Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

57. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 6, 1964.

SUBJECT

• MLF—An Alternative View

1. You asked yesterday why President Kennedy was tentative and careful about the MLF. It was rightly pointed out that there were different reasons at different times, but in the last half of 1963 the reasons were, I think, dominated by his feeling that if he could only get the MLF by major and intense U.S. pressure, it was not worth it. His exact reasoning I do not know, but I do know that he reacted very strongly and affirmatively to a memorandum which I sent him on June 15, 1963 (Tab A).² While parts of it are outdated, I think it may be worth your attention, and I attach it.

2. I do this partly because I feel that we have not given you a full and fair statement of the case against pressing hard now for the MLF. I myself do come out on the side of going ahead very hard with Wilson himself, but you are entitled to know that there is another side of the case, and it would go something like this:

(1) The MLF or AMF will make very heavy demands on direct Presidential leadership, and there are better things for the President to do. It is all very well to talk of Bob McNamara converting the Senate, but the man who will really have to do it is the President.

(2) The new force, even though wider and better than the old MLF, will have many opponents, and their voices will be heard, whatever specific leaders of governments may say. The most important of them are as follows:

A. France.

General De Gaulle’s hostility is fixed and strongly supported by all French Gaullists. Tactically, the violence of French feeling can probably be somewhat moderated if you visit Paris and reason with him, but the underlying hostility of France will remain. It is true that the French propaganda now is preventive in purpose, but it will continue at least until ratification in all countries. The French will charge us with dividing the Alliance and blocking the future of Europe, and many who do not support de Gaulle will believe them. The Germans will be split by this French pressure and they, too, will show some tendency to blame us.

B. The Soviet Union.

The Soviets already charge that the MLF is a reopening of cold war hostility. Most of their opposition I consider tactical, but it is built on their genuine fear of Germany, and it strikes a lot of resonance among peace lovers and liberals in all countries.

C. Most professional military men are cool at best, and many are openly opposed. Lemnitzer is warning against this enterprise as divisive within the Alliance. Norstad is publicly against it. The JCS will be loyal but probably not enthusiastic. General Eisenhower may not be any better than neutral and could be opposed.

D. American commentators like Lippmann and George Kennan are violently opposed. Lippmann believes that there is no serious support for this force anywhere except among a few faddists in the State Department. He will shortly come back from Europe saying that his travels have confirmed this impression. (Walter, more than most, sees only what he wishes to see in nuclear matters.)

E. The Joint Committees and the Armed Services Committee are very wary of any treaty which seems to affect U.S. nuclear power and still more wary of any amendment of the McMahon Act. Holifield has publicly stated his opposition, but this is of course less important than what Russell and Anderson decide.

F. Hubert Humphrey summarizes Senatorial sentiment as strongly opposed and on many grounds. While we have never made a major Administration effort with the Senators, there are a large number who have informed themselves reasonably well, and I think it is fair to say that right now I know of not one hardened supporter, while there are many skeptics and many outright opponents. Hubert says that when Livingston Merchant gave informal MLF briefings on the Hill last year the surface response was polite, but the real reaction was negative.

3. All this means that we will have a great effort of political education ahead of us even after we have gone past Wilson and worked out a genuine multilateral agreement, perhaps in January or February. President Kennedy used to say that we would do this only if the Europeans really wanted it. Given the level of European skepticism, we will have to make an entirely different case based on our own judgment that this is what the whole Atlantic Community now requires if it is not to break apart and if Germany is not to be tempted into another disastrous national rearmament. (Incidentally, all those in America who fear the Germans will be hostile—as many of them are already.)

4. The devil’s advocate might continue by saying that the choice this week is not at all as black and white as men like Acheson say. Even if Wilson says “yes” there will be further problems of timing and tactics which may give you later moments of choice. And if he refuses to say “yes” at this stage, there is still quite a political charade to be played out.

5. The devil’s advocate would argue that even on this basis we can save most of our real interests—though not the MLF itself.

6. The Germans will still need us as friends and we will need them. This basic common interest is exemplified in the enormous U.S. nuclear and conventional forces now in Germany, and most of those forces will still be there, MLF or no MLF, in the coming years.

7. We can continue to prevent de Gaulle from dominating Europe even without an MLF—the Europeans themselves have no desire to follow him. His nuclear force is not a big magnet. The number of Germans who really tie their fate to France as against the U.S. is ridiculously small. The German politicians who favor France today would be the first to come to Washington if they ever came to power.

8. We can enlarge political and nuclear consultation even without an MLF. It is true that this is an inferior way of doing it, but if the MLF is not destroyed by us but by circumstances, new consultative procedures could usefully show our good will.

9. We can leave the British Polaris problem unsettled and let London stew in its own juice and thus show that we are true to our doctrine that any new arrangement must take full account of the needs of the Germans.

10. We can also say clearly that we will go right back to the MLF—and perhaps even to more drastic measures—if the Cold War heats up again (it is worth remembering that the MLF was generated in 1960–62, a period of heavy and active Soviet pressure on Berlin; the absence of that pressure is a major part of our present tactical problem).

11. In sum, the devil’s advocate would state your choices this way:

(1) If you go full steam ahead, you face a long, hard political fight, a major confrontation with De Gaulle, and a possibility of defeat or delay which would gravely damage the prestige of the President.

(2) If you go half steam ahead, there will probably be no MLF, but it will not be your fault alone. You will have kept the letter and spirit of the Kennedy readiness to move if the Europeans wanted it. There will be trouble with the Germans, but nothing unmanageable. There will be plenty of opportunities for debate, discussion and delay, and for gradual and ceremonial burial. Your wisdom, caution and good judgment will have the praise of liberals, of military men, of the British, of the French, and of many Germans—and you will have freedom to make a different choice later if you wish.

McG. B.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 7. Secret.
2. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIII, Document 201.