Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

170. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 2, 1965, 3:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Discussion on Southeast Asia and Other Matters

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Robert I. Owen, SOV
• U.S.S.R.
  • Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
  • Alexander I. Zinchuk, Counselor, Soviet Embassy

The Secretary said he would like to make some comment today as part of a review of questions of mutual interest, perhaps the first of a series of sessions. He recalled that he and Foreign Minister Gromyko had discussed a number of matters in their five meetings last fall.² We continue to be interested in possibilities for the improvement of relations between our two countries. We do believe that we two have heavy responsibilities in world affairs and that we must be very attentive to how we exercise these responsibilities.

The Secretary said he wished to turn to the situation in Southeast Asia and to comment in part on the history of the past four years. When President Kennedy became President (and, he noted, Mr. Johnson became Vice President) he looked at the situation in Southeast Asia and felt that here the largest interests of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. need not be in conflict, and that both therefore should try to find ways to help bring peace and security to the area. When this was discussed with Mr. Khrushchev at Vienna, it seemed to us that there was mutual agreement that Laos should not be a bone of contention. This agreement opened the way for negotiations on Laos, and the Geneva Accords of 1962 underlined the concept that if everyone left Laos alone Laos could develop peaceably and independently. This was an understanding of major significance.

The Secretary said that in reaching that agreement (1962 Geneva Accords) the United States had made some important concessions to views not held previously, namely we (1) accepted Souvanna as Prime Minister and (2) accepted the idea of a government of national union. Subsequently we took various steps to reinforce the agreements. Last year we supported Prime Minister Souvanna fully when he was opposed by rightist groups and helped him restore stability. We supported Souvanna again when he encountered difficulties with Generals Phoumi and Siho and the police forces.

The Secretary said that as we understand the significance of our information: (1) North Vietnamese military personnel in Laos never dropped below six thousand; (2) continuously since 1962 Laos has been used by North Vietnam for infiltration into South Vietnam—this directly contrary to the agreement; (3) the Pathet Lao last year moved against the neutralist elements on the Plaine des Jarres forcing us to take action. “Let’s find a common basis of facts.” We believed in 1962 that we had an agreement. This was a very important development, a way by which we could find a basis of mutual interest. The actions of Hanoi and the Pathet Lao have prevented this.

The Secretary said that he had talked with Gromyko in December³ concerning some way to return to the agreement. One question was that of further talks between the three Laotian factions—with the obstacle that the Pathet Lao suggested Souvanna not go (to talks) as Prime Minister but rather as chairman of the three factions. Souvanna has tried to have contact for talks with Prince Souphanouvong but without success. The Secretary wondered what the Soviets might think about the prospect for talks between Souvanna and Souphanouvong.

The Secretary noted that under the 1962 Accords (Article 19 to be specific) the co-chairmen have the responsibility for reporting by July 1 of this year with regard to the effectiveness of the ICC. The British Government is aware of this. Perhaps the two co-chairmen may wish to consult with each other, with members of the ICC and, possibly, with some of the other signatories. This might open the way for a constructive process leading to a return to the ‘62 Accords. The Secretary stressed that our sole logic is capital and meticulous compliance with the ‘62 Accords and, as far as we are concerned, we will do everything to bring this about.

The Secretary said that a big problem with regard to a conference is whether it would begin where the last one ended or where the last one began. There would be no prospects for success if we had to start all over again from the beginning. On the other hand, we’ve never seen any evidence that the Pathet Lao (or Hanoi) ever really adhered to the agreements. The Secretary hoped that our two governments can find ways to limit the causes of tension. Noting that during the Kennedy-Johnson period the 1962 Accords and the Test Ban Treaty were seen as two important ways to reach accord and reduce tensions, the Secretary said it is important for us to find ways these two agreements can be made effective and carried out.

With regard to the situation in South Vietnam where there has been no bilateral agreement comparable to the one achieved on Laos in Vienna in 1961, we have no doubts whatsoever concerning the facts of North Vietnamese infiltration, the introduction of arms, personnel and units into South Vietnam. The Secretary stressed that we have made it clear many times that if South Vietnam were left free of efforts to bring it down from the outside we would be perfectly willing to pull out and go home. However, we have very serious commitments there to the South Vietnamese government and people, commitments which we intend to honor. We do not accept the view that what is happening in Vietnam is indigenous. It is no more indigenous than the conflict in Korea was indigenous. (At Ambassador Dobrynin’s request the Secretary explained the meaning of the word indigenous.) Neither we nor the South Vietnamese can accept that the supplying of arms and intrusion from the North is merely part of a “civil struggle”.

The Secretary said that more talks are needed to clarify the issues and to improve our understanding of one another in the interest of peace in Southeast Asia. The United States does not want any larger or expanded conflict in the area but we do consider the safety and the security of the people of South Vietnam to be most important. We cannot sit by and allow them to become innocent victims. The Secretary said that for Ambassador Dobrynin’s private information we have had a number of contacts with Peiping along the way and, indirectly, also with Hanoi. Despite these and other channels of communication we have not seen any indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop what it is doing in South Vietnam. This is a key point, a central point. (Asked if the Soviets had received any such indication from Hanoi, Ambassador Dobrynin was evasive.) Our going home is an idea which we might entertain if Hanoi would actually stop doing what it is doing in South Vietnam. We are not going to pull out and leave South Vietnam to be overrun by North Vietnam. The Secretary asked that Ambassador Dobrynin inform Mr. Gromyko of this firm U.S. position. The Secretary said that if there continued to be disagreement as to the facts of the situation in Vietnam it is important that the matter be discussed further at the Ambassador’s earliest convenience in an effort to make progress toward mutual understanding.

[Here follows discussion on the Geneva Disarmament Conference, East-West trade, and the German question.]

Presented the opportunity to address himself to the Secretary’s remarks, Ambassador Dobrynin said that the Soviet positions on developments in Southeast Asia are very well known and that consequently he would not review them in detail. As for speaking about the improvement in our bilateral relations, these depend very much on the previously mentioned developments in Southeast Asia. In other words, when you Americans bomb North Vietnam we are very concerned that if you continue the bombing and military intervention in North Vietnam this can cause a spreading of the conflict into one of a larger scale. This creates an immediate and important danger. (The Ambassador avoided answering a question by the Secretary as to the Soviet attitude with regard to stopping what is going on in South Vietnam.) Ambassador Dobrynin then compared the scope of the U.S. military effort in Vietnam to the assistance granted the Viet Cong by the North Vietnamese. Who can believe that in addition to 300,000 South Vietnamese troops, the mighty U.S. with many aircraft, 25,000 troops, missiles and so forth is not capable of crushing the few men with limited equipment who come in from North Vietnam? In other words, even if one accepted the figures of the State Department’s White Paper with regard to the scale of North Vietnamese assistance this assistance is very small compared to the scale of opposing U.S. assistance. The only answer is that the peoples of South Vietnam do not support the U.S. effort. The Soviet Union cannot accept the logic that military failures in South Vietnam justify U.S. attacks on North Vietnam. Just as in the fighting against the French, the majority of the Vietnamese are now fighting the U.S. There was a discussion of guerrilla warfare techniques and whether or not they can be effective without truly popular support.

Ambassador Dobrynin continued that the U.S. has started a new policy. At first it ostensibly was a policy of reprisal, bombing North Vietnam because of actions against Americans in South Vietnam. He asked what the policy was today? Things have been quiet in Vietnam and now the Americans bomb the North without any claims that this is reprisal action. Ambassador Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union wants better relations, but that they are convinced that what the U.S. is now doing cannot lead to any peaceful solution in the area. He ignored a question from the Secretary as to what his people think about Hanoi’s activity and whether that activity can lead to a peaceful solution.

Ambassador Dobrynin stressed the importance of stopping the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam as the first imperative if there is going to be any search for peaceful solutions. He asked where does one go from there if the bombing is not stopped. The Secretary said that one place to start would be a return to the 1962 agreements on Laos. Ambassador Dobrynin repeated that bombardment does not lead to peaceful solutions. The Secretary responded with a reference to the apparent Soviet desire that we desert the South Vietnamese, leaving them in the position of a petrified rabbit waiting for a snake. In another vein, Ambassador Dobrynin deplored some talk that he has heard around Washington which supports strong U.S. measures as necessary to prove that the U.S. is not frightened. He said that this is ridiculous, that the U.S. is mighty and powerful and “nobody thinks you are scared”. The Secretary said we weren’t.

As to a resumption of the Geneva disarmament talks Ambassador Dobrynin, speaking personally, asked what kind of an atmosphere would it be to sit down and talk in Geneva at the very same time as the U.S. is bombing North Vietnam. He said that the suggestion seem inconsistent or at least unrealistic to completely divorce the actions in Vietnam from other questions. The Secretary commented that disarmament is a long-term problem and one we should continue to work despite disagreements elsewhere. He asked if the matter of the arms race in the Near East might not also be a problem which could be usefully considered in the Geneva context. Ambassador Dobrynin reaffirmed his personal feeling that U.S. actions in North Vietnam created an atmosphere which is not conducive to talks on disarmament and related matters.

As the conversation concluded, Ambassador Dobrynin said that he would report everything that the Secretary had said to his government and again stated that the Soviet Union was greatly concerned over the dangerous situation in Vietnam. The Secretary responded that the situation would be much less dangerous if everyone stayed behind his own frontiers.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1–1 ASIA SE. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Robert Owen of SOV and approved in S on March 9. The meeting was held in Rusk’s office.
2. Apparent reference to meetings between Rusk and Gromyko at the United Nations during the UN General Assembly session, November–December 1964.
3. See Document 149.