52. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)1
SUBJECT
- The Future of the MLF
Against my own expectations of two weeks ago, I am reaching the conclusion that the U.S. should now arrange to let the MLF sink out of sight. Whether this should be done quickly or slowly is an important tactical question, but the overriding point which I wish to suggest in this tightly limited group is that we should now ask the President for authority to work toward a future in which the MLF does not come into existence.
I reach this conclusion because it seems increasingly clear that the costs of success would be prohibitive. They would include at least the following:
- 1.
- A deeply reluctant and essentially unpersuaded Great Britain.
- 2.
- A Germany whose governing party was divided on this issue and whose participation was ambiguous in meaning.
- 3.
- Additional strains on an Italian government which is weaker and not stronger as a result of its last elections.
- 4.
- At least a temporary setback in efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons by international agreement (those who believe strongly in such agreements, in all countries, are skeptical of the MLF).
- 5.
- A protracted and difficult Congressional struggle in which we would be largely deprived of the one decisive argument—that this arrangement is what our major European partners really want.
- 6.
- A constitutional debate in NATO which, even if successful, would provide justification for further Gaullist outrages against the organization.
- 7.
- A genuine and enduring blow to Franco-German relations which the Germans will blame on us.
This is not an attractive prospect, and the MLF is not worth it.
From my own conversations with the President, I am sure that he does not feel the kind of personal Presidential engagement in the MLF itself which would make it difficult for him to strike out on a new course if we can find one which seems better. I believe we can.
[Page 122]The fundamental requirement is that we should work in harmony with the Germans, and my own judgment is that our first course should be to engage in a most intimate and careful discussion with Erhard himself. When he chooses to be, both his popularity and his position make him the undisputed political leader of Germany. I myself believe that he would be glad to join with the President of the United States in a radical defusing of the MLF and a proposal for a completely fresh look at the nuclear defenses of the Alliance, with an ostentatious inclusion of France in this process of discussion.
As long as the German Chancellor is treated with care and dignity by the American President, I believe we can meet the main purposes of the MLF, at least in the short run, without paying its heavy costs.
And even if a fresh look should lead nowhere over the next year or two we would still be free to take new steps with the Germans if the situation then demands it. I do not believe that any such steps need be worse than the MLF is today.
Since this question is fundamental to the Johnson/Wilson talks, and since the President counts very heavily upon the advice of the four of us, I hope very much that we may be able to talk this matter out among ourselves over the weekend. I am calling Dean Rusk separately to ask if he will propose times at his convenience for a meeting under his chairmanship.
- Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272. Top Secret; Sensitive; Personal; Literally Eyes Only. Also addressed to Rusk and McNamara.↩