Office of the Historian

327. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1

Moscow, November 29, 1968, 1420Z.

6643. Following message to be decrypted by senior communications watch officer only. Literally Eyes Only for Secretary from Ambassador:

Ref: State 278030.2

1.
While appreciate President’s desire to advance cause of peace before leaving office, I confess I am skeptical that much can be achieved at proposed meeting except announcement of agreement on principles to guide missile talks which I gather is already well prepared.
2.
Progress is possible on Middle East if we are prepared to make deal which we would both agree to try to impose (short of use of force) on the two sides. But I wonder how much leverage we will have on Israel with only little over a month remaining from time of talks until new administration takes over.
3.
Highly publicized top level meeting may make Soviet pressure on North Vietnam more difficult as Chinese Communists will make much noise about collusion and sell-out. In any event I doubt Soviets will go beyond urging a settlement on NVN in general terms. I do not believe they will support any particular political terms but will probably be prepared to press NVN on reduction of violence. Greatest value of meeting might be in using Soviets to impress North Vietnamese that we are not about to capitulate and that real compromise will be necessary if agreement is to be reached.
4.
Soviets will be glad to draw attention away from Czechoslovakia and exploit suspicions of our allies. On the other hand an even moderately successful meeting will diminish likelihood of further Soviet adventures or pressure on such issues as Berlin.
5.
I should think President would wish to raise Pueblo case as Soviets could probably be pushed into giving us at least a little more help on that issue and mere fact of meeting might exercise some influence on North Koreans.
6.
Even if Brezhnev should attend meeting, Soviet principals will almost certainly be bound by rigid instructions and there will be little time in two-day meeting for them to consult Moscow.
[Page 778]

Present regime is not noted for ability to reach quick decisions. Therefore, the more clearly President can indicate to Soviets in advance what he expects of them, the more likely agreement can be reached.

Thompson
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 109. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cherokee.↩
  2. Document 325.↩