209. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals1
Washington, October 5, 1966, 8:25 p.m.
60472. Tosec 77. Following based uncleared memcon,2 FYI, Noforn and subject to revision upon review. Points covered in Secretary’s post-luncheon conversation with French Foreign Minister on October 3 regarding NATO matters were as follows:
- 1.
- Secretary said he had impression French did not wish have any arrangements which would prejudge in advance position they might take in event of war and it is therefore hard to see how NAC could count on functioning effectively in Paris in wartime. He asked how French could guarantee this. Couve, in response, wondered why same question did not apply to location in some other country. Secretary replied that other members have not brought into question their readiness to take common action, and that rest of us have made arrangements on basis of contingency that we will act together. Couve said French are prepared make arrangements in event we go to war together and could not understand how this differed from previous situation.
- 2.
- Foreign Minister said he did not dispute right of NAC to move to Brussels if they wished do so. Secretary said that if in wartime NAC is cut off from communications with military commands, its position would be difficult. He said we operate on assumption Belgium and Netherlands will join together in common action in event of war. Couve said this was “psychological analysis” and if this is case then NAC should go to Brussels and France would make no objection. Secretary thought question of NAC relocation would be settled during next thirty days. Couve repeated that problem did not lie with France regarding NAC relocation.
- 3.
- Foreign Minister felt current discussions academic since there would be no war in Europe. Secretary differed in recalling that we had very close call only four years ago over Berlin crisis and wondered if four years is long enough to be sure about Soviet intentions. He said that if NATO breaks up this might stimulate USSR to draw wrong conclusions and to provoke another crisis. Couve said NATO must readjust to meet changed conditions and Secretary asked whether there have been real changes or illusions of change. Couve thought stabilizing element of nuclear standoff between US and USSR became apparent during Cuban crisis and that this is basis for equilibrium in Europe rather than existence of NATO.
- 4.
- Foreign Minister said question of arrangements to be made in event of war is in French view not urgent and does not have to be settled now. He said we can wait to see how things develop in NATO particularly from psychological standpoint. He said same would hold true concerning French military presence in Germany.
- 5.
- Secretary recalled Couve had said in Brussels that French air defense units must be withdrawn from Germany since they could lead to automatic French involvement in war. Foreign Minister had said this did not apply to ground forces and French were indifferent whether latter forces remained in Germany or returned to France. Secretary noted situation with our troops is quite different. Couve acknowledged this true but said this was statement of fact, not of legal situation.
- 6.
- On US facilities in France, Secretary said he wished make clear we never accepted April 1, 1967 date as compelling with regard to our withdrawals. While we will get out of France as soon as possible there will be some material not removed until after April 1. Couve said this has been clear all along. Secretary also said we make complete reservation regarding financial aspects of relocation in addition to those provided for in US bilateral agreements with France. Couve said he noted US position, although this position of course did not commit France.
- 7.
- Foreign Minister recalled his discussion with Bohlen3 about civilian control of US pipeline in France in peacetime and said arrangements for wartime use could only be made when time comes. Secretary said that arrangements to use facilities in France if made only when war comes would be too late, and that arrangements must be made in advance if they are to be effective. Couve reiterated unwillingness of France to make wartime arrangements in advance and said if France decides to go to war all this can be arranged. Secretary postulated that it may be easier for US forces to secure oil through neutral countries in wartime than through France. Couve doubted it would be any easier in wartime to secure oil through Sweden or Switzerland than France. Couve thought pipeline question could be left open regarding possible wartime use and only present question is therefore that of periodic US inspections of French management.
- 8.
- While peacetime use of pipeline and telecommunications would continue into wartime unless operation stopped by French, Bohlen pointed out this not case with other facilities which would have to be prepared in advance to be useful. Foreign Minister wondered how any country could agree to our use of facilities without that country having declared war. Secretary said we operate on basis of common assumption with other countries as indicated in point 1 above.
Katzenbach