51. Editorial Note
At the end of November 1964, Richard E. Neustadt visited London at the request of the White House. In a meeting with Prime Minister Wilson on November 25, he stated that he had to come to avoid misunderstandings in light of the 1962 Skybolt experience and stressed that his visit did not represent a change in U.S. policy toward the MLF. He added that discussions the previous day at the Defense and Foreign Ministries on the subjects of mixed manning, Polaris submarines, and surface forces indicated that the United States and the United Kingdom were on a collision course, because the British seemed unable to appreciate the political value of the MLF surface fleet to the other NATO governments involved in the Paris discussions. He concluded by noting that the Prime Minister could not expect the United States to throw away 2 years’ work. The Prime Minister replied that for the United Kingdom there were two questions: 1)whether there should be a surface fleet at all, and 2) whether the British should be in it, if there were one. The United Kingdom believed the answer to the first was no and hoped to present better alternatives. (Telegram 2565 from London, November 25; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO)
On November 26, Neustadt continued the discussion with Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker. Both men agreed that one critical aspect of the problem was German involvement and the avoidance of any appearance that the United States and the United Kingdom were ganging up on Germany. Neustadt concluded that the discussion between the United States and the new Labour government must begin from the question: “What is the U.S. position on the surface fleet?” And in the coming weeks, when Ball again visited Europe and Wilson went to Washington, the United States must make clear that the principle of a surface-ship component in any MLF or ANF was a sine qua non. (Telegram 2582 from London, November 28; ibid.)