Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

326. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 29, 1968, 1038Z.

6635. Eyes Only Secretary.

1. Gromyko called me to the Foreign Office at 11:30 this morning and made following oral statement:

“Secretary of State Rusk in a conversation with USSR Ambassador in Washington Dobrynin on November 25 of this year² touched on a number of questions which, in the opinion of President Johnson, could be discussed in the event of his meeting with Soviet leaders.

In conformity with the desire expressed by Rusk to learn the opinion of the Soviet side with respect to these questions, we would like to report the following for transmission to President Johnson:

1. We proceed from the fact that, concerning the limitation of the strategic arms race, there was agreement, in the course of the preceding exchange of opinions between us, on a sufficient number of concrete propositions regarding common goals and basic principles for limiting and subsequently reducing strategic weapons, the approval of which could be completed by a discussion of this question at a possible meeting. As far as we understand, our detailed considerations on this subject, handed to the Secretary of State on October 2 of this year,³ were positively received on the American side. For our part we are ready as before to review the stated considerations as a basis for the achievement of an initial, principled agreement on this subject.

2. The opinion expressed by Secretary of State Rusk, to the effect that through the joint efforts of the USA and the USSR toward peace in the Near East, there can be achieved positive results in a peaceful settlement of the Near Eastern conflict, fully corresponds to our point of view on this subject.

From our side we are doing and intend in future to do everything dependent on us in order to promote in practice a peaceful political settlement of the Near Eastern problem and to strengthen understanding of the necessity for such a settlement in those countries of the region whose governments give consideration to our opinion.

We have also repeatedly and frankly expressed to US representatives, including to President Johnson personally, our opinion that if the US Government will maintain an analogous line with Israel, the cause of liquidating the consequences of last year’s Israeli aggression against the Arab states and thus the establishment of peace in the Near East has every chance of success.

Therefore, we are by no means inclined to consider that events in this region ‘are not amenable to control.’

3. We also have no doubt of the usefulness of an exchange of opinions on questions concerning Southeast Asia. From our point of view, the main problem of this region today remains the stopping of the bloodshed in Vietnam and the achievement there of a political settlement on the basis of respect for the legal rights and aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

As a result of the agreement reached at the Paris negotiations on the cessation by the US of bombing and other military acts against the DRV and on the beginning of political negotiations with the participation of representatives of the DRV, NLF, USA and the Saigon administration looking toward a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, more favorable conditions have in our view been created for movement forward in this direction. Moreover, as is well known, it is in no way the fault of the DRV or its friends that there is a delay in beginning the political talks with the participation of the four sides.

In the event the American side has any other additional considerations which it would like to express in connection with the consideration of the question of the possible arranging of a meeting between President Johnson and the Soviet leaders, we are ready of course to hear them and to take such considerations into account before final decision on this question.”

2. I said that you were sending me the exchange of correspondence on missile talks but I had not yet received it. I asked if it was Soviet idea that at possible meeting an agreement on principles to guide missile talks would be reached and embodied in some sort of declaration or communiqué and that this would then be followed by detailed negotiations. He said that was his understanding.

3. I referred to your seven points on the Middle East and asked if he thought these could furnish the basis of an agreement. He said he did not wish to discuss details but could say that the seven points contained some constructive suggestions. He also wished to refer to the conversation he had had on this subject with you in New York. He said the trouble was that there appeared to be no change on the part of Israel. He said the US should use its influence to change the Israeli position.

4. Dobrynin has not been able to reach Moscow because of bad weather here. I therefore told Gromyko for his background that I understood we were thinking of December 16 and 17 in Geneva. He said he was not in a position to comment.⁴

5. Indicating I was speaking without instructions I said that a two-day meeting would leave little time for any consultation by the principles with their governments and that it seemed to me that the more advance preparation the better. He nodded but did not comment.

6. You will note statement referred to Soviet leaders in the plural. I will try to find out from Dobrynin whom they have in mind.

Thompson

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 109. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.
2. See Document 325.
3. Document 308.
4. In telegram 279345 to Moscow, November 28, Rusk stated: “Regarding time and place of meeting referred to in my last Cherokee our thinking is approximately December 16–17 in Geneva. You are free to suggest this to Dobrynin at first opportunity.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 109)