Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

283. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 17, 1968, 1:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Non-Proliferation Treaty (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
• Mr. William C. Foster, Director, ACDA

Ambassador Dobrynin invited me to lunch primarily to discuss the situation with reference to NPT. By the time I had arrived, he had obtained the results of the Foreign Relations Committee meeting and its favorable vote.² I gave him the details of the vote as we knew it, in which he was interested. I said this was favorable, and had been done in spite of the action of the Soviet Union in connection with Czechoslovakia. However, it had been very difficult to achieve because of the question of their intentions. I said that if there were further similar events in Romania and Yugoslavia, the NPT and other arrangements between us might just as well be forgotten. He asked why I felt there would be such other events, and I said certainly that there were rumors on a broad enough scale to raise question. He said that he had officially informed Mr. Rusk there would be no further action and he reiterated that assurance to me. It was impossible, he said, to conceive of additional action in connection with Romania and Yugoslavia where conditions were completely different. He was interested as to further appraisal of chances for floor passage of the NPT, which I said were good in my opinion, although the brief period for the remaining weeks of the session made it difficult to be sure as to the passage of any floor bills. I said we continued, however, to be hopeful now that a major hurdle had been overcome in the committee.

We then talked about other disarmament items including a possible expansion of the ENDC, which he felt was dangerous since opening the doors to include the Japanese, who were likely candidates, would mean pressure from other nations. We discussed the NNC,³ regarding which his government had the same concerns that we did, particularly as to the request for greater assurances, free gifts of nuclear equipment, fuels and know-how, and the possibility of regular continuing sessions of a fundamentally irresponsible body.

He asked as to our plans for the General Assembly on disarmament. I responded that we would, of course, be prepared to talk on the Report of the ENDC including further discussions on the NPT, the seabed, and CBW, with particular reference on this latter to a Secretary General’s study of effects. He informed me that the Soviet delegation to the UNGA would not arrive until September 30 and he was already attempting to make arrangements for the arrival of the special plane for their delegation. He didn’t know whether Mr. Gromyko would be coming or perhaps Mr. Kuznetsov, in view of his intimate knowledge of the situation in Prague.

He told me of the Soviet inscription in the General Assembly of an item of urgency to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament.

I emphasized throughout the responsibility which his government had if further advances in arms control were to take place since events such as Czechoslovakia would prevent any progress whatsoever. He again attempted to reassure me that things would be much better rather than worse.

It was clear from his conversation that he had had no advance notice of the intrusion into Czechoslovakia.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential;Exdis. Drafted by Foster on September 17 and approved in S on September 18. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.
2. On September 17 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended, by a vote of 13-3-3, that the Senate give its advice and consent to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For text of the Committee’s report, September 26, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 642-667.
3. Regarding this Conference, see footnote 3, Document 263.