133. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson1
As you leave for Moscow, I want to share my thoughts with you on one further problem that you have occasion to discuss with the Russians. This is the problem of relations between the negotiations on non-proliferation and our efforts to get an agreed Atlantic nuclear policy. I think we have to walk a careful line between contending groups which would give one or the other of these related problems an overriding priority.
The Soviet Government continues to assert that any form of cooperation with Bonn in the nuclear field is dangerous. While this position [Page 317] may in part reflect a genuine concern about the Germans getting control over nuclear weapons, it is also plain that the Soviets are seeking to use the issue as a means of causing trouble in the NATO Alliance.
The main point of Soviet tactical pressure in the coming weeks is likely to be the language of the non-proliferation treaty. They will be pressing for language which would bar what they call “access” to nuclear weapons by non-nuclear powers. Their evident purpose is to foreclose the possibility of nuclear arrangements in NATO which would involve the Germans more intimately in the business of nuclear defense.
We are inclined to think that the best way to counter the Soviets on this—and to get on with a constructive treaty—is to focus discussion on the true meaning of proliferation, and, at the same time, to convince Moscow that we will not sign a treaty which would rule out NATO nuclear arrangements which would not, in fact, involve proliferation.
In our new draft treaty, we have suggested that proliferation results when a non-nuclear nation acquires its own national control, or the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear nation. In addition, there should be no increase in the number of states and organizations which have control of nuclear weapons. In general, the draft represents an attempt to come to grips with the real problem of proliferation without sacrificing the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear members of the Alliance.
In any case, I think it most important that we not let the Soviets maneuver us into a position which would arouse strong and honest resentment in Germany. To let them do this would be no service to the cause of non-proliferation, since it would increase the very dangers that the Soviets constantly stress.
The Soviet Government is surely not blind to one further aspect of this matter—namely, that there is on this issue, a pronounced difference of emphasis between your public opinion and ours. They are bound to see advantage in trying to exploit that difference to set us against one another. We must be careful not to fall into that trap.
My own view is that we should keep an absolutely even handed view of these twin problems. A sound non-proliferation agreement and a sound Atlantic nuclear policy are in truth mutually consistent and reinforcing. I do not accept the argument that we must finally solve the Alliance nuclear problem before there can be a treaty. But I think we should equally reject the notion that we can push aside the Alliance problem now, and go along with a treaty which would rule out, or drastically narrow, possibilities for a NATO nuclear arrangement which would not result in proliferation.
On non-proliferation, we can meet the legitimate interests of the Soviet Government because they are the same as our own. But we must not let the Soviet use this most important issue to undermine German [Page 318] confidence in our willingness to treat their nuclear problem seriously and constructively. This course naturally tempts some in Moscow, but it is no more in the Soviet interest than in ours.
I thought it would be useful for me to give you this indication of my own thinking, because of the great advantage which comes to us both when we stand together.
I hope you will have a good trip and I send you once again my best wishes for success in your effort to get Soviet help in reconvening a Geneva Conference.2 I am doing what I can to keep the public discussion here from complicating your task, but it is an understatement to say that I do not control it completely.3
- Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. A typed note at the top of the source text reads: “The following message was transmitted directly to Prime Minister Wilson from President Johnson on February 20, 1966.” A copy of the message was transmitted to London in telegram 4853, February 20, for Bruce’s information. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 262)↩
- On February 26, following his return from Moscow, Prime Minister Wilson reported that the 3-day visit was “hard pounding.” He noted the Soviet obsession with the prospect of Germany obtaining access to nuclear weapons. In this regard, Wilson told the President that he had assured Moscow of his and U.S. opposition to German or European independent nuclear deterrents and that nuclear sharing within NATO or an MLF/ANF force was the best means of meeting legitimate German demands. The Prime Minister concluded that he had probably not convinced the Soviet Union, but had given it something “to chew over.” (Ibid.)↩
- Printed from and unsigned copy.↩