Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

104. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 26, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Call on the Secretary by Ambassador Dobrynin

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State
• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

The Ambassador began by congratulating the United States on the achievements of our cosmonauts and on the Ranger lunar probe. He then made the following oral statement, which he said was on the instructions of his Government.

“I informed Moscow about our conversation on March second, Mr. Secretary.² Now I have been instructed to convey to you some considerations in connection with your statements, made during that conversation.

“1. Careful study was given in Moscow to what you said on a number of questions concerning international affairs and our bilateral relations as if in continuation of the talks held last December between you and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

“To your statement that the Government of the United States continues to be interested in the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union, we can give a plain answer:

“The Soviet Government, as it has already declared, stands consistently for the development and improvement of relations with the United States of America. And we agree when you, Mr. Secretary, say that, as the U.S. Government believes, our countries must pay a constant attention to every possibility of improving the understanding between them and to the search for ways of settling outstanding problems. And it was with this view, in particular, that we held the exchange of opinion with the American representatives during the December talks, mentioned by you, Mr. Secretary. In the same spirit we, as is known, had also an exchange of views later, including exchanges through other channels.

“It would hardly be right, however, to pretend that since the time of the December meetings nothing has happened in the world and that the international situation as well as the atmosphere of the Soviet-American relations have not undergone any changes. It would mean to depart from the reality and to close eyes to the actual state of affairs. One cannot but admit that the international tensions have again increased in the recent months and that a certain damage has been caused to the relations between our countries.

“First of all, we have in mind, of course, the actions of the U.S. against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, our attitude toward which was given in the statements of the Soviet Government of February 9 and March 4.³ Such actions by the U.S., and we deemed it necessary to say it also publicly, are incompatible with the statements about an intention to improve relations with the Soviet Union. It is hard to imagine that the leaders of the U.S. foreign policy would not have realized this and would not have taken into account that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is a socialist country to whose fate the Soviet Union cannot and will not remain indifferent. How then should we view the American bombings of the DRV territory? In any event these aggressive actions of the U.S.—and they cannot be defined otherwise—cannot serve as an example of a ‘constant attention toward all possibilities of improving the understanding between us.’

“The Soviet Government has warned the U.S. Government that the Soviet Union together with its allies and friends will take measures to protect the security and to strengthen the defense capability of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. There should be no misunderstanding on this point: all necessary measures are already being taken and will be taken for defending the brotherly socialist country.

“It should be said straightforwardly: the armed provocations by the U.S. against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam are undermining the very foundation on which the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. can only be based, namely-the principle of peaceful coexistence. One may not accept this terminology, one may use other words-but what is important is strict observance of this principle in international affairs and, especially, by the great powers. In our times, no less than before, it is true that ‘the world is indivisible’ and that creation of a hotbed of tension in one point of the globe inevitably entails new dangers, new deterioration of the whole international situation. It would be also a mistake to proceed from an assumption that it is possible to apply different standards to one’s own actions and the actions of other powers and to believe that one may do what the other may not.

“2. In our conversation, Mr. Secretary, you said a great deal about the situation in Southeast Asia. The U.S. Government believes, as one can understand your words, that the interests of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. do not collide in that region and that therefore our countries should both apply their efforts to finding mutually acceptable solutions to the problems of that area. First of all, it should be noted that the first point would be correct provided neither of the sides interfered into the affairs of the countries of Southeast Asia. We find it necessary to state quite definitely that open military interference of the U.S. in South Viet-Nam, the American bombings of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam affect the interests of all socialist states and all peace-loving peoples.

“We, of course, absolutely do not agree with your evaluation, Mr. Secretary, of the situation in South Viet-Nam and of the reasons that have created the present situation. In the talks last December you, Mr. Secretary, were informed in detail about our view with regard to the developments in South Viet-Nam and it was shown that the assertions about the so-called “aggression from the North” against South Viet-Nam were without foundation. Precisely the U.S. policy which in the past wrecked the Geneva agreements that provided for a unification of Viet-Nam on the basis of free elections, gave start to the deterioration of the situation in Viet-Nam. It was emphasized that the U.S. does not have any rights to dictate to the Vietnamese people as to how they should decide their domestic problems. We warned at that time that by trying with the help of bombs to solve this problem, the U.S. was taking a very dangerous path and that the American actions in South Viet-Nam were in contradiction with the statements of the U.S. Government about the desire to contribute to the lessening of tensions in Southeast Asia.

“The recent events show that the U.S. has taken the course of escalating the war in Indo-China. The increasing armed intervention of the United States in South Viet-Nam, the landing there of combat units of the U.S. Marines, the sending of new American military units and armaments to that region, the concentration of U.S. Navy forces off shores of Viet-Nam—all these are acts of overt aggression creating a threat to peace and security of the peoples. Having taken the course of bombings of the territory of the DRV the U.S. has crossed all the limits in its aggressive acts and actually started military actions against an independent and sovereign state.

“If the United States assumes that by its provocative aggressive actions in Viet-Nam it will be able to intimidate anybody, it is a gross miscalculation. Calculations of this sort are without any real ground. By such kind of actions, by direct and gross violation of the Geneva Agreements on Indo-China and of most elementary norms of international law it is impossible to find ‘a mutually acceptable solution of the problem of this region’ of which you, Mr. Secretary, spoke. It is the course aimed not at finding a settlement, but at a dangerous widening of the military conflict, a course fraught with most serious consequences for the entire international situation. The U.S. Government is assuming a very grave responsibility for all the consequences of such a course.

“When you, Mr. Secretary, say that we should, perhaps, discuss respective evaluations of the situation in Viet-Nam, at least, for the purpose of clarifying this question and when you state that the U.S. is prepared to do this, one can answer as follows: if the U.S. Government really desires to look for ways for a peaceful settlement, then it is necessary to strictly carry out the Geneva Agreements and, first of all, cease the aggressive acts against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

“The U.S. Government knows how we view the situation in Laos. We have repeatedly drawn the attention of American representatives to the fact that the aggravation of the situation in that country is caused by continuous interference of the U.S.A. into her internal affairs which recently has taken an absolutely inadmissible form of American bombings of various points on the territory controlled by the Pathet Lao forces. Is it not a most rude violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos?

“Whether Souvanna Phouma can come to an agreement with Souphanouvong is an internal matter of Laos. We hold the view—and we have repeatedly stated it to the U.S. representatives—that an agreement between Laotian factions would have become possible had it not been hampered by American interference into the affairs of Laos. You, Mr. Secretary, suggest that in the efforts to settle the problem of Laos the starting point should be the signing of the 1962 Geneva Agreements and not the situation which had developed in that country before the Agreements, since otherwise, as you said, there would be little hope for success. In reality, however, the actions of the U.S. are leading to the pre-Geneva situation if not to an even worse situation. At the same time the United States rejects proposals on the necessity to convene an international conference on Laos. The question arises what is the true position of the U.S.A.?

“We believe that if the Geneva Agreements on Laos are to be considered, as you suggest, ‘a symbol of a possibility to achieve not only a bilateral agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. but of broader agreements,’ then it is necessary first of all to strictly observe the Geneva Agreements.

“As to giving recommendations by the co-Chairmen to the participants of the Geneva conference, in accordance with Article 19 of the Protocol, concerning further activities of the International Control Commission, this question is under study now. However, one cannot but see that the development of events in Laos hampers making of a decision.

“3. You put forth considerations why the American Government thinks it useful to resume the work of the Committee of 18 on disarmament.

“As is known, the questions of disarmament were rather thoroughly discussed during the exchange of opinion between the Soviet Union and the United States in New York and Washington last December. On December 7, 1964, the Soviet Government submitted for the consideration by the 19th session of the U.S. General Assembly specific proposals on the measures for further relaxation of international tensions and limitation of the armaments race.⁴ The U.S. representatives said that these proposals would be thoroughly studied. So far, however, we have not received any reply from the Government of the United States. Due to the well-known circumstances, the responsibility for which rests not with the Soviet Union, the problem of disarmament has not been discussed at the 19th session of the U.N. General Assembly either.

“We consider negotiations on the problem of disarmament to be important and necessary. However, speaking about the work of the Committee on disarmament, it is necessary to recognize that it has not produced any tangible results. Besides, it can be said that tensions that recently increased in connection with the United States’ acts in Southeast Asia create the atmosphere which by no means facilitates negotiations on disarmament. One cannot ignore in this connection also the plans for creating the NATO nuclear forces in any of their variations-in the form of ‘multilateral force’ or ‘Atlantic Force.’ Such plans are absolutely incompatible with the need to solve the disarmament problem and, in particular, of the problem of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. If these plans were realized this would inevitably cause a new intensification of the armaments race.

“4. There are also other important international issues which are on the agenda and which must be solved. Among such problems is first of all the problem of European security and German peace settlement.

“It should be pointed out that your statements on the questions which you raised do not contain any constructive proposals.

“As to us, our proposals, in particular on such questions as the German problem, disarmament and Laos, are well known to the American side. The position of the Soviet Government in connection with events in Viet-Nam are also well known to the Government of the United States. We can only repeat that first of all it is necessary to stop aggressive acts against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, to withdraw the U.S. Armed Forces from South Viet-Nam and to strictly observe the Geneva Agreements.

“We shall not conceal that we are under impression that in Washington they apparently underestimate all the seriousness of the situation which is developing in this connection, all the burden of responsibility which the United States is assuming for its aggressive actions in Indo-China.”

The Secretary said that he would wish to study his statement carefully and would be in touch with him later about it, but would make certain preliminary comments. He said that with respect to Laos, the sole object of our policy and attitude was complete compliance with the 1962 Accords. He wondered how we could make progress unless there was a common understanding of facts. We knew that at no time after the signature of the 1962 Accords did the North Viet-Namese strength decline below six thousand men and that they have continued sending men and arms into Laos contrary to the Geneva Agreement. The present situation was that the Soviet Government supported the Geneva Accords and this was important. We did the same. The problem was now how to get to the result that that Accord was implemented for. To be frank, since the Kennedy/Khrushchev talks in 1961,⁵ and the conclusion of the 1962 Agreements we felt that the Soviet Union was acting in good faith. When major violations of those Agreements occurred, we did not attempt to hold the Soviet Union wholly responsible since we realized that they did not control the Pathet Lao or the Viet-Namese. Nevertheless, violations did exist. The problem was how could we and other signatories bring Laos back to compliance. The Secretary referred to the events in 1964, when the Pathet Lao moved in the Plaines Des Jarres to destroy the position of the neutralist forces there. Then there was the difficulty of the position of Souvanna as Prime Minister, which the Pathet Lao treated with contempt. In addition, there was the continued paralysis of the International Control Commission, which was unable to find out the simplest facts about the situation. He wished to suggest that the question facing us in Laos was how to make the 1962 Accords effective. We were prepared to do everything possible to bring the situation back to compliance with the Geneva Agreements. He doubted, however, that Hanoi was interested. The Secretary concluded his remarks on this subject by saying that he would give further study to the remarks which Dobrynin had made.

With regard to Viet-Nam, the Secretary said we should distinguish between two different aspects of the matter. If the Soviet Union felt it has a commitment to support the security of a socialist state, then we have no quarrel on that issue. We have no desire to destroy any socialist state and, on the contrary, we would use our own influence against the use of force to interfere with socialist countries. In Southeast Asia, however, we have a different problem. North Viet-Nam is attacking its neighbors, sending military men and arms into Laos and into South Viet-Nam. For the Soviet Union to say it is going to support socialist countries in such activities does bring us into a situation in which we have a real issue. We have said to all capitals concerned that peace can be restored almost overnight if North Viet-Nam stops its activities directed against South Viet-Nam. We do not ask the Soviet Union publicly to confirm the facts as we know them to be, but we do ask them to believe us when we say that North Viet-Namese men and arms are being sent regularly to Laos and South Viet-Nam. Yesterday the Secretary had seen reports of prisoners identifying their North Viet-Namese units. We knew that there was a North Viet-Namese divisional headquarters in South Viet-Nam.

The Secretary said we recognize the fact that the Soviet Union had some problems within the Communist world that make for complications in settling these matters, but they should be settled. We were not asking North Viet-Nam to surrender, but only to stop shooting.

Dobrynin broke in to ask if they were shooting at us. The Secretary replied that they were. He went on to say that we saw no suggestion that the North Viet-Namese were interested in stopping the conflict. He said that if the North Viet-Namese forces had moved as divisions across the border, the whole problem would have been quite clear, but clandestine infiltration did not change the matter. We did not believe that the problem of the divided countries such as Korea, Germany, and Viet-Nam should be changed by force. We did not know what capabilities the Soviet Union had to get Hanoi to settle the South Viet-Nam problem promptly. We had hoped that the Soviet and British co-Chairmen could have ascertained the views of the parties so that the co-Chairmen and others could have examined these views to see whether there were possibilities to solve the problem. We were disappointed that the Soviet Union decided it could not act in that capacity. It was hard to believe that there was any basic conflict of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia. At least we hoped that it was the case. The ability of these states to live at peace with each other was all we asked as we had no specific United States interest in this area.

The Secretary said we hoped it would be possible to solve this question without undue delay, but he had to add that we have undertaken direct, simple, and clear commitments to South Viet-Nam and we would meet these commitments. He only hoped that the necessity for meeting them could be avoided by prompt restoration of peace in the area.

With regard to disarmament, the Secretary said we attached real importance to the continuation of the discussions in Geneva. Each side had made a number of proposals to the other. There had been a little progress and he cited the Test Ban Treaty and some steps taken by mutual example. He thought we should not be discouraged because we have not accepted the Soviet proposals nor they ours. Each side was disappointed by the response of the other, but the efforts should be continued. In this respect, we had an obligation to our own peoples and to the rest of the world. He pointed out that conditions had not been good when Mr. McCloy and Mr. Zorin had made progress in 1961. There had also been tension while the Test Ban Treaty was being considered. He hoped both Governments would continue to work on the subject of disarmament.

On the German question, the Secretary said he did not have much to add at the present moment. He had raised with Gromyko the possibility of informal discussions at the Ambassadorial level but Gromyko had not been receptive to Four-Power talks on this issue.

Dobrynin pointed out that the Soviet Government had also made a proposal for discussions.

The Secretary concluded the interview by saying that he would later give the Ambassador a more systematic reply to his statement.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 17 USSR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S and S/AL on March 26. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 2587, March 27. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VIII)
2. A copy of the memorandum of Rusk’s March 2 conversation with Gromyko, primarily on Vietnam and Laos, is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 1–1 ASIA SE. The portion of the memorandum on Laos is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXVIII, Document 170. The two also briefly discussed resumption of the Geneva Disarmament Conference and East-West trade.
3. For text of the two statements, see The New York Times, February 9, p. 12, and Current Digest of the Soviet Press, March 24, 1965, p. 17.
4. See footnote 4, Document 78.
5. For records of Kennedy’s conversations with Khrushchev, June 3 and 4, 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. V, Documents 83–85 and 87–89.