Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

332. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, October 7, 1968, 8:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Dinner for NATO Foreign Ministers

PARTICIPANTS

• See attached list²

(The following record of the discussion at the Secretary’s dinner was prepared by Mr. Alec Toumayan and Mr. Peter Sebastian who served as interpreters during the dinner.)

The Secretary first suggested that a date for the November Ministerial Meeting be set informally and after some discussion it was determined that the 14th, 15th and 16th of November were the most convenient dates. The meeting of the NATO Parliamentarians in Brussels that week was not considered to be an obstacle. There was a brief discussion about the nature and length of the November meeting and the Secretary said that the November meeting was a substitute for the December meeting. Mr. Brosio agreed that the November meeting was a regular meeting. He noted that Defense Ministers might have to meet again in December to approve the necessary force planning steps.

The Secretary asked Mr. Brosio to explain what the Council had done with respect to Czechoslovakia. Mr. Brosio explained that he could not add much to what the Ministers already knew. He wanted to draw attention to certain aspects of the military and political reports³ that had been prepared and of their conclusions: some practical measures had been taken in the area of crisis management. He noted that some delays had been encountered in collection and dissemination of information. A promising development was the fact that we now had a Situation Center; we did not have it in Paris and had taken advantage of our move to Brussels to establish it. It was now a new part of the organization which was working well and was useful.

There were three reports—military, political and procedural. Mr. Brosio would now sum up the summary. The political report contained an evaluation, a prudent one, which was a compromise of all opinions expressed. It was not daring. Its value was that it was a unanimous report by the fifteen. It considered that the action of the Soviet Union against Czechoslovakia was essentially a defensive action caused by Soviet concern over the erosion of the communist empire and by their desire to maintain their control over the communist countries. The conclusion of the report agreed that there were dangerous implications in the intervention because of the high degree of uncertainty that now existed in Eastern and Western Europe. The report reflected the impact on Yugoslavia and Romania, and concern over the presence of communist troops near the German border. There was uncertainty in Europe about the further readiness of the Russians to use force. The impact of the situation went beyond central Europe and was felt in all Europe and in the Mediterranean.

The policies suggested were cautious and prudent. We should affirm our intention to improve and extend East-West relations, not losing sight of a possible European Security Pact. The need for solidarity within the Alliance was stressed, as was the fact that the pursuit of a detente should not weaken or split the Alliance.

The actions recommended contained no bold formulations. Some points were raised: 1) The need to make plans and to make very clear the consequences of any aggression against NATO countries. 2) It was agreed to continue to develop relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union but with discretion and moderation so as not to appear in any way to condone Soviet aggression. 3) Continued military efforts were called for to strengthen Western security, noting that this is a long-term objective.

Mr. Brosio wished to make two additional points: the need to make a statement on solidarity with Germany and to study what the attitude of the Alliance would be if Romania, Yugoslavia or another country became involved in a crisis.

The military report had been approved by the 14 members of the DPC. It aimed especially at remedying current shortcomings. All agreed on the need to carry on the effort to bring manning levels and training up to standards; to improve and correct force levels and the equipment of reserve units; to increase the frequency of exercises; to improve the conventional role of the air force as distinct from its nuclear role; and to make general recommendations to the countries to dedicate sufficient resources to fulfill the goals and bring up the forces to the 1969 levels. The report also recommended a series of studies.

This completed the summary of the two reports which reached the conclusion that a firm response of the Alliance was needed. What was contained in the reports was in effect a minimum consensus. Two additional points deserved to be stressed: one was contained in the report and the other was implied in it. The report made a distinction between the short term and long term effect of the Czechoslovakian crisis on detente. The suppression of liberalization forces would make detente more difficult in the short term, but the long term effect might well be that these forces could not be repressed. The second point was that we must reach a determination in our mind as to whether the Soviet Union’s policy was, on balance, defensive or offensive.

Minister Luns stated that with the Czechoslovakian intervention the Soviets had embarked on a new policy, in which military and political considerations took precedence over ideological considerations. There should not be a complete lack of response on the part of NATO. We should not limit ourselves to expressing our disgust and our worry. Minister Luns continued that he and his government had been struck by the attacks directed against Germany. There was a clear difference between a state of peace and a state of war, but we now live in a twilight zone in which the Russians may be tempted to move further. Mr. Luns stressed that his country would do its share in increasing the defense capability of NATO. He was not in a position to make a pledge but he could state that the Netherlands would follow the recommendations of the Council. He drew attention to the fact that the Netherlands defense budget had already been substantially increased and that the figures now being made public had been set before the Czechoslovakian crisis. The sums budgeted for defense would be raised further. He hoped that all NATO countries, and in particular the most powerful member of the Alliance, would draw the necessary conclusions from the willingness of the European countries to do more.

Minister Debre considered that the documents would be studied further in November. He stressed that his government viewed the reports as working documents only. Mr. Brosio drew his attention to the differences between the military and the political reports. The military report had not been approved by the French government which had not participated in its preparation. The political report had been approved, and its summary conclusions had also been approved with one exception only by the French delegation. The document therefore remains before the Council. It is not a document of the Council.

Minister Brandt stated that his government welcomes the study of the political and military aspects and views these reports as a good basis for the November meetings. The German government would, he felt sure, implement its recommendations. But even before the November meeting, he would welcome a statement, a joint statement if possible, on the Alliance so that there can be no misjudgment on the part of the Russians. He would be happy if we could all agree that we intend the Alliance to continue. There are measures that need to be taken with respect to what had happened and with respect to the Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia. Even before the November meeting we should stress that NATO viewed a move against Yugoslavia as a very serious development for Europe and the world. We sometimes hear the excuse that the Soviets act to maintain the integrity of the Warsaw Pact. His view was that they act to preserve their supremacy over their pact. It should be clearly underlined that solidarity is indivisible and he agreed with Mr. Luns that we cannot exclude the possibility of new dangers. The FRG was willing to participate in serious discussions on these questions.

Regarding defense, Brandt pointed out that the FRG is close to the Czechoslovak border and has to be both watchful and careful; the FRG has to take into consideration not only the Soviet Union but the fact that some of its friends would not like to see a German contribution larger than what they feel they can accept. In conclusion the FRG would go along with the steps outlined and this would include budgetary meas-ures. He felt that we should begin to implement some of the DPC recommendations even before the Brussels meeting in improving quality even more than the force levels. His government would certainly try to raise the quality of the troops, their effectiveness and their capabilities to bring them up to the levels dictated by their equipment.

Minister Stewart stated that what the Russians are saying in effect is “if we think it necessary in the interest of our alliance, we will invade one of our allies”. This is the situation we are faced with. It is an attitude which we of course in the NATO Alliance would never hold. It makes a clear response, both military and political, imperative on the part of NATO. Consideration must also be given to other countries which are neither in NATO or the Warsaw Pact. What would be NATO’s attitude if such countries were attacked by the USSR? There was a feeling among certain Europeans that if they did more for the Alliance then the U.S. would do less. No European should even feel that this would be so.

Stewart thought that NATO governments should give thought to possible statements, joint or national, that they might make on the continuation of the Alliance. Such statements might be made in November—or prior to the November meeting. They might be definite, viz., they might state that the Alliance continued for a stated number of years. Or they might simply make it clear that the Alliance would continue well beyond 1969—the year in which members are entitled to give notice of their intention to withdraw.

The Secretary stated he wished to comment briefly on his conversation with Mr. Gromyko.⁴ The Secretary stated he was convinced we must take the new Soviet doctrine seriously. It is a doctrine which is not limited geographically. The socialist “Commonwealth” has no geographical boundaries. It is not coterminous with the Warsaw Pact. Gromyko had refused to discuss Czechoslovakia with the Secretary indicating that he could not discuss that matter with any government. The Secretary stated that Gromyko’s UNGA speech, the Pravda article to which he (Mr. Rusk) had referred in his UN remarks,⁵ and his conversation with the Soviet Foreign Minister strongly suggested that we were in the presence of a new or revived doctrine, the full effect of which we have not yet determined. The Soviets have given us strong assurances regarding Romania and Berlin (on Berlin these assurances were repeated by Gromyko last night). But they are worth what they are worth. If the Soviets are contemplating further moves, these “assurances” may have been designed to mislead us. We must be watchful. The November meeting can be important if it reflects a political solution and decisions on military measures to demonstrate that NATO intends to look to its defenses. In June we had talked about the mutual reduction of forces in Europe but we were now seeing an increase in Soviet forces in central Europe with a southward thrust into Czechoslovakia. Regarding Minister Stewart’s comments on the US attitude, if there was a feeling in the US that we were asked to do a great deal because others were doing less than their share, then of course this would place us in an impossible situation. However, the others would hear from the US by the November meeting, if not before, on what measures the US can take in the defense field. Regarding a statement on the duration of the Alliance, we have no problem with a statement of policy, but Ministers would understand that, any constitutional requirements levied upon the US, for example, anything requiring Senate action, would have to be left for the new administration.

Minister Debre remarked that since Ministers would discuss these matters at the November meeting he would be brief today. First we must know what we want and what the situation is as we see it. One speaks of the need for a response, but what is its nature? A few battalions—a little equipment—this represents no real supplementary effort and has only drawbacks.

The real question is: have we entered or are we entering into a period of preparation for conflict? If so, all we have been talking about here is insignificant. If we are entering such a period, we must have discussions with the US regarding its nuclear intentions for the defense of Europe. If, on the other hand, we think we have not entered into such a period, if we believe instead that this is the beginning of a process essentially based on a Soviet defensive reaction, the problem is not immediate, since it may be a process that will last for three, four or five years. For a number of years we have been going in a certain direction. The Soviet government has now committed an act which is morally and politically inadmissible. But should we react with token military measures thus appearing to take a position which may not be maintained, made effective, or be pertinent in the months to come? At our November meeting we must talk more and deeply about the key question of our interpretation of Soviet policies. There are two assumptions: 1) The Soviets threaten our military security: in this case, the only thing worth talking about is the nuclear support of the US. 2) The problem is essentially political. There we must study the relations between the Soviet Union and the other Eastern countries, and examine our attitude with respect to attacks on the FRG. We must take these questions up more seriously than in a short discussion. For a month and half, Mr. Debre said, he had heard statements about re-inforcing the Alliance, but all he had heard represented only drawbacks and no advantages. We all said we were shocked by the Soviet policies, but what do we do tomorrow if Yugoslavia is invaded or if there is other military action? That is a real question. The Soviet government certainly knows that European countries are prepared to defend themselves. We need more serious study of these matters. Perhaps the best service we can render the Czechoslovaks and Eastern European countries is to focus on the problems of Germany and continue to show the Soviet government that it has committed an error; that if it pulls out its troops then conversations can be resumed between the US and the Soviet Union, and other detente projects can be pursued once more. Debre felt the issues were so serious that he hesitated to speak on them now. The proposed NATO military measures he thought were self-satisfying and hence self-deluding gestures which could have no fortunate effect—only unfortunate consequences. The Secretary asked Debre if he would be prepared to have some of these questions discussed by the Permanent Representatives in the Council between now and the November meeting and Minister Debre replied “I don’t see what else they can be talking about”.

Minister Pipinellis stressed that we must pursue rearmament. Greece has neglected other items of its budget in order to be able to raise the level of its military forces. To deter aggression one must let the agressor know that if he tries to invade things will be difficult for him. This is what Tito is now doing. He has submitted a bill to his parliament providing for the creation of a national (guerilla) army to continue to fight after the regular military forces have been defeated. We must also raise the Alliance’s standard of credibility which has sunk very low in the last few months. The Russians believe there will be no reaction if they attack a country which is not in the Warsaw Pact. If there is a doubt, they will hesitate and consider more seriously. They do not want messy conflicts. They will not want to do what Hitler had done in waging a two-front war. They have China at their backs. We must take these factors into account and use them to our advantage. He agreed with Minister Steward that we must announce that we all agree to support NATO in the coming years, and that we accept the concept that strategic implications go beyond our juridical commitments. The Alliance’s legal commitments are based on the 1949 situation. The strategic situation has been transformed by the presence of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia. If Yugoslavia were occupied tomorrow, what would this do to Italy, Greece and Germany?

The Secretary commented that some of the Ministers’ colleagues were waiting in the other room and suggested that we should not try to summarize the conversation for them, but should join them there.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sebastian and Toumayan and approved by S/S on October 15. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers.
2. Not printed.
3. The texts of the “Summary Assessment of the Implications of the Czechoslovak Crisis” was transmitted in telegram 5084 from Brussels, October 4. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO) Regarding the military report, see footnote 3, Document 331.
4. A memorandum of Rusk’s conversation with Gromyko (SecDel/MC/16) at 7:30 p.m. on October 6 is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 321.
5. For text of Rusk’s address to the General Assembly on October 2, see Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1968, pp. 405–410. The article in Pravda appeared in the September 25 edition. For text of Gromyko’s address to the General Assembly on October 3, see U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1679, pp. 6–14.