Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

105. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, April 5, 1965, noon.

2920. Vietnam and Soviet-American Relations.

I. When new Soviet leadership decided, several months ago, that conduct their conflict with ChiComs required reversal Khrushchev line and reversion to active role in Southeast Asia, they must have realized this could entail deterioration their relationship with U.S. They apparently hoped damage could be limited both in scope and in duration, and assumed normal relationship could then be restored.

After Kosygin in Hanoi found Ho Chi Minh and company confident with respect outcome South Vietnam and negative with respect negotiations, Soviet dilemma sharpened. It has since been aggravated by mounting American support of South Vietnam, on one side, and continuing ChiCom attacks on Soviets, on other. In circumstances, they have now clearly decided imperatives their commitment and influence in Communist world at this stage are incompatible with and predominate over interest in continued development relations with U.S.

II. More precise import this decision is now emerging, both in word and in deed. As regards deeds, it now seems clear that there will be no new initiatives on Soviet side or acceptance of initiatives from American side (with possible exception a few non-political matters of tangible interest or value to Soviets). Presently arranged exchanges will be allowed to continue but will not be extended or added to. Not only will direct negotiations at least be played down, if not avoided, but same will apply to international forums where U.S. and U.S.S.R. are main protagonists.

Following are principal matters in which this decision has played major role to date:

1. Bilaterals.

A. Rejection of national war college visit and postponement of U.S. visit of Sov military officers.

B. Inaction on leased line request.

C. Refusal of requested extensions to U.S. exchange students.

D. Stalling on other bilaterals such as exchange of meteorological data. (Exception for King Crab discussions and fishing inspections which Sovs must regard as of commercial advantage.)

2. Negative decision on resumption of ENDC.

3. Color TV deal with French.

Unless and until situation changes, this line of action (or inaction) will continue to be followed, with negative implications for resumption progress in bilateral field, and further aggravation already negative attitudes with respect such international problems as disarmament, UN finance and peace-keeping, and Germany.

III. As regards words, all stops are now being pulled out in major political and propaganda campaign designed to justify course adopted by Soviet leadership in eyes own people and to undermine U.S. position throughout world. This has gone through several stages:

1. Initial reaction to airstrikes against North Vietnam, while shrilly reflecting official anger at coincidence with Kosygin visit, was relatively controlled. Main feature this phase, demonstrations Feb 9 and March 4 against Embassy, boomeranged so violently they could only add to embarrassment and frustration leadership (and hopefully, may finally have persuaded them this not useful instrument of diplomacy).

2. After fiasco March 4 demonstration, campaign of more peaceful protest meetings launched in factories, institutes, universities, trade unions and other organizations throughout country and similar activities promoted abroad. These have produced shower of petitions to Embassy, telegrams to White House, and continuing flow of material “branding shameful aggression American imperialists” which now constitute substantial portion reading matter offered Soviet people in daily press.

3. World-wide interest in Voskhod II was exploited to initiate sharper phase of campaign, with Brezhnev on March 24 branding “American aggressors” as barbarians and bandits who should not think “time will wash off disgrace [of] their crimes.” Polemical style of professional party propagandists was apparent in subsequent note delivered to and returned by this Embassy March 26 stating as fact “confirmed by official U.S. spokesmen” that “poison gases are being used in South Vietnam by the U.S. armed forces with approval U.S. State and Defense Depts” and charging that “Today United States has passed over from experiments to combat employment these inhuman weapons” which even “Hitler and his generals did not dare to put into use.”² Particularly scurrilous cartoons have subsequently developed theme of rejected note, though this aspect may in time be inhibited by our setting record straight and paucity foreign reaction for local quotation. Campaign in general, however, continues and likely be sustained indefinitely, blending into anti-U.S. and anti-FRG themes being developed for 20th anniversary World War II victory.

4. Top officials from government ministries were instructed not attend social functions U.S. Embassy February and March but lower ranks were allowed to come and no effort made cut off scientists, journalists, artists and other “intellectuals.” In encounters at various ceremonies elsewhere, leaders and high officials have been personally cordial but have seemed almost studiously avoid substantive talk, particularly about Vietnam.

IV. Current period seems likely be much more protracted and harder [to] live through without serious damage than Cuba crisis, especially in view relative weakness and sense of frustration of present Soviet leadership. However, some salutary forces are at work and may help so:

1. A knowledgeable Soviet source has told us that while “tough” sections top leadership want complete stoppage Soviet-American activities, including exchanges, “you have some influential friends who do not allow this to happen.” This seems confirmed by continuing friendly attitude members Soviet elite, who while apprehensive about possible escalation and confrontation, seem anxious continue contacts and keep things going forward.

2. As nearly as we can judge, people generally are apathetic and skeptical. Somewhat disturbed by sense of increased war danger and by “poison gas” charges but with basically curious and friendly attitudes toward United States unchanged. Embassy travelers have been in north, in central Asia and in south during past two weeks visiting many institutions where “protest meetings” had been staged by party agitators. Reception invariably friendly, practically no mention Vietnam, some expressions regret damage to Embassy and hostility toward Chinese.

V. I see little we can do which would bring about substantial change current Soviet policy in short run. However, I consider essential for longer run to maintain posture on Vietnam reflected in President’s statement of March 25³ and to demonstrate in word and deed we desire continue course of sound improvement Soviet-American relations of recent years. Indeed, while I recognize deteriorated atmosphere presents problems, I hope we will push forward such pending matters as ratification of consular convention, East-West trade legislation, and provision suitable premises for new Soviet Embassy, all of which are in our net interest, and encourage private interests similarly carry on as normally as possible, for example by participation in upcoming Soviet film festival and chemistry exhibition. In word, I think we should persistently reiterate themes that (a) U.S. policy of helping in past ten years; (b) U.S. policy of improved understanding with Soviet Union continues; and (c) if there is deterioration relations this result of changes in Soviet, not American policy. Soviet controlled media will not publish American side of story, but this becomes known here through VOA and other foreign media and local grapevine and will have salutary effect.

Dept please pouch to interested posts.

Kohler

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VIII. Confidential. A handwritten note at the top of page 1 of the telegram reads, “Bundy: Kohler’s estimate of US–USSR relations and his recommendation.”
2. Regarding the use of riot-control gas by U.S. forces in Vietnam, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. II, Documents 210, 211, 215–217, and 248.
3. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, p. 319.