Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

208. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson¹

Washington, undated.

I had a strenuous but useful meeting with the Chancellor. As you know, he has now agreed to join with you and ourselves in a tripartite review—to begin promptly—of the entire range of relevant questions: the nature of the threat; strategy, force levels and deployments; burden-sharing; and foreign exchange neutralization. I have in mind asking John McCloy to represent me in these talks. I would very much hope that you could name some public figure of comparable stature and objectivity.

In connection with the points you made to me in your note of August 29,² let me say that I can certainly understand why it may be necessary for you to announce in mid-October your determination to reduce by some 33 million pounds the foreign exchange drain associated with the BAOR. However, I am sure you will understand why I must emphasize again the importance of avoiding public commitment to troop cuts and drawdown of stocks until we have completed our tripartite talks. Otherwise, these talks will lose credibility and political usefulness in all three countries and throughout the Alliance. (None of this, of course, arises in connection with the 8 million pounds of the 33 million pounds which would not involve reductions in either troops or stocks.)

In your shoes, I would certainly not back away from the savings target. The question is only whether it would be possible for you to say that the steps by which HMG will realize these savings cannot be decided until the completion of the tripartite discussions. I myself have every intention of insisting that we complete these discussions by mid-January. This should give you time to make whatever moves will be necessary to achieve your savings target in your fiscal year beginning April 1, 1967.

You will not be surprised, incidentally, that the newspaper reports on what was agreed between myself and Erhard are, as usual, thoroughly mixed up. Specifically, we in no sense agreed, either explicitly or tacitly, to the German proposition that there would have to be some fixed upper limit to the amount to foreign exchange neutralization after June 30, 1967. Our position was—and is—that the question of future offset will have to be thrashed out thoroughly in the tripartite discussions. (Your people will of course have made available to you the communiqué.)

If we make the tripartite procedure work, it can help us hold off the pressures on each of us, including Erhard, to do things which would badly damage NATO and the Western position in Europe. Indeed, it can give us a start in reconsolidating the Alliance for the longer pull—and on a more sustainable basis—until the day when the French will be ready to rejoin the fold. And, if we fail to make it work, I am afraid we are in for serious trouble.

Thank you for your letter on Rhodesia.³ I will give you my views in detail within a few days.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. A typed note at the top of the source text reads: “Following is the text of a message from President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson sent October 1, 1966.”
2. See footnote 3, Document 198.
3. Copies of this September 28 note and Johnson’s October 18 reply are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272.
4. Printed from an unsigned copy. In his October 7 reply, Wilson thanked the President for his report, but stated that a delay until January 1967 offered no prospect of achieving the full measure of the British savings. The Prime Minister proposed to accelerate the schedule, having the talks completed in time for the December NATO Ministerial Meeting. (Ibid.)