, or leave it open while seeking bilateral talks with the Chinese. Meanwhile, there probably will be some moderation of polemics.

14. Beyond this, the successors have little room for maneuver. The removal of Khrushchev, plus the Chinese atomic feat, practically ensure that any substantial rapprochement would be on Mao’s terms. Both sides are wary and quiet at present, but the USSR is at a tactical disadvantage because China can afford to wait and to make large demands.

15. The Neutrals: Khrushchev personified the Soviet policy of cultivating the nonaligned, and his successors have had to move quickly in confirming his commitments. It will take time (and money) to overcome the nervousness of these countries and repair their confidence. Meanwhile, any suggestion of reneging will be costly, and this will give the new regime extra incentive to sustain its support of, for example, Indonesia and the UAR.

16. The West: Peaceful coexistence has been reaffirmed, and indeed the factors which commend tactics of détente—strategic inferiority, economic faltering, the dispute with China—have not lost force. Some of specific consequences may be:

a. The USSR, pleading a new government, can probably get increased support for postponing any showdown in the UN on the Article 19 issue which confronts the USSR with the loss of its vote in the General Assembly because of Moscow’s refusal to pay peacekeeping costs.

b. On the Cuban overflight issue, the successors are in a somewhat poorer position to resist Castro if he urges a showdown. But they are also in a somewhat poorer position to take on the US in an early crisis. There is a good chance that Castro will be less inclined to press the matter soon; he will need time to convince himself that the Soviet commitment is unaltered.

c. There are no strong reasons to expect a change in Soviet policy in Southeast Asia.

d. Policy toward Germany will probably be immobile. It is worth remembering for the longer run, however, that an alternative German policy probably was developed (by Beriya) in the last succession struggle, and that Khrushchev may have had in mind a shift here which, at least to his colleagues and to Ulbricht, seemed risky. Further, the likely trend in Eastern Europe will sharpen the contradictions in the traditional Soviet position on Germany.

Conclusion

17. Factionalism in the USSR has a way of hurting the Soviet state. De-Stalinization is a case in point; Khrushchev’s secret speech was in great part a blow against his rivals, but the USSR is still paying for its larger consequences. The present display of the uglier side of Kremlin politics has weakened party prestige at home and Soviet prestige abroad. It has set internal politics on an unfruitful course which stores up future troubles. It has produced another lurch westward in Eastern Europe. It has played into Chinese hands. It has provoked second thoughts among many Soviet friends and clients abroad. Khrushchev’s departure may remove a certain disorderly and erratic quality from Soviet policy-making, but at the expense of losing the dynamism of his personal leadership. All in all, his ouster may prove to be a costly move for the USSR.

18. For the US, the meaning of the change is uncertain. Within the limits imposed by the world relation of forces, the new men and their jockeying for power could move Soviet policy in directions that would be either less troublesome or more dangerous to the West.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VI. Secret. A cover sheet, not printed, indicates that the memorandum was prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence. A one-paragraph summary is not printed.
2. Major General Mironov, a veteran secret police official who had close ties to Brezhnev, was the chief of the watch dog department in the party apparatus charged with overseeing the activities of the KGB, the judiciary, and probably the military establishment. [Footnote in the source text.]