348. Editorial Note
A disagreement arose among U.S. officials over U.S. offers at Geneva on the tariff on canned hams. As of May 5, 1967, the United States had offered to cut the present duty of 4.5 percent by 50 percent, and to bind the duty at that level; that is, not to raise the duty without compensating foreign suppliers. In a May 5 memorandum to the President, Francis Bator indicated that Secretary Freeman wanted to withdraw both offers, whereas “Roth, Blumenthal, Rusk, Katzenbach, Solomon and the rest of us” believed that the United States could “afford to withdraw the offer to cut the present tariff, but we must not withdraw the offer to bind the tariff,” because an adverse reaction by the Nordic countries in support of Denmark’s interest in a lower tariff could throw agricultural tariff negotiations into disarray. Bator believed that the Vice President favored “the compromise: bind but don’t cut.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Trade Negotiations, Kennedy Round, “Potatoes” [2 of 2], Box 47)
Following a May 6 meeting with Secretary Freeman, Katzenbach, Roth, Blumenthal, Bator, and Solomon, Vice President Humphrey pointed out that the President had to decide the issue, as Freeman opposed talks on canned hams, while “all the others feel canned hams imports present no problems,” since “there is no effective lobby on this commodity such as on beef.” Humphrey suggested binding the present tariff. (Memorandum from Jim Jones to the President, May 6; ibid.) Bator, the Geneva negotiators, and the Vice President recommended that the President approve the suggested compromise. (Memorandum from Jim Jones to the President, May 8; ibid.) In telegram 190533 to Geneva, May 9, Bator reported that the “President had decided that you may maintain offer binding on canned hams, but not duty cut.” (Ibid.)