253. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
Moscow, November 12, 1967,
1000Z.
1755. Subj: Shifting Balance of Power in Soviet Leadership.
- 1.
- Perhaps the most significant development during the week-long 50th anniversary festivities was the conduct of the Soviet leadership itself and the implications of this conduct for developments within the hierarchical structure.
- 2.
- Obvious efforts were made during jubilee to perpetuate the public image of the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgornyy troika. However, after all was said and done it was Brezhnev who emerged more obviously than ever before as the primus inter pares in the present political constellation.
- 3.
- It was he who clearly dominated the festivities. He dedicated Lenin statue in Kremlin November 2; made the major addresses at sessions in Moscow November 3–4 and in Leningrad November 5; and acted as principal host and speaker at Kremlin reception following November 7 parade. Kosygin’s role was limited to chairing part of November 4 Moscow joint session; addressing the Moscow organizations at awards meeting November 6; and delivering “short” toast at Kremlin reception. Podgorny’s contributions about matched Kosygin’s, with former chairing opening of joint session November 3 and presenting awards in both Leningrad and Moscow.
- 4.
- Deferential reference to troika members in speeches of lesser leaders were interesting. Brezhnev and several others referred by name to Kosygin and Podgorny in their “official roles,” but that was all. In fairly sharp contrast all republic first secretaries at joint meeting in Moscow voiced explicit approval of Brezhnev’s report although some endorsements evidently considered too personally laudatory and so were not carried subsequently in central press. Perhaps one of more interesting performances in this connection was Marshal Grechko’s at the November 7 Kremlin reception where in homage to Brezhnev he noted the “daily leadership” of armed forces by CC CPSU and Politburo and toasted “CC CPSU, Politburo and General Secretary CC CPSU Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev.”
- 5.
- Also were especially struck by minimal attention of speakers during talkathon to principle of “collective leadership.” While Brezhnev pledged continuation and strengthening of principle once briefly and in passing, no other speaker touched this point which had been hallmark this leadership’s pronouncements starting with Khrushchev’s ouster.
- 6.
- How much Brezhnev’s public preeminence reflects accretion personal power and how much attributable his institutional role on what was primarily a party holiday may be debatable. Nonetheless, his conspicuous over-shadowing of other members of leadership troika was so marked as to raise questions about future leadership balance.
- 7.
- In this context, the differences in tenor and content Kosygin’s two speeches in Moldavia (Moscow 1334 and 1369)2 and Polyansky’s [Page 600] article in “Kommunist” (Moscow 1578)3 take on more interesting overtones. This particularly so since Brezhnev in his marathon address seemed to endorse Polyansky’s exposition and then go one step further to demonstrate close sympathy with military on assessment defense needs, securing in process Grechko’s personal public tribute—an endorsement suggesting a close developing relationship between General Secretary and armed forces leadership.
- 8.
- It probably still premature to suggest that Brezhnev’s leadership is unquestioned or that his views necessarily carry the day. By same token, however, it is difficult to ignore public personality play of last few days and implications it may have for changes in leadership.
- 9.
- Polyansky’s star appears to be rising and his portrait was the only one, apart from the troika, in front ranks not in alphabetical order in the main parade of pictures carried through Red Square on the seventh.
- 10.
- Kosygin has at times appeared tired and his poor health and death of his wife have doubtless affected him. (For what it may be worth British Ambassador’s barber said Kosygin spent large part of his summer holiday in heart clinic.) We have heard repeated reports that he has offered to resign.
- 11.
- Despite Brezhnev’s preeminence, he has not succeeded in establishing his image as the leader and Kosygin appears to be much more respected by the public. I suspect also that even in party circles, Kosygin by sheer ability has influence comparable to that of Brezhnev, at least in his own field.
- 12.
- Podgorny appears to be ambitious but limited in ability. Should Kosygin resign, he or Polyanskiy would appear to be the most likely successors. On the other hand, if there should be a Kremlin coup, Shelepin would be the most likely to lead it and Brezhnev and Podgorny the most likely to be dropped.
- 13.
- I must point out that these views are highly speculative as we have little to go on. I am encouraged to submit them by the fact that I have recently had occasion to ascertain that they coincide not only with those of a number of my colleagues but also of the few Russians who have been willing to talk about such matters. It is a game that anyone can play.
Thompson