Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, February 2, 1966, 7:25 p.m.

1865. Ref: Embtels 2275 and 2266.² For Ambassador from the Secretary. Obviously the United States has a fundamental interest in good relations between France and Germany. We ourselves have been drawn into two world wars that had their origins in Franco-German hostility. It would be a great thing for us to be able to say once and for all that war between France and Germany was unthinkable—after all these centuries.

That does not mean that we are interested in good Franco-German relations “at any cost.” The crisis in Europe results from French efforts to promote the supremacy of narrow French nationalism over the common interests of the others. Because the Five have recognized that the attempt by Paris to emasculate the EEC was against their own economic and political interests, they have been able to make progress in settling the Common Market crisis. If the Five continue to hold the line there is a good chance that the French will retreat further and progress toward European integration can again resume.

We have thus far scrupulously avoided taking sides in this intra-European controversy. At the same time we have continued to reaffirm our convictions that European unity and Atlantic partnership are essential to long-range stability in the West. A decent Franco-German understanding lies at the heart of European unity but centuries of experience have shown that it can be achieved only in the context of a larger European arrangement, and not through a bilateral agreement between two ancient rivals on whom history sits heavily. This is sound policy and we should continue to pursue it.

Any suggestion to the Germans that we favor concessions to French nationalist ambitions either in the European or NATO contexts would discourage a process that so far seems to be producing useful results. Certainly, we have nothing to gain and a great deal to lose by encouraging accommodation with a French policy which, if successful, would fragment Europe and divide the Atlantic world.

The present French leadership responds to firmness and exploits any whisper of weakness. Its national policies run athwart our own conceptions of how Atlantic power can be best organized and Western interests secured. We should not display any lack of confidence in our own positions or any willingness to compromise them in the interests of a transient amity between France and Germany—and this applies to nuclear and offset arrangements, as well as other elements of policy.

For all these reasons we should avoid making any suggestion to Erhard that he should try to improve his relations with President De Gaulle by concession or accommodation to French demands. Certainly there is no harm in suggesting the utility of Franco-German collaboration on such matters as the improvement of relations between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. But I have some misgivings about your talking with Erhard in terms of general and necessarily rather vague principles that could lead to inferences of ambiguity as to our own policies or intentions. It would seem better to direct such a conversation to particular questions directly affecting the relations between our two countries.³

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–GER W. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ball and approved by him for Rusk. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. Telegram 2266, February 1, suggested that the growing estrangement between France and West Germany would have serious consequences on the stability of Western Europe, but added that it was easier to define the problem than to know what the United States could do about it. McGhee concluded that it would be best “discreetly” to support Bonn, particularly in areas where no vital U.S. interests were involved. Telegram 2275, February 2, referring to telegram 2266, added that Erhard’s visit to De Gaulle February 7–8 might further the growing gap. Since he had an appointment with the Chancellor prior to the meeting, McGhee asked for authority to indicate U.S. interest in French-German relations and encourage the Chancellor to achieve a positive atmosphere during his meeting with De Gaulle. (Both ibid.) This view was supported by Bohlen on February 3. (Telegram 4578 from Paris; ibid.)
3. On February 4, Bohlen expressed his agreement with this telegram, saying that good French-German relations should not be purchased at any price, but stated that the United States should have on the record with Erhard a clear expression of where U.S. interests really lay. (Telegram 4620 from Paris; ibid.)