Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

337. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State¹

Brussels, November 16, 1968, 1243Z.

5845. Secto 43. Subject: Wrap-up of NATO Ministerial Meeting, November 14–16.

1. Against the background of continuing Allied concern following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the NATO partners met in Brussels a month early this year to underscore by word and deed their reaction to the Soviet aggression. Their response has been positive and constructive. The Allies have formally recognized the changed security situation in Europe and most key members of the Alliance have pledged their determination to spend more money to improve their military forces. It is politically significant that the constant trend toward reduction of military expenditures by the European allies has been certainly stemmed and hopefully reversed. The military side of the Alliance was given needed attention.

2. All Fifteen Allies—including France—showed unexpected cohesion on the key political issues. The Ministers approved a clear but non-provocative signal to the Soviets that any further adventures in intervention would “create an international crisis with grave consequences”. While agreeing that detente remains a long-term goal of NATO policy, the NAC indicated sober realization that today’s accent is on military preparedness.

3. The French have been reasonably constructive throughout in contrast to the Canadians. The Berlin and Germany section of the communique² prepared by the Bonn group was approved swiftly at the quadripartite dinner. The major issue of stating the determination of the members to continue the Alliance was dealt with responsibly by the French who added a concurring opinion to the otherwise agreed formula. The French exhibited a clear appreciation of the significance of Soviet actions as they affect the security situation in Europe. Beyond the specific French action the manner in which Debre handled himself impressed many delegations. There was a marked change in the manner of French performance, which seemed to us more than merely a difference in personality between Debre and Couve.

4. The meeting provided opportunity for the Secretary to have bilateral meetings with such key figures as Brandt, Debre, Stewart, Caglayangil and Brosio. In addition to the specifics facing the Ministers, the Secretary was able to discuss in some depth the prospects for Europe in the post-Czechoslovakia period and how the Alliance should face the future. As usual Berlin and Germany received close and sympathetic attention, the Secretary stressing the importance of maintaining the viability of Berlin.

5. The session was opened by an NDAC meeting which went well. Secretary Clifford picked up where he left off at the Bonn NPG meeting in bringing his fellow Ministers along toward greater understanding of the nuclear problem in the defense of Europe. The serious and sober consideration of this subject revealed that Ministers have acquired a better appreciation of the terribly difficult decisions involved in this whole area, a point the Secretary of State noted in his NAC presentation. Several Ministers emphasized the value they attached to this activity.

6. The balance of payments problem received more high level attention than at other Ministerial meetings. Secretary Fowler personally intervened, an historic first for a NATO Finance Minister in the DPC discussion with a forthright explanation of the complicated and critical nature of the Alliance’s financial problem: Ministers showed understanding but were reluctant to make specific commitments. The general reaction, however, was such that we now have a basis for seeking more serious consideration of this subject in capitals than has been the case previously. The communique paragraph dealing with this matter has proved to be one of the more difficult to draft in acceptable language.

7. Public reaction to the Ministerial Meeting has been, on the whole, positive. Coincidental public meeting of North Atlantic Assembly had effect of bringing prominently to attention of press much of subject matter and considerations which also before Ministerial Meeting. Allowing for fact that Parliamentarians present are generally Alliance supporters, the recommendations they generated provided helpful backdrop of Parliamentary expressions. Assembly recommendations recognizing need for overcoming military deficiencies, resolving military balance of payments and signaling NATO concern to Soviets were especially helpful in this regard. Recommendations represented undertaking by those Parliamentarians, moreover, to help translate Assembly’s sentiments into national actions.

8. The specific contributions from members (reported separately) revealed growing awareness by European leaders that they must expand their contributions in sharing burden of collective defense. The unique November Ministerial Meeting has capped our efforts to carry out the scenario developed in response to the President’s directive last September.³ The spade work done by Ambassadors in the various capitals, by USNATO and the informal October 7 meeting of Foreign Ministers⁴ in New York has paid off. While this Ministerial Meeting has not yet by any means solved NATO’s problems, we can take encouragement from the fact that the European allies have indicated by their actions that they recognize what must be done and more importantly, they seem willing to make the sacrifices necessary to preserve the common security. As a result of this meeting we have a base from which to move forward towards greater European efforts in their own defense.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Secret; Immediate. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, Madrid, Moscow, and four European military commands.
2. For text of the final communique, see Department of State Bulletin, December 9, 1968, pp. 595–597.
3. See Document 324.
4. See Document 332.