311. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk1
Washington, October 15, 1968.
Mr. Secretary:
Believe me I am not trying to find out what you have been discussing with Ambassador Dobrynin, but I do venture to express the very strong hope that it is not for the purpose of arranging a meeting between the President and Kosygin. Any such meeting at this time would have nothing in my opinion but bad effect for the U.S. and its general position in the world.
- 1.
- It would undo all of the effect of our reaction to the Czech invasion and would undercut any attempts that we may make to strengthen NATO. It would be regarded widely, in Europe particularly, as condoning the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. This is particularly true since the story in Czechoslovakia is by no means over and there may be a considerable number of disagreeable and brutal action in the cards for the relatively near future.
- 2.
- It is difficult to see anything that could be constructively accomplished by a meeting at this juncture. It would certainly confirm the Soviets in the belief that they can virtually do almost anything in the world and still have “business as usual” with the U.S. I cannot see any particular agreements that could be facilitated by a Summit Meeting that could not be handled through normal diplomatic channels. This includes Vietnam and the fixing of a date for the Disarmament Meeting.
- 3.
- If a possible Summit Meeting has not been the subject of your discussion with Dobrynin, then I will take back and destroy this memorandum.
CEB.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Memoranda Drafted in G. Secret. A handwritten note by Bohlen at the top of the memorandum reads: “Shown to Sec—not relevant—no discussion of meeting.”↩