Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations¹

Washington, February 18, 1966, 7:52 p.m.

4020. NATUS. For Farley from Cleveland. Meeting of Nuclear Planning Working Group went extremely well.² Ministers had done their homework, partly on the special flight together Wednesday. Discussion around table among them achieved an intimacy and a relevance quite out of the ordinary for international meetings, especially on so complex a subject.

It quickly emerged that there was a consensus on the adequacy of existing strategic nuclear forces, though perhaps there were still some questions about whether more of the total force should be in Europe (the “MRBM issue”). It was therefore decided to try to capture and record this consensus as part of the concluding action document which sets forth the Working Group’s future program of work.

As you will see from the agreed conclusions (in separate telegram),³ work program for next two months places considerable responsibility on Deputies in Paris, and implies sizeable analytical tasks both in Washington and in SHAPE. Please arrange early date for me with General Lemnitzer for discussion of where we stand on Special Committee work and discussion of how Working Group III Deputies can best work with SACEUR.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Cleveland and approved by Spiers. Passed to SACEUR.
2. The Nuclear Planning Working Group of the NATO Special Committee of Defense Ministers met in Washington February 18. For text of the press release issued at the conclusion of this first meeting, see Department of State Bulletin, March 7, 1966, p. 368.
3. Circular telegram 1573, February 18. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) The agreed conclusions accepted that the size of NATO strategic nuclear forces was adequate to deter a large-scale Soviet attack, but there appeared to be no way to prevent unacceptable damage to the West from an all-out nuclear exchange. The Defense Ministers also instructed their Deputies to prepare studies for further consideration on tactical nuclear forces and participation in nuclear planning by non-nuclear Alliance members.