Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

307. Memorandum Prepared by Secretary of State Rusk¹

New York, October 2, 1968.

Gromyko and I talked alone for an hour and a half. He handed me a Russian and unofficial English translation of the Soviet answer² to Rostow’s latest communication to Dobrynin.

I read it over and asked him if he had any further observations to make. He said that he would prefer to comment after I had made any observations after reading the communication.

I said that the portion dealing with offensive and defensive strategic missiles seemed to be constructive and positive. We would wish to give it further study but I was under the impression we were making some progress.

On Viet–Nam, I said I was disappointed that there was no real response to the important communication which Rostow had given to Dobrynin.

On the Middle East, I asked if he had received the reply which Katzenbach had given to Dobrynin on Sunday.³ He said that he had received it just as he had reached the airport but had not yet had a chance to read it or study it. I then said that it might be desirable for us to have a further discussion on the Middle East after he had had a chance to consider our reply.

His own comments were as follows: On strategic missiles he said that the Soviet Union was serious about this question. It involved not only economic and financial aspects of the arms race but also involved increasing dangers to both sides. After a number of exchanges on this matter I concluded that the Soviets were seriously interested and that they were trying to make some significant progress.

On Viet–Nam Gromyko said that the Paris talks were not getting anywhere on substance even though there was a broader understanding on both sides of the other side’s viewpoint. He said that they much appreciated the fact that we had kept them informed in some detail about the Paris talks and that Hanoi had done the same. I pointed out that, in that case, the Soviets were probably the best informed people in the world as to the negotiating situation since they were getting detailed information from both sides. He said modesty prevented his making that point but that it was probably correct.

He said he had two questions to put to me about Viet–Nam. The first was whether the presence of the South Vietnamese at the conference table was the sole obstacle to stopping the bombing. I told him that this was a most important issue and, in some respects, might be the most difficult for Hanoi to accept. But I called his attention to the fact that in Rostow’s communication to Dobrynin we had described three matters as simple facts of life. The President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing if there were abuses of the DMZ, if there were rockets and mortars slamming into population centers such as Saigon, Danang and Hue and if North Viet–Nam did not sit down promptly in negotiations at which the GVN would be present. I emphasized that it was not necessary to talk about “conditions”, “reciprocity” or “quid pro quos.” It was simply an elementary fact that no President of the United States could maintain a cessation of the bombing under certain circumstances and we had tried to be explicit to the Soviet Union about such circumstances.

His second question was whether we could eliminate Thieu and Ky as parties to the situation. He said we should not draw any conclusions from the question—he was merely asking a question. He said that the authorities in Hanoi took a very strong view toward these individuals and that the character of the regime in the South was a major obstacle. I replied very firmly that we could not go down this path. President Thieu and Prime Minister Huong together represented 45 percent of the votes cast in the last Presidential election in South Viet–Nam. They, too, had some strong views about the authorities in Hanoi but they were willing to negotiate with them and were willing to let them have the NLF on their side of the table. I made it very clear that there was no possibility that we would bring about a change in government in Saigon to accommodate Hanoi.

Gromyko then said that there were three parties involved in these communications: the North Vietnamese, the Soviet Union and the United States. He said that the United States ought to take into account the problem which Moscow faces in its own dealings with Hanoi and that we should put Moscow in a position to use its influence in Hanoi in a constructive direction. He illustrated his point by saying that if we told the Soviet Union that we would have to resume the bombing on this or that condition, the Soviets would have to say that to Hanoi. Hanoi, in turn, would then say to the Soviet Union “what have you done—have you sold out to the Americans?” I tried to get him to be more specific about just what he had in mind but all I could get was a statement that the atmosphere would be greatly changed if we stopped the bombing and vague allusions to what might happen if we did so.

In this connection, I told Gromyko that it was very important that the United States and the Soviet Union be precise with each other and that we not mislead each other. He seemed to agree. I reminded him that we had said that if the Soviet Union were to give us serious advice about stopping the bombing with full knowledge of the “three facts of life”, we would take their advice very seriously indeed. We were interested in results; we were not standing on ceremony, we were not insisting upon particular procedures, we were not debating who might make the first move, we were not interested in face, we were only interested in peace. We were prepared to be flexible about procedural and other modalities if we could have reasonable confidence that results would follow. Just as Dobrynin has done in Washington, he tried to leave the impression that we ought to stop the bombing but he would not say that anything specific would result.

At one point I told Gromyko that we would be interested if the Soviets would tell us, with full understanding of our views, that the Soviets would make a maximum effort following a cessation of bombing. He said that he could state that they would do so but he refused to confirm that they would do so on the three points which we have described as “facts of life”.

We had some rather pointless discussion on the Middle East which reflected my own discussion with Riad of Egypt the day before. For present purposes, this memorandum will not go into that because he and I agreed we should discuss the Middle East on a later occasion.

During a brief conversation about Czechoslovakia, referring to Rostow’s remarks on the subject, Dobrynin stated quite categorically that under no circumstances would the Soviet Union discuss this subject with any other government—meaning particularly the United States. I told him about some of the problems which this had created for us but he was utterly unwilling to get into it in any way.

He said, at one point, that the Soviet leaders were ready for a meeting “at any time” and that that was a matter for us to consider. I did not respond on this point but made the general observation that I would report our conversation to the President and would be in touch with him further. Gromyko fully understands the President’s personal relation to the Rostow–Dobrynin exchanges and that only three of us are informed about them.

In all of my exchanges with Gromyko since 1961 his personal attitude, manner and language were more friendly and agreeable than I have ever found him. He seemed to be going out of his way to establish a rapport. I mention this not because I think a new day had dawned but because it may be of some interest in thinking about the present situation. He told me that he would say some things in his speech tomorrow⁴ about Viet–Nam that would not surprise me. I replied that I did not believe he was surprised by my speech today⁵ in the General Assembly, to which he replied “not surprised but I could have hoped you would have said something different”.

My own impression is that I should go back at him again on Viet–Nam, as well as on the Middle East. There is something on his mind which he has not yet fully disclosed. I do not believe that we have a basis for acting now on the basis of the Rostow–Dobrynin communication. Before I see him again, I would wish to have the President’s reactions to this first contact.

DR ⁶

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
2. The Russian text is ibid. The unofficial translation is Document 308.
3. Katzenbach handed Dobrynin the 7–page paper, which was a reply to a paper that Dobrynin gave Rusk on September 4 (see footnote 6, Document 295) during a meeting on September 29.
4. For text, see Izvestia, October 4; excerpts are in The New York Times, October 4.
5. For text, see the Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1968, pp. 405–410; excerpts are in The New York Times, October 3.
6. Rusk wrote beneath his initials: “I could come to Washington at the end of the day on Thursday [October 3] if this seems desirable. Gromyko plans to return on Oct. 8.”