Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

374. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, November 14, 1963, 1 p.m.

1642. Eyes only for McGeorge Bundy. I am gratified that the President plans to make statement on Barghoorn case in his press conf today¹ and I welcome opportunity to offer some suggestions on line he might take in terms maximum possible impact on Sov as well as world audience.

My own view is that action against Barghoorn by Sov security authorities has undoubtedly disturbed Sov intellectual community and possibly also those elements of Sov bureaucracy which are not primarily concerned with internal security considerations. It is apposite to point out that when making my demarche yesterday to Foreign Office I had distinct impression that Zorin, despite his past role as Soviet “hatchet man” was embarrassed and such views as he expressed on Barghoorn case seemed to me to lack usual conviction which has characterized defense by Foreign Office spokesmen in similar circumstances in past. Smirnovsky, head of USA section who attended Zorin, was clearly uncomfortable and appeared downcast throughout session.²

While having of course no direct evidence of their attitude, I am certain that many Sov intellectuals and particularly elements of Sov academic community are deeply upset by Barghoornʼs arrest and implications it may have for continued active interchange with Western opposite numbers, although, of course, we must recognize that it would be impolitic, if not dangerous, for them so to indicate to us or other Western contacts.

I believe these considerations should be borne in mind in our handling of Barghoorn case and any public statements we may make with regard to his arrest. The expressed reaction of the American academic community is thus a particularly useful peg on which to hang any public statement, and I would think it desirable for the President amply to exploit the message from Yale University. The tone and emphasis of the Yale statement in my view is exactly right, and it was for this reason, of course, that I used it in my démarche to Zorin.

Naturally the President will wish to supplement his reference to the consternation and shock of the American academic community at Barghoornʼs arrest by a reiteration of his own strong personal conviction that the arrest is wholly unwarranted and unjustified along lines set forth in your message to me yesterday.

Further, in any prepared statement the President should plan I would think it advisable to stress his personal concern that the Sovs took an inordinately long time (at least 12 days) to notify the Embassy of Barghoornʼs arrest and are continuing to deny access to him by appropriate American officials and that this behavior is in contravention of established international norms with regard to protection of nationals. I would suggest that the formal statement made by the President be on this note.

Finally I would think it useful if the President would avoid any specific threats of reprisal since this might set in motion irreversible trends seriously restricting the maneuverability in policy which is vital, it seems to me, in the present context of our relationships with the Soviet Union. The President, however, should be prepared to deal with inevitable questions with regard to the effect of Barghoornʼs arrest on pending negotiations. In this connection I would suggest that he respond along the following lines:

1. If the President should be asked (as we are being asked in Moscow by local American correspondents) what bearing Barghoornʼs arrest may have on the tentative agreement to begin negotiations for the renewal of the Cultural Exchange Agreement, now tentatively scheduled November 15, he might express the view that so long as the Soviet Government persists in detaining Barghoorn on grotesque and unwarranted charges it would be inappropriate if not impossible to discuss with the Soviets continuation of exchange arrangements with which such action by the Soviet Government is totally incompatible. He could add that the exchange agreement envisages, among other things, the development of wide contacts between American and Soviet scholars in all fields and Soviet Governmentʼs action against Barghoorn raises apprehensions as to how it intends to treat legitimate American scholars in the pursuit of legitimate lines of inquiry. Naturally he would wish in this connection to point out that the exchange negotiations do not involve the US Government alone but require the cooperation and active participation of significant segments of the American society, particularly the academic community. An exchange agreement cannot be implemented nor can it be satisfactorily negotiated without the full cooperation of such elements.

2. If the President should be questioned on the effect of Barghoornʼs arrest on continuation of the Consular Convention negotiations, he might state that the issue of protection of nationals is one of the most vital points under discussion with the Soviets in these negotiations. United States negotiators have made it clear and will continue to stress that inordinate delay in notification to American Consular Officials of the arrest of an American national is unacceptable as well as denial of access to him by such officials. In this connection the President will undoubtedly wish to underline the creditable US record on these points with regard to recent clear cases of Soviet espionage against United States.

One final suggestion which I hesitate to put in too positive terms since I recognize that domestic considerations and other requirements may dictate the course of action. With this reservation, I would think it advisable for the President to avoid identifying the Barghoorn case as obvious reprisal for Ivanovʼs arrest.³ He could field any such question along this line by simply saying he, like many others, is frequently unable to fathom the motives for Soviet behavior.⁴

Kohler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, PS 7-1 US-USSR Barghoorn. Confidential; Flash.
1. On November 13 Bundy had asked Kohler for his views on the line the President should take on Barghoornʼs arrest at his press conference on November 14. (Telegram 1559 to Moscow; ibid.)
2. Kohler reported on his meeting with Zorin at 4:45 p.m. on November 13 in telegram 1638 from Moscow. In the meeting Kohler expressed the “grave concern” of the President and Secretary of State at the arrest of Barghoorn and read Zorin parts of a telegram that he had from the President of Yale. (Ibid.)
3. I.A. Ivanov, an Amtorg employee who had been arrested in New York in October for espionage.
4. For a transcript of the Presidentʼs press conference on November 14, during which he made a statement along the lines suggested by Kohler, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 845-853.