Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

252. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 25, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Ivanov Case

PARTICIPANTS

• The Attorney General
• Mr. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General
• Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• Mr. Malcolm Toon, Country Director, Soviet Union Affairs
• Mr. Kohler called on the Attorney General today at 11:30 to discuss the Ivanov case.

As the Attorney General was aware the Soviets had made clear by their behavior over the past three years that they attached considerable importance to Ivanov. This had been reflected by several attempts to lay hands on possible hostages in the Soviet Union—e.g., Barghoorn in 1963² and more recently Wortham and Gilmour,³ and by high level appeals for clemency both in Moscow and in Washington. (In response to the Attorney General’s query as to why the Soviets attach so much importance to Ivanov, Mr. Kohler said that because attention had been given the case at the highest levels he could only assume that more was at stake than simply the morale of the Soviet espionage services; he suspected that there was a family connection between Ivanov and high officials in the Soviet Government.) Mr. Kohler said that the Secretary of State was aware of the difficulties that the Justice Department would face in considering any recommendation for Executive clemency in the Ivanov case, and it was for this reason that the Secretary had asked Mr. Kohler to raise the problem personally with the Attorney General. The Secretary had discussed the question with the President and Walt Rostow was aware that Mr. Kohler was raising the matter with the Attorney General today. Mr. Kohler then reviewed the case for clemency along the lines of the attached Talking Paper,⁴ a copy of which he left with the Attorney General. Mr. Kohler told the Attorney General that Ambassador Dobrynin had renewed the Soviet appeal for clemency with him at lunch yesterday and that Dobrynin had been told that while the question would be discussed with the Department of Justice Mr. Kohler was not in a position to make any commitment of any kind at this stage. Mr. Kohler then read to the Attorney General a full account of his conversation on this subject with Dobrynin.

The Attorney General said that he had not had an opportunity to examine the Ivanov file in detail but was of course aware of the case and of the Soviet interest in bringing about Ivanov’s release. He would now examine the problem carefully, consult with his associates and be in touch with Ambassador Kohler at an early date. Meanwhile, he would like to explain in general terms the difficulties which he foresaw in supporting a recommendation for Executive clemency. In the first place, as a law enforcement officer he was conscious of the need to do nothing which would downgrade the vital nature of the responsibilities carried out by officials in his Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in protecting the security of the United States. Seizure and conviction of a foreign espionage agent is a rare occurrence, and release of a convicted spy without an adequate quid pro quo could be detrimental to the morale of law enforcement officers. Exchange of a Soviet espionage agent for one of our own was entirely defensible; but unilateral release of a convicted spy was quite another development which would be difficult for law enforcement officers to understand and support. Secondly, we had to look at the problem from the standpoint of deterrence. If the Soviets felt that their agents caught in the act of espionage would ultimately be released and would not have to serve the full penalty for their acts, seizure and conviction would not serve as substantial deterrence. The Attorney General, of course, recognized that Soviet espionage activities in the United States and elsewhere did not depend exclusively on efforts by their own nationals; they had a wide network of agents to draw upon. Thirdly, clemency for Ivanov could generate an impression with the American public that the principle of law enforcement was to be applied in a different way when diplomatic considerations were involved. Finally, and related to the third factor, was the problem of domestic political considerations. The Attorney General wondered how clemency for Ivanov could be explained to the public, to the press, and the Congress.

Mr. Kohler said that both the Secretary and others concerned with the problem in the Department were keenly aware of the difficulties cited by the Attorney General which must be faced in reaching a decision. Obviously we would have to give careful thought to a rationale for use in dealing particularly with the Congress, and on a background basis with the press, for clemency in the case of Ivanov. Perhaps the best approach to this problem would be to describe the act as a gesture of goodwill toward the Soviet Union with the aim of removing a serious irritant in our bilateral relations and with the hope that this would influence Soviet decision making in a direction favorable to us.

The Attorney General asked whether the matter was urgent. Mr. Kohler pointed out that the question of appeal to the Supreme Court was now pending and it would be desirable to have a decision on the question of clemency before the appeal must be filed. Mr. Yeagley pointed out that he understood that Mr. Edward Bennett Williams, whose services the Soviets had recently engaged in the Ivanov case, had requested a stay until December 5 in which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. It was agreed that we should aim for a decision on clemency before the expiry of the stay. The Attorney General commented that the fact that Williams had taken on the case could have ominous overtones; Williams was not the sort of lawyer to take on a loser.

It was agreed that the Attorney General would be in touch with Mr. Kohler or Mr. Yeagley with Mr. Toon when the Justice Department had had an opportunity to examine the problem in the light of this discussion. Meanwhile, Mr. Yeagley would be provided with a list of cases involving detention and/or conviction of American and Soviet nationals in recent years and the way in which these cases have been disposed of.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Dobrynin/Kohler Memoranda of Conversation. Secret. Drafted by Toon on October 25 and approved in G on October 26.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. V, Documents 372, 374, and 376.
3. See footnote 2, Document 190.
4. Not printed.
5. During a meeting with Kohler on November 29, Dobrynin again raised the issue of releasing Ivanov and, “saying he was speaking personally, then stressed that this case was of importance in Soviet-American relations far beyond its intrinsic importance. Whatever the ‘Special Services’ might think about it, he was sure that the detention of Ivanov influenced negatively decisions in completely unrelated fields of real importance to the Soviet-American relationship.” (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Dobrynin/Kohler Memoranda of Conversation)