64. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State1

887. From Smyth2 for Llewellyn Thompson. Ref Embtel 813, Oct 19.3 Conversation with Emelyanov Oct 24, 1964.

Pursuant to the brief talk with Emelyanov on Oct 19 already reported I asked him whether we could continue and he agreed to come to my room at The Imperial Saturday morning. He came about 10:00 and talked for about two hours. In making the appointment he had said that he would speak for my ears alone therefore I didn’t feel I could take notes. At the end of our conversation I pointed out that much of what he had said would be of interest to my colleagues. He replied as long as nothing he said was given to the news media he had no objection, in fact felt it desirable that responsible officials should know what had happened. It is essential that the source of my information be protected for the sake of future relations. I have every reason to believe that what he said was honest reporting of facts observed or beliefs held.

The talk was roughly in two parts, the first having to do with the Chinese bomb, Indian activities and intentions and related subjects. The second part a specific account of recent events in Moscow.

Most of the material in the first part was familiar and need not be reported.

As to the Chinese bomb he did not pretend to know much. In fact he was assuming that it was a plutonium bomb and apparently had not seen US press reports that it was U–235. He spoke at considerable length of the concentration of Chinese scientists in China made up of senior men trained in Europe or the USA and younger men many of whom were trained in the USSR.

He stated that the Russian scientists in China before the break in relations were aware that there was a major installation to which they did not have access.

On the whole he appeared to have little or no direct knowledge of the Chinese affair. He has not been there.

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On the events in Moscow recently his account was approximately as follows:

He had been having some disagreements over many months with Petrosyants, his nominal boss, and concluded he had to clarify his position. Therefore shortly after his return to Moscow from the IAEA general conference (probably Sept 25 or later) he had attempted to see Brezhnev who is a friend of his. This he found impossible since Brezhnev was continually reported out of his office or busy.

This became understandable when one afternoon late (presumably Tuesday, Oct 13) Emelyanov got word that the Central Committee was to meet at six o’clock. Emelyanov went and found the whole Committee assembled (three categories, he belongs to the middle category, candidate member). After they had all gathered there were still several chairs vacant which were then filled by the leaders coming in led by Mikoyan and including Suslov, Brezhnev, Kosygin and a few others. (Emelyanov gave me the list in order of appearance but I cannot reproduce it nor can I remember whether Khrushchev came in with this group. I think so. Certainly he was there because Emelyanov frequently referred to the fact that Khrushchev was sitting with his head in his hands.)

Apparently Mikoyan presided but shortly turned the meeting over to Suslov. Mikoyan (or possibly Suslov or both) referred to troubles in the Presidium which they had been unable to resolve over a period of many months and about which they had just been meeting for two days. Suslov then described the nature of these difficulties. According to Emelyanov this was done in a very quiet restrained but systematic and devastating way.

The kinds of charges against Khrushchev which Suslov made in his speech (or which Emelyanov mentioned) were the kind reported in the N.Y. Times European edition during the last few days (i.e. Oct 21, 22, 23), i.e. arbitrary exercise of power, unwillingness to accept advice, nepotism, rude and violent reaction to any criticism or suggestion.

In this connection, Emelyanov described a row about agriculture that had taken place last February where Khrushchev had supported Lysenko against other scientific agricultural experts in the academy, had told the opposing faction they were stupid ignoramuses and had threatened to disband the academy.

(Because of such digressions as the above I find it difficult to be sure of the order of events he related.) To resume the account of the meeting:

Suslov gave the conclusion of the Presidium meeting that the present one-man rule must end, that there must be new men appointed as Premier and as Secretary.

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He then said there was agreement that policies should not be changed, that the recommendations of the 20th, 21st and 22nd Party Congresses should continue to be carried out. At this statement there was general applause including applause by Khrushchev himself.

Either at this point or earlier Suslov stated that the conclusions of the meetings of Presidium had been unanimous.

Shortly after this Suslov said that the business of the meeting was to approve the recommendation of the Presidium, nominate a new Secretary of the Party and recommend a new Premier.

(Emelyanov made quite a point of distinguishing between the right of the Central Committee of the Party to name a party official but only to recommend someone for Premier.)

(At this point the account began to sound more and more like an account of an American party convention.)

When the question of nomination for Secretary came up there were shouts of Brezhnev, Brezhnev from all over the hall and apparently no other nominations. Emelyanov says the voting was unanimous but he was so excited he didn’t notice how Khrushchev voted or whether he did. This comment implies vote by a show of hands but Emelyanov did not actually say how the vote was taken.

When the question of recommending Premier came up, the process was similar, shouts of Kosygin, Kosygin and then a unanimous vote.

Emelyanov mentioned two documents (presumably accounts of proceedings in the Presidium meeting, the Central Committee, or both) one of which he said had been made public, the other he thought should be and probably would be. At least he hoped so. He may have been referring to two sessions of the Central Committee but I had the impression he was reporting one continuous session.

Apparently the reports by Suslov of Khrushchev’s inequities were echoed and reinforced by speeches or interjections from the floor voicing grievances from various groups all over the country. There was apparently no defense of Khrushchev in the committee although I have the impression he had been given a hearing in the Presidium.

One comment that Emelyanov made was that it had become increasingly difficult to know whether Gromyko or Adzhubei was Foreign Minister. He also complained about Khrushchev taking not only his immediate family but a variety of relatives on trips at government expense.

In speaking of relations with China Emelyanov said he did not believe that there would be any basic change but that if Suslov were to go to China he would be less violent, much “smoother” than Khrushchev which might lead to an easing of strain. Emelyanov clearly feels that the basic split is at present irreconcilable particularly in the light of their difficulties along the border.

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I received no impression as to what determined the timing of the ouster action.

With reference to the subsequent public vilification of Khrushchev, Emelyanov said he thought it was mostly from individuals giving vent to personal spite based on grievances.

He said he did not know where Khrushchev was, probably in his apartment near the university or at his country house.

Emelyanov gave me quite a speech about the time having passed when Russia or any other country could be ruled by a single czar or king. This was along the same lines as his earlier remark to me about the need for them to move toward greater “democracy.” Though these appear to be his own views he obviously feels the recent action is consistent with them.

In a later conversation in a general group he said things have changed since Stalin’s time, now if you are out of favor you lose your job but not your head.

We did not discuss the cosmonauts at any point.

Brandin
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential.
  2. Henry De Wolf Smyth, U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
  3. It reported that Smyth had invited V. S. Emelyanov, Soviet Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, to come up to his room to discuss the recent events in Moscow. (Ibid.)