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  4. Document 151

151. Memorandum of Conversation1

US/MC/11
New York, September 22, 1966, 8:15–11:30 p.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September-October 1966

SUBJECT

  • Outer Space Agreement (Part III of IV)2
[Page 366]

PARTICIPANTS

  • US
    • The Secretary
    • Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson,S/AL
    • Ambassador Foy Kohler, Amb. to Moscow
    • Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, USRep to UN
    • Ambassador William Foster,ACDA
    • Mr. William D. Krimer, OPR/LS, Interpreter
  • USSR
    • Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
    • Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko, Ambassador to UN
    • Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador to US
    • Ambassador Alexey Roschin, Ambassador to Disarmament Committee
    • Mr. Lev Mendelevitch, Deputy Delegate to UN
    • Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The Secretary expressed the hope that the negotiations concerning an agreement for peaceful exploration of outer space could soon be brought to a successful conclusion. We felt that the discussions in the UN Committee had resulted in considerable progress and that the remaining issues had really narrowed down to one or two specific points.3 He hoped that our colleagues could resume their discussions here in New York and reach agreement on these remaining points during the present UN General Assembly meeting. For our part we were prepared to undertake necessary measures for mutual use of tracking stations as far as US territory was concerned; we could not, however, force third countries to do the same, although we would be willing to do all we could to encourage all countries to take a cooperative position. The Secretary repeated his hope that our negotiators could bring the work they started in Geneva to a successful conclusion.

Mr. Gromyko agreed that the outer space negotiations had achieved positive results and that there remained only the one point the Secretary had mentioned. He expressed the view that all countries signing the proposed agreement must assume the same obligations and enjoy the same rights so that the principle of equality be preserved. If however some countries took the position that their “relatives” would be extended privileges while other countries would be denied these same privileges, the principle of equality was violated; what kind of cooperation would that represent? He was surprised that the Soviet proposal of equal rights and obligations had met such a negative response. He was sure that acceptance [Page 367] of the Soviet proposal would not affect the interests of the United States. He would, therefore, like to see a more positive attitude on the part of the US toward this principle of equality of rights and obligations. Did the Secretary see any possibility of overcoming this difficulty? If so, he thought a treaty could be signed soon. He asked the Secretary to think about this problem; the Soviet Union was not, after all, asking the impossible.

The Secretary replied that given this Soviet position we would have to face the very real possibility that the US and the USSR would be the only two countries signing the outer space agreement; other countries might not be willing to sign. Such a Soviet and American signature in itself might represent a positive step; but, as is the case in negotiating “most favored nation” treatment in trade agreements, this was really a matter for bilateral negotiations between the countries involved. The Secretary did not believe that this single issue should stand in the way of signing an outer space treaty.

Mr. Gromyko repeated that this difficulty would have to be overcome. He agreed that the representatives of the two countries should continue to exchange opinions on this matter, but would hope to see greater objectivity on the part of the United States. If all parties agreed to cooperate on an equal basis there was no problem, otherwise this represented an instance of discrimination against the Soviet Union. He realized that the United States had worked out use of tracking stations with other countries on a bilateral basis, and he did not blame the US for doing so, but this had taken place when an outer space treaty was not even being discussed. Now that such a treaty was under consideration, being a multilateral treaty, new arrangements on a multilateral basis, providing for the principle of equality, were in order.

Ambassador Goldberg commented that we ought to be able to reach agreement; in fact, we had leaned over so far backwards for the purpose of reaching agreement that certain American newspapers had referred to the outer space negotiations as a succession of American retreats. On the UN General Assembly floor we had said today that we accept the principle on a bilateral basis.4 We are willing to work out a bilateral tracking station agreement with the USSR; we are further willing to include in the preamble of the agreement a statement emphasizing the desirability of signatory countries working out practical arrangements with each other. As a practical matter this was not really a problem which easily lent itself to multilateral solution. Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Lebanon and Australia wanted to have their own say in this matter. We did not encourage any opposition on the part of any country to working out suitable [Page 368] technical arrangements with the Soviet Union and with each other; this was not only a matter of equality of rights, but also a matter of very special technical arrangements. Thus, for example, tracking facilities set up for our purposes would not be of help to the Soviet Union, since different equipment would be required. The Ambassador emphasized that this was not a matter of opposition on the part of the US, but rather a matter of other sovereign states wanting to have their own say in the matter. As a matter of fact, some of our friends had told us that the offer we made today had put them in an awkward position. We should have a treaty before either of us achieved a landing on the moon. Later such a treaty would present many more difficulties. It is for this reason that we are willing to include a statement as to the desirability of bilateral arrangements being worked out in the preamble or text of the proposed treaty.

Mr. Gromyko agreed that representatives of the two countries meet and discuss possible solutions; the points of view of both countries had been expressed clearly.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in S on September 26. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko headed their respective delegations to the opening of the 21st session of the U.N. General Assembly, September-October 1966.↩
  2. Part I dealt with a Civil Air Agreement; Part II with an Indonesian Creditors’ Moratorium. (Ibid.) Part IV is Document 152.↩
  3. The Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. General Assembly’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met in Geneva, July 12-August 4, and reached agreement on most points of the draft outer space treaty including one arms control measure, namely that “No party will orbit any nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction or station such a weapon on a celestial body.” (U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1966 (Washington, November 1967), p. 14) The Legal Subcommittee resumed negotiations in New York, September 12, but reached no further agreement before it adjourned September 16.↩
  4. See Goldberg’s statement before the U.N. General Assembly in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 962.↩