58. Memorandum for the Record1
I talked to the President on the telephone from my office to his at 1:30, and he gave me the following debriefing of his conversation with Harold Wilson between 11:30 and 1:00 today.2
The President said that the conversation began with a discussion of the British and American elections. The President pointed out to the Prime Minister that there were a lot of problems which did not show in the U.S. returns, especially with respect to international affairs. He said that our folks were damned tired of being told that it was their business to solve all the world’s problems and do so mainly alone, and that he was very wary of taking any tall dives that might get him into the situation Roosevelt got into in 1937.
[Page 138]Against this background, the President spoke frankly but kindly to the Prime Minister about the troubles which the latter had already given the President. He pointed out that the impression which had been created by the British budget, with its heavy emphasis on social security, and the pressures created against the pound had combined to make the President’s own budgeting process very difficult. He had originally planned on a budget of $107 or $108 billion and now he was forced to think in terms of $101–$102, which would make it very difficult to carry out the programs he wanted. This British decision had shaken us up some.
The President said the second thing which had given him trouble was the monetary action of the British Government. The British had made trouble for themselves and for others by sounding as if they did not believe in the instrument of the bank rate and then using it very heavily and suddenly.
The third point the President made was that the British economic problem was in no sense over, and we might well expect a good deal of trouble in the next 60 to 90 days and that problems for the pound would also be problems for the dollar.
Finally, the President talked to the Prime Minister about the difficulties created by his speech on Atlantic nuclear defense in the House of Commons.
By that time, the President said, the Prime Minister was almost on the ropes. The Prime Minister said that on the Atlantic nuclear force he laid the blame on Flora Lewis. (Later on in the day the President described this episode to Rusk and McNamara by saying, “He chased Flora Lewis all around the room.”)
The Prime Minister knew that this episode had created a serious episode and he wanted us to know that he had not said no to the MLF but only to a force without a US veto. On the MLF, he had said maybe. (Later the President told us this reminded him of the girl who, when she said maybe, really meant yes, and the President said he was not in a position now to accept the bargain.) The President reminded the Prime Minister of the difficulties Sir Alex Douglas-Home had given him on commenting on Cuban busses from the White House steps. This time the Prime Minister had given him trouble ten days before the visit. The Prime Minister said he felt very sorry—that he had meant to give a very preliminary and general discussion as the President did at Georgetown.
The President returned to the Atlantic nuclear problem and said he himself would not take any adamant position and had no intention of forcing the matter now. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] We had been over there twice now in his lifetime and we did not want to have to do it again. He said that the best people in his government had worked on this, both under President Kennedy and under him, and they just did [Page 139] not see any other way of doing it than the way that was now before us. The President told the Prime Minister that a stitch in time saves nine, and that if we couldn’t solve this problem and tie the Germans in, [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The Germans had made rockets for the U.S. and the British, which proved they had brains, and they lent a lot of money to the UK, which showed that they had money. All they needed now was will, and that was what we had to prevent, so that we should all get together and work this thing out.
Bob McNamara would show the Prime Minister how to reduce his force from 5 submarines to 3, and take the money and men he had saved, and put the men on the surface ships. The President knew the Prime Minister wanted to keep our finger on the trigger, and we want exactly the same thing; the object was to keep the Germans with us and keep their hand off the trigger. The President repeated that McNamara and the other Americans could show the British how to join in on this without any real trouble, and with no cost.
Earlier, in the presence of the Prime Minister and Sir Burke Trend, the President had debriefed to Trend and me by saying many of the same things. He pointed out in that meeting that he had spoken of Erhard’s problems. (He later told Rusk and McNamara that the Prime Minister had been low on Erhard and high on Willy Brandt.)
The two had agreed that Adenauer was no help. Mr. Wilson remarked that while he had agreed on the fact that the Germans presented a real problem, he had not got to specifics. The President said that he had described all his best advisers as men with the temperament of Rhodes Scholars, dangerously sympathetic to the UK, and had made it clear that while he was “not going to put his feet in concrete” or get the Prime Minister’s feet in concrete, he did very much hope that we could reason it out together. In this meeting he put his point about the Germans by saying that he had just won an election by preaching against discrimination in the United States, and he could not now preach in favor of discrimination in international affairs.
The President said that he and the Prime Minister had agreed to have a private talk on monetary matters with experts from both sides, and he asked me to arrange a meeting at which Secretary Dillon, Chairman Martin and Chairman Ackley would be present at 4:45. This I later did.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 7. Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy.↩
- For another account of this meeting, see Harold Wilson, A Personal Record, pp. 46–48. Wilson visited Washington December 6–9 for conversations with the President on questions of mutual concern.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩