Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium¹

Washington, January 28, 1966, 3:51 p.m.

948. Ref: Ecbus 631.² Believe French have consistently seen interrelationship between EEC crisis and NATO. They probably calculate that resolution EEC crisis on their terms, thereby weakening German position in particular, would facilitate moves to restructure alliance system more to their liking. Therefore, they would wish to deal separately with each problem from tactical standpoint and movement on EEC crisis would have to come first. We had anticipated French actions on NATO after French elections, and formation of new government, probably in spring 1966. Earlier French reckoning may have been that EEC “crisis” could be resolved by early spring, thus opening way to moves on NATO. Firmness of Five on EEC crisis and De Gaulle’s electoral set back, however, have led to delay. French pressure now to move fast on “EEC crisis” and use of shock tactics like “calendar” at Luxembourg Jan. 18 may be based on judgment that firmness of Five can be shaken and resolution of EEC crisis be obtained on French terms by early spring, which would permit moving on NATO by late spring or early summer. Firmness of Five and concomitant drawing out of EEC crisis for several more months might deter initiation of French action on NATO (Paris 4362)³ or lead them to reassess their tactics with respect to both EEC and NATO.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by LeRoy F. Percival (EUR/RPE); cleared by McKillop, Hinton, GER, and RPM; and approved by Schaetzel. Also sent to Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Rome, Bonn, Luxembourg, and The Hague and repeated to London.
2. Ecbus 631, January 24, discussed problems and positions that would occur at the second round of the EEC meeting at Luxembourg and noted that Couve de Murville seemed to be under increased pressure from De Gaulle to get an early settlement of the crisis, albeit on French terms. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 4362 from Paris, January 26, reported that officials in France and the French press agreed that De Gaulle did not want to deal with the EEC and NATO crises at the same time, and would probably not move on the latter until the Common Market problem was solved. (Ibid.)

4. The EEC meeting at Luxembourg January 28–29 adopted a compromise resolution (the Luxembourg Compromise) which reduced the autonomy of the EEC Commission and ended the French boycott. In a circular telegram to all EEC posts on January 31, the Department of State sent the following statement as guidance to queries about the U.S. position on the resolution of the crisis:

   “American support for a united Europe working in close partnership with the United States is a well-known policy consistently followed by this Government for over fifteen years.

   “We are therefore extremely pleased that the European states concerned appear to have successfully surmounted the crisis in the Common Market and we look forward to getting on with renewed vigor with our common task of negotiating trade liberalization in the Kennedy Round.” (Circular telegram 1445; ibid.)